Tag Archives: continuous fraud auditing

Fraud Detection-Fraud Prevention

One of our CFE chapter members left us a contact comment asking whether concurrent fraud auditing might not be a good fraud prevention tool for use by a retailer client of hers that receives hundreds of credit card payments for services each day. The foundational concepts behind concurrent fraud auditing owe much to the idea of continuous assurance auditing (CAA) that internal auditors have applied for years; I personally applied the approach as an essential tool throughout by carrier as a chief audit executive (CAE). Basically, the heart of a system of concurrent fraud auditing (CFA) like that of CAA is the process of embedding control based software monitors in real time, automated financial or payment systems to alert reviewers of transactional anomalies in as close to their occurrence as possible. Today’s networked/cloud based processing environments have made the implementation and support of such real time review approaches operationally feasible in ways that the older, batch processing based environments couldn’t.

Our member’s client uses several on-line, cloud based services to process its customer payments; these services provide our member’s client with a large database full of payment history, tantamount to a data warehouse, all available for use on SQL server, by in-house client IT applications like Oracle and SAP. In such a data rich environment, CFE’s and other assurance professionals can readily test for the presence of transactional patterns characteristic of defined, common payment fraud scenarios such as those associated with identity theft and money laundering. The objective of the CFA program is not necessarily to recover the dollars associated with on-line frauds but to continuously (in as close to real time as possible) adjust the edits in the payment collection and processing system so that certain fraudulent transactions (those associated with known fraud scenarios) stand a greater chance of not even getting processed in the first place. Over time, the CFA process should get better and better at editing out or flagging the anomalies associated with your defined scenarios.

The central concept of any CFA system is that of an independent application monitoring for suspected fraud related activity through, for example (as with our Chapter member), periodic (or even real time) reviews of the cloud based files of an automated payment system. Depending upon the degree of criticality of the results of its observations, activity summaries of unusual items can be generated with any specified frequency and/or highlighted to an exception report folder and communicated to auditors via “red flag” e-mail notices. At the heart of the system lies a set of measurable, operational metrics or tags associated with defined fraud scenarios. The fraud prevention team would establish the metrics it wishes to monitor as well as supporting standards for those metrics. As a simple example, the U.S. has established anti-money-laundering banking rules specifying that all transactions over $10,000 must be reported to regulators. By experience, the $10,000 threshold is a fraud related metric investigators have found to be generic in the identification of many money-laundering fraud scenarios. Anti-fraud metric tags could be built into the cloud based financial system of our Chapter member’s client to monitor in real time all accounts payable and other cash transfer transactions with a rule that any over $10,000 would be flagged and reviewed by a member of the audit staff. This same process could have multiple levels of metrics and standards with exceptions fed up to a first level assurance process that could monitor the outliers and, in some instances, send back a correcting feedback transaction to the financial system itself (an adjusting or corrective edit or transaction flag). The warning notes that our e-mail systems send us that our mailboxes are full are another example of this type of real time flagging and editing.

Yet other types of discrepancies would flow up to a second level fraud monitoring or audit process. This level would produce pre-formatted reports to management or constitute emergency exception notices. Beyond just reports, this level could produce more significant anti-fraud or assurance actions like the referral of a transaction or group of transactions to an enterprise fraud management committee for consideration as documentation of the need for an actual future financial system fraud prevention edit. To continue the e-mail example, this is where the system would initiate a transaction to prevent future mailbox accesses to an offending e-mail user.

There is additionally yet a third level for our system which is to use the CFA to monitor the concurrent fraud auditing process itself. Control procedures can be built to report monitoring results to external auditors, governmental regulators, the audit committee and to corporate council as documented evidence of management’s performance of due diligence in its fight against fraud.

So I would encourage our member CFE to discuss the CFA approach with the management of her client. It isn’t the right tool for everyone since such systems can vary greatly in cost depending upon the existing processing environment and level of IT sophistication of the implementing organization. CFA’s are particularly useful for monitoring purchase and payment cycle applications with an emphasis on controls over customer and vendor related fraud. CFA is an especially useful tool for any financial application where large amounts of cash are either coming in or going out the door (think banking applications) and to control all aspects of the processing of insurance claims.

Matching SOCS

I was chatting with the soon-to-be-retired information systems director of a major Richmond insurance company several nights ago at the gym. Our friendship goes back many years to when we were both audit directors for the Virginia State Auditor of Public Accounts. My friend was commenting, among other things, on the confusing flood of regulatory changes that’s swept over his industry in recent years relating to Service Organization Controls (SOC) reports. Since SOC reports can be important tools for fraud examiners, I thought they might be an interesting topic for a post.

Briefly, SOC reports are a group of internal control assurance reports, performed by independent reviewers, of IT organizations providing a range of computer based operational services, usually to multiple client corporations. The core idea of a SOC report is to have one or a series of reviews conducted of the internal controls related to financial reporting of the service organization and to then make versions of these reports available to the independent auditors of all the service organization’s user clients; in this way the service organization doesn’t have to be separately and repeatedly audited by the auditors of each of its separate clients, thereby avoiding much duplication of effort and expense on all sides.

In 2009 the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) issued a new International Standard on Assurance Engagements: ‘ISAE 3402 Assurance Reports on Controls in a Service Organization’. The AICPA followed shortly thereafter with a revision of its own Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 70, guidance around the performance of third party service organization reports, releasing Statement on Standards for Attestation Engagement (SSAE) 16, ‘Reporting on Controls in a Service Organization’. So how does the SOC process work?

My friend’s insurance company (let’s call it Richmond Mutual) outsources (along with a number of companion companies) its claims processing functions to Fiscal Agent, Ltd. Richmond Mutual is the user organization and Fiscal Agent, Ltd is the service organization. To ensure that all the claims are processed and adequate internal controls are in place and functioning at the service organization, Richmond Mutual could appoint an independent CPA or service auditor to examine and report on the service organization’s controls. In the case of Richmond Mutual, however, the service organization itself, Fiscal Agent, Ltd, obtains the SOC report by appointing an independent service auditor to perform the audit and provide it with a SOC 1 report. A SOC 1 report provides assurance on the business processes that support internal controls over financial reporting and is, consequently, of interest to fraud examiners as, for example, an element to consider in structuring the fraud risk assessment. This report can then be shared with user organizations like Richmond Mutual and with their auditors as deemed necessary. The AICPA also provides for two other SOC reports: SOC 2 and SOC 3. The SOC 2 and SOC 3 reports are used for reporting on controls other than the internal controls over financial reporting. One of the key differences between SOC 2 and SOC 3 reports is that a SOC 3 is a general use report to be provided to anyone while SOC 2 reports are only for those users specifically specified in the report; in other words, the distribution is limited.

SOC reports are valuable to their many users for a whole host of obvious reasons but Fraud Examiners and other assurance professionals need to keep in mind some common misconceptions about them (some shared, I found, by my IT friend). SOC reports are not assurances. IASSB and AICPA guidelines specify that SOC reports are to be of limited distribution, to be used by the service organization, user organization and user auditors only and thus should never be used for any other service organization purpose; never, for example, as marketing or advertising tools to assure potential clients of service organization quality.

SOC 1 reports are used only for reporting on service organization internal controls over financial reporting; in cases where a user or a service organization wants to assess such areas as data privacy or confidentiality, they need to arrange for the performance of a SOC 2 and/or SOC 3 report.

It’s also a common mistake to assume that the SOC report is sufficient verification of internal controls and that no controls on the user organization side need to be assessed by the auditors; the guidelines are clear that while verifying controls at the service organization, controls at the user organization should also be verified. Since service the organization provides considerable information as background for the service auditor’s review, service organizations are often under the mistaken impression that the accuracy of this background information will not be evaluated by the SOC reviewer. The guidelines specify that SOC auditors should carefully verify the quality and accuracy of the information provided by the service organization under the “information provided by the service organization” section of their audit program.

In summary, the purpose of SOC 1 reports is to provide assurance on the processes that support internal controls over financial reporting. Fraud examiners and other users should take the time to understand the varied purpose(s) of the three types of SOC reports so they can use them intelligently. These reports can be extremely useful to fraud examiners assessing the fraud enterprise risk prevention programs of user organizations to understand the controls that impact financial operations and related IT controls, especially in multiple-service provider scenarios.

Talking Through the Hindrances

That control self-assessment (CSA) can be used as an effective facilitation tool to develop fraud risk assessments is, I’m sure, of no surprise to many of the readers of this blog.  But, for those of you who are not so aware … typically, a control self-assessment session to identify fraud risk is a facilitated meeting of managerial and operational staff (the business process experts) coming together to openly discuss fraud risk prevention objectives related to identified risk factors associated with one or more of a company’s business processes.

Fraud prevention objectives for the business process are identified, as well as obstacles impeding the success of those objectives.  Finally, the team suggests, for upper management consideration, ways to overcome identified obstacles and a proposed corrective action plan is prepared.  At the start of the self-assessment session, the participants adopt a Team Operating Agreement to ensure that an open and honest discussion takes place in a threat free environment.  It takes a consensus of the participants to approve the operating agreement which all the participants in the session sign; no management decisions regarding actions to be taken are made during the session.

After the Operating Team Agreement is in place, team members typically develop and approve what they perceive to be a list of fraud prevention objectives for the target business process under discussion.  Once the anti-fraud objectives are defined, the participants enter a discussion (and develop a list) of what they feel to be the existing overall fraud prevention strengths of the subject process.  Next, the team discusses and develops a list of the hindrances currently preventing the process from achieving its anti-fraud related objectives.  Finally, the team develops recommendations for overcoming the identified hindrances.  Sometimes the team ranks its fraud reduction recommendations by order of importance but this step is not critical.

A CSA for fraud prevention is akin to a risk assessment brainstorming session.  For example, the scope of such a session regarding a financial reporting related business process might be tailored to the risks of financial statement fraud and misstatement as well as to the issue of management override of controls over financial statement reporting.  The objective of the CSA is for the team to identify and discuss fraud risks, fraud scenarios and mitigating controls followed by the preparation of a set of recommendations for referral to management.

For each risk factor identified the CSA team should:

–try to identify what would cause a fraud to occur, or detail the risk factor itself;
–determine the specific fraud risk;
–determine potential fraud schemes or scenarios associated with the risk;
–identify affected financial accounts;
–identify staff positions that could potentially be involved;
–try to assess the type, likelihood, significance and inherent risk involved;
–formulate the controls that could mitigate the risk;
–classify the controls by type (i.e., preventative, detective, entity, and process level);
–identify and assess residual risk.

Certified fraud examiners (CFE’s) have an active role to play in tailoring the CSA format for use in risk identification and mitigation as well as in performing actual facilitation of the CSA sessions.   Specifically, CFE’s can help client staff develop a more detailed, in-depth understanding of complex fraud risks that management and operational staff sometimes only vaguely perceive.  Armed with the knowledge developed during the CAE session(s) and coupled with their risk assessment and group facilitation skills, CFE’s can assist management and the audit committee of the client to identify, assess, and develop final fraud risk mitigation strategies to strengthen the fraud prevention program of the organization as a whole.  Following what are sometimes multiple CAE sessions, CFE’s can assist the team in detailing the menu of anti-fraud measures developed during the individual sessions in a report to client management embodying the anti-fraud recommendations of the CAE session members to the Executive Management Team and to the audit committee for their consideration.  It’s up to top management to decide which of the CSA team’s anti-fraud recommendations to implement and which of the team’s identified risks to accept.

Just a few of the advantages of conducting fraud prevention related CAE’s for critical client business processes include:

–building fraud risk awareness among those middle level managers charged with day-to- day management of our client companies business processes;
–mapping organization wide fraud prevention efforts to specific business processes;
–establishing links between information technology (IT) systems development projects and the broader fraud prevention program;
–identifying, documenting and integrating fraud prevention skill sets across all the business processes of the organization;
–support for the construction of a strong, management supported fraud prevention program that enjoys full management and board support company wide.

Finally, consider the advantages that the self assessment process brings to the ethical dimension of the utilizing enterprise.  The values that a corporation’s managers and directors wish to instill in order to motivate the beliefs and actions of its personnel need to be conveyed to provide the required guidance.  Usually such guidance takes the form of a code of conduct that states the values selected, the principles that flow from those values, and any rules that are to be followed to ensure that the appropriate values are respected.

The code of conduct itself is a worthy subject for a series of separate control self assessment sessions composed of representative levels of company staff such as the management team, lower level management and the operating staff.  The results of these sessions can be analyzed and a final comprehensive report produced documenting the comments (and even suggested revisions) that CSA participants have made regarding the code during their respective sessions.  This exercise is, thus,  an excellent vehicle to build “ownership of the code” among the staff comprising all levels of the enterprise.

Exploiting the Dual

businessmeet1Many of today’s CFE’s hold dual certifications as CPA’s, CIA’s, CISA’s and a host of others.  This proven enhanced expertise endows the employers of fraud examiners engaged as full time corporate auditing staff with a whole host of new and exciting fraud detection and prevention capabilities.  This is especially true of corporations whose operations are daily fraud targets.  Rather than dealing with the infrequent single instance of fraud, as is most often the case in conventional CFE practice, these staff practitioners endow their employers with enhanced power in the task of devising investigative and preventative approaches to cope with random, most often automated, fraud attempts arriving on a recurring basis, twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year.

One of the most effective innovations that dually certified CFE’s can bring to bear in such dynamic fraud environments involves some version of a mixture of continuous monitoring, continuous fraud auditing and continuous assurance. As the external and internal auditing professions view the first of these general concepts, continuous monitoring constitutes a feedback mechanism, primarily used by management, to ensure that systems operate and transactions are processed as prescribed. For example, as one of hundreds of possible examples, management might mandate that its staff CFE (s) periodically monitor the key fraud prevention controls that ensure that customer orders are checked against credit limits to ensure that the controls remain in place and aren’t deactivated.

Continuous auditing for fraud has been defined as the collection of evidence concerning fraud scenarios, by one or more examiners, on systems and transactions, on a continuous basis throughout a temporal period. For example, the staff examiners could routinely extract details of any unusually large adjusting journal entry for investigation, validate the reasons for the entry, determine whether it had been approved, and document these findings. The historical case file of irregularities will be built up from this and like evidence and from its related investigation, as will the examiner’s knowledge of the landscape of on-going fraud threats confronting the business.

Continuous fraud control assurance can even provide a concurrent or on demand assurance opinion on systems or transactions. A continuous opinion could represent an examiner’s or auditor’s opinion that overall fraud prevention controls are operating satisfactorily, unless a report is given to the contrary (often referred to as an ‘evergreen’ fraud control report). On-demand assessment concerning the functioning of key anti-fraud controls can be called for at any time to provide a spot evaluation at a point that does not necessarily coincide with a fiscal year or month-end. For example, a potential investor or lender might want to know the state of a company’s fraud prevention controls on the day that he/she makes a final investing or lending decision. Although these types of control assessments are still relatively rare, it’s possible that, given the pervasiveness of fraud in some heavily automated financial industries, the demand for this type of assessment may accelerate in the future.

Each of these three elements are built upon (and depend on) the one that precedes it. A continuous process of fraud assessment needs continuous monitoring systems to be in place to be effective. These monitoring systems provide the evidence to be collected and assessed upon which to build management assurance.

One of the biggest benefits of a program of continuous fraud control assessment is the beneficial effect it can have on an employing organization’s overall fraud control program. It’s obvious that, with continuous assessment, any key fraud control failures are detected and fixed as soon as they occur, bringing the effectiveness of the failed controls again more closely into conjunction with management’s expectations.  An additional plus for the continuous fraud control evaluation approach is that it provides early warning of problems; employing management can be apprised of a control failure as soon as it happens, providing maximum rectification time. Early warning reduces rectification downtime for the control. The objective is for the external auditors, when they later perform their checks, to find that the control weakness identified by the staff fraud examiner is now corrected and the corrected control operative as of the sign-off date, thus avoiding audit points.  One more advantage conferred by the presence of a dually certified fraud examiner on the audit staff is that many of the controls critical to the anti-fraud program can be fully automated under the CFE’s supervision and thus lend themselves to a continuous review approach. This proactive ‘no surprises’ approach to fraud control should be attractive to all organizations considering employing those holding the CFE certification as either staff auditors or security professionals.

What does it take for management to get this fraud prevention approach off the ground?  First, hire more dually certified CFE’s.  Next, automation is key to the program’s success, especially emphasizing data mining and analytics. Technology that can speed up communication is also needed, because there is no value in identifying an issue quickly if it is not communicated equally quickly to those who need to know about it. Continuous auditing for fraud includes continuous monitoring and reporting by exception on problems that arise. Therefore, the control environment of the employing organization must be at least good enough to ensure that the number of exceptions detected is not initially overwhelming. If anti-fraud controls are at a semi-mature level of effectiveness, however, there is really no reason why, with effort, a continuous assurance approach can’t work.

In setting up continuous audit tests, CFE’s must understand what can go wrong and know what they are looking for, in advance; this is a point where dual certification as an experience CPA or CIA is a plus in guiding the testing process and for creating the business rules for detecting exceptions and understanding them. This latter point is no trivial matter since something that could seem an exception under one set of circumstances, can be perfectly normal under a different set and trained financial assurance professionals know the difference.

Creatively employing their dually certified CFEs in an enhanced fraud detection and prevention effort based on the continuous audit approach confers several benefits to any management while enhancing the fraud prevention program:

–Creation of a database of the most frequently occurring fraud scenarios coupled with the most effective audit approaches to investigate and resolve them;

–Development of tailored data analytics and investigative tools for common fraud scenarios; auditors can get the fraud related data they need when they want them;

— Faster and more thorough fraud examinations and greater depth of audit for the same cost;

— Investigation and resolution of fraud related issues as they occur is a proven proactive approach demonstrating an enhanced level of management due diligence;

— The entire audit staff can have more alternatives in the way they perform fraud related work, including reliance on preventive controls like front end systems edits which prevent fraud be screening out transactions likely to contain fraud on the system’s front end.

–Because fraud related auditing is more effective it becomes more visible for those being audited both within and without the enterprise. Senior management has first-hand knowledge that auditors are ‘on the case’ even if they do not see them every day of the week. This visibility can also act as an additional deterrent to frauds, both internal and external.

That Break’s For You


vacation“We are again honored to have a seventh guest post from our friend and Richmond Chapter 2015 Vice-President, Rumbi Bwerinofa, CPA/CFF. Rumbi is a Director of the Queens/Brooklyn Chapter of the New York State Society of CPAs and a member of the NYSSCPA Litigation Services Committee. She is the editor of TheFStudent.com, where she discusses financial forensic issues.” – Charles Lawver-2015 RVACFES Chapter President…”

I live in New York City, the city that, in its own mind at least, never sleeps. Those of us who live here wear that like a badge of pride.  Rest? Only when we’re dead! If you ride the subway, death apparently includes the daily rush-hour commute. Here, we’re a city of zombies who have even figured out to sleep, standing up, crammed like sardines into whatever tin box is taking us to work. Out bosses love our never rest attitude. What could be better than workers who express shame when requesting time off? Who wouldn’t like an office full of people competing to see who can pull the longest hours?

Well, it turns out that, perhaps, a worker who never leaves his or her desk may not be such a good thing for company health, when it comes to fraud prevention and detection. That person who’s so diligent that, not only does she never need help, but she’s even willing to take on additional tasks like, say, picking up and distributing the mail or making bank deposits, may be taking on all these extra tasks for a reason, say to make sure that no one discovers she’s actively stealing from the company. That why it’s important for forensic accountants and fraud examiners to help our clients understand the criticality of enforced staff vacations for the overall integrity of their fraud prevention programs.

It’s so important to stress to the employer that, when employees do take vacations, desks mustn’t be allowed to sit idle, with work and mail just piling up, untouched for two or three weeks.  Vacation times represent the perfect point to perform targeted, concurrent fraud prevention and detection related tests. One, or more, of the vacationing employee’s cross-trained peers should take over the daily, detailed tasks of the employee. Such tests are especially important if the employee has access to assets or cash, but it’s a good prevention practice for every employee’s desk. Mail should be opened, bank statements reconciled and checks to vendors written. In this way, fraud and error stand a good chance of being caught.  Just knowing that this type of testing is mandatory during enforced annual vacations is a potent fraud deterrent in itself.

Too often fraud is caught by accident, when one employee happens to be out of the office and a question needs to be answered. Someone will dig into that employee’s work and stumbles onto something amiss. Rita Crundwell  stole almost $54 million from the city of Dixon during the nearly three decades she was that city’s comptroller. Her crime was discovered while she was out of her office, on vacation, and the acting comptroller, asked for bank statements, found a statement for an account that was not recorded in the ledger. The account held millions, had an official-sounding name wasn’t identified in any city record. Had, someone else in the city’s finance department routinely performed banking and mail duties while Crundwell was out of the office (of even at random times when she wasn’t), this embezzlement may have been caught years earlier.  Prior to the fraud’s discovery, no manager in authority seemed to see a conflict of duties issue with Crundwell, the comptroller, picking up all the city’s mail. While she was on vacation, she would have a relative or city employee pick up the mail, separate out hers’, and distribute the rest. Yes, a relative, not even a city employee, picked up and distributed the city’s mail!  Had Crundwell known that her work would be independently randomly checked and reviewed on a regular basis, she may have decided that stealing from the city was just too risky and have never perpetrated her crime.

The FDIC and SEC recommend mandatory vacations of two consecutive weeks for traders and others in the financial industry. This guarantees there’s adequate time for the employer to have another staff member perform the work of the vacationing employee and check for fraud and error. Any business would benefit from adding this process to their control systems.

An earlier post on The Inner Auditor discussed the risks and control weaknesses associated with only one person in a business holding the bulk of the information about how things work. Should that person take an extended vacation, retire or quit, the company could very well come to a confused standstill because no one else knows how to perform certain processes or where certain information is kept. A benefit of and enforced mandatory vacation and random testing policy is that other staff members will be forced to learn, through cross-training,  what their colleagues do and know; knowledge about the functioning of every desk will be shared among various employees.

Employers should be thoroughly briefed on benefits for fighting fraud, reducing error and sharing knowledge that a well-planned and executed vacation and concurrent testing policy can bring to the fraud prevention effort. They may or may not worry too much about how tired their workers are, but I’m pretty sure that they care a lot about keeping their assets safe.

Continuous Auditing versus Continuous Monitoring in Fraud Prevention Programs

wreath-4The efficacy of modern fraud prevention programs has been vastly improved by advances in data mining, analytics and the near ubiquitous cloud based storage and availability of client transactional data; the advances, however, have been accompanied by some confusion on the part of fraud prevention professionals in the incorporation of  these new tools into an effective, risk based, prevention program.  Three common sources of confusion usually arise during the implementation process of analytically supported fraud prevention schemes; first, is the confusion  between the continuous monitoring of transactions (made possible by data mining and analytics coupled with enterprise risk management approaches for the identification of high risk business processes) and continuous auditing for fraud.  Second is the need to understand the role of the continuous auditing for fraud in high risk business processes as a meta control (i.e., as a control of controls) and third is the concern of separation of duties (i.e., who will do what when actual instances of suspected fraud are identified by the process).

The continuous, analytically based,  monitoring of high risk business processes found to be especially vulnerable to pre-identified,  attempted fraud scenarios is a dynamic process (i.e., the fraud examiner/auditor can turn analytical procedures on and off by re-configuring tests based on what fraud scenarios and levels of accompanying risk s/he feels  are presently most active as threats.  By continuously monitoring particular, configurable high risk items, continuous testing for the presence of likely fraud scenarios constitutes a wholly new control level, acting as a meta control.  For example, a bank’s analytically based loan transaction system can issue an alarm regarding the presence of a suspected component of a fraud scenario and issue an alarm, under pre-specified  circumstances, to the bank manager’s supervisor as loans to a given customer exceed pre-authorized levels.  This fraud prevention program measure thus increases the number of configurable controls (e.g., choosing to issue an alarm and when) by going past simple continuous monitoring all way to the level of continuous auditing/testing and subsequent management alert.

Implementing this type of approach to fraud prevention generally means taking the following general types of steps:

—identifying the client’s high risk business processes for scenario testing.  The choice of high risk business processes should be integrated into the annual fraud prevention plan and the enterprise risk management (ERM) annual review.  This exercise should be integrated with other compliance plans (for example, with the internal audit annual plan, if there is one).

—identify rules that will guide the analytically based fraud scenario testing activity; these rules need to be programmed, repeated frequently and reconfigured when needed.  As an example, a financial institution might have defined a critical component of a given fraud scenario;  in response the bank monitors all checking accounts nightly by extracting files that meet the criteria of having a debt balance that is 20 percent larger than the loan threshold for a certain type of customer.

—determine the frequency of testing for the critical fraud scenarios and related business processes; this is important because the chosen frequency of testing has to depend on the natural rhythm of the subject business process including the timing of computer and business activities and the availability to the client of fraud examiners and auditors with experience of the underlying fraud scenario.

—cost benefit analysis needs to be performed; only the most high risk business processes vulnerable to a given frequently occurring  fraud scenario should be continuously tested; once the threat is determined to have subsided (perhaps by the application or tightening of  prevention controls) shut the continuous testing down as no longer cost effective.

—mechanisms must be in place to communicate positive testing results to business owners and the communication must be independent, objective and consistent; all the parties who will address elements of the suspected fraud and whose role requires taking some pre-defined action under the identified fraud scenario must be informed.

The evolution of fraud prevention programs to incorporate analytically based fraud evaluation and examination testing on a continuous and near continuous basis  is a giant step for the fraud examination and auditing professions. This evolution will take time, substantial attention from senior management and additional costs and resources as continuous fraud auditing activities are implemented and extended; these efforts will have a lasting effect on the future of both professions.