Category Archives: Concealing Assets

Working Toward Non-Prosecution

A recent major article in the financial trade press alluded to the importance of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a piece of US government regulation of which it behooves all fraud examiners to be aware. The reference got me to thinking about the confusion that still persists regarding certain provisions of the Act among corporate players as reported in the article in question following several high profile prosecutions. Enacted to great fanfare in 1977, the purpose of the FCPA was to prevent the bribery by the agents of US corporations of foreign government officials when those agents were negotiating overseas contracts. The FCPA imposes heavy fines and penalties for both organizations and individuals. The two major provisions address: 1) bribery violations and 2) improper corporate books and records as well as maintenance of inadequate internal controls. Methods of enforcement and interpretation of the law in the US have continued to evolve to the present day.

From the first, the FCPA spawned questions of definition and interpretation for those trying to comply, i.e., who is a “foreign official?” What is the difference between a “facilitation” payment and a bribe? Who is considered a third party? How does the government define “adequate” internal controls to detect and deter bribery and corruption?

The United Kingdom enacted its UK Bribery Act in July 2010 which really represented the first real attempt at an anti-bribery law to address some of these issues. The UK Bribery Act introduced the concept of “adequate procedures”, that if followed could allow affirmative defense for an organization under investigation for bribery. The UK Bribery Act recommended several internal controls for combating bribery and offered the incentive of a more favorable result for those who could document compliance. Among the controls:

• Establish anti-bribery procedures;
• A top corporate level commitment to prevent bribery;
• Periodic and documented risk assessments;
• Proportionate due diligence;
• Communication of bribery prevention policies and procedures to all involved parties to corporate transactions;
• Monitoring of anti-bribery procedures.

The concept of an affirmative defense for adequate procedures creates quite a contrast to the US FCPA which only offers affirmative defense for payments of bona fide expenses or small gifts within the legal limits of the foreign countries involved. The UK Bribery Act simply equates all facilitation and influence payments to bribery, thus eliminating much confusion. Finally, the UK Bribery Act dealt with the problem of defining a foreign official by making it illegal to bribe anyone regardless of government affiliation. Several countries such as Russia, Canada and Brazil have enacted or updated their anti-bribery regulations to parallel the guidelines presented in the UK Bribery Act. The key to the effectiveness remains enforcement.

Then, in 2010, the US Department of Justice and the Securities Exchange Commission released a guide book introducing several hallmarks of an effective FCPA compliance program. The publication of the guidebook is a development which, according to the article I was reading, many auditors and CFE’s remain unaware, even today. The Resource Guide provides our client companies with the tools to demonstrate a proactive approach to the deterrence of bribery and corruption. Companies found out of compliance may receive some consideration during the fines and penalty stage of their cases.

The guidebook recommends that companies doing business overseas:
• Establish a code of conduct that specifically addresses the risk of bribery and corruption;
• Set the tone by designating a Chief Compliance Officer to oversee all anti-bribery and anti-corruption activities;
• Train all employees to be thoroughly prepared to address bribery and corruption risk and document that the training took place;
• Perform fraud risk assessments of potential bribery and corruption pitfalls by country and industry;
• Review the anti-corruption program annually to assess the effectiveness of policies, procedures and controls;
• Perform audits (routine and surprise) and monitor foreign business operations to assure strict compliance with the published code of conduct;
• Ensure proper legal contractual terms exist within agreements with third parties that address compliance with anti-bribery and corruption laws and regulations;
• Investigate and respond promptly and appropriately to all allegations of bribery and corruption;
• Take proper disciplinary action for violations of anti-bribery and corruption laws and regulations;
• Perform adequate due diligence that addresses the risk of bribery and corruption performed by third parties prior to entering into any business relationship.

Fraud examiners should make their clients aware that a company which can provide evidence of compliance with these recommendations is afforded many advantages if they’re ever charged with a violation of the Act. Among them is a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA). Under a Deferred Prosecution Agreement the Department of Justice files a court document charging the organization while simultaneously requesting that prosecution be deferred in order to allow the company to demonstrate good conduct going forward. The DPA is an agreement by the organization to: cooperate with the government, accept the factual findings of the investigation, and admit culpability if so warranted. Additionally, companies may be directed to participate in compliance and remediation efforts, e.g., a court-appointed monitor. If the company completes the term of the DPA the DOJ will dismiss the charges without imposing fines and penalties!

The DOJ and the company may alternatively even enter into a Non-Prosecution Agreement. Under such an agreement the DOJ retains the right to file charges against the organization at a later time should the organization fail to comply. The NPA is not filed with the courts but is maintained by both the DOJ and the company and posted on the DOJ website. Similar to the DPA, the organization agrees to monetary penalties, ongoing cooperation, admission to relevant facts, as well as compliance and remediation of policies, procedures and controls. If the company complies with the agreement, the DOJ will, again, drop all charges.

The good news is that, since publication of the guidebook, corporate compliance programs have continued to mature, and are now generally accepted as just another cost of conducting business in a global marketplace. The US government is continuing to clarify expectations with regard to corporate responsibility at home and abroad, and working with international partners and their compliance programs.

Increased cooperation between the public and private sectors to address these issues will assist in leveling the playing field in the global marketplace. Non-government and civil society organizations, i.e. World Bank and Transparency International, are playing a key role in this effort. These organizations set standards, apply pressure on foreign governments to enact stricter anti-bribery and corruption laws, and enforce those laws. Coordination and cooperation among government, business and civil entities, reduce the incidences of bribery and corruption and increase opportunities for companies to compete fairly and ethically in the global marketplace. Hence, every fraud examiner and assurance professional should strongly support these efforts while strongly encouraging our clients to become familiar with and comply with the provisions of the recently updated 2010 guidebook.

Reaching Behind the Curtain

Not too long ago a close friend of one of our Chapter members paid a substantial sum of money to a relative, the owner of a closely held corporation, in exchange for a piece of the relative’s real estate to which, it turns out,  the relative/owner did not have clear title.  The relative apparently used a substantial portion of the funds to immediately clear debts of his corporation of which he and his wife are the sole officers and shareholders.  He now claims that, since he used the sale proceeds for corporate purposes, the refund of the purchase price he owes our Chapter member’s friend is a debt of the corporation and not of his personally.   Our Chapter’s friend has engaged an attorney at the suggestion of our certified Chapter member.

Our legal system recognizes that corporations have a separate existence from their shareholders/owners and are treated as ‘individuals’ under the law. There are two ways for a wrong-doer to use the existence of a corporation to avoid efforts to recover a money damage judgment from him or her:

–As in this case, the scammer argues that the corporation and not the shareholder/owner committed the offense, and therefore the shareholder’s personal assets and property should not be used to satisfy any judgment for the offense.

–Argues that the wrongdoer/shareholder’s property is held in the name of the corporation, and therefore s/he has no personal assets that can be used to satisfy a judgment against him  or her.

The first reflects the classic doctrine that shareholder/owners are not liable for the debts or liabilities of the corporation. Of course, if the shareholder/owner also controls the corporation and personally acted wrongfully, s/he may still be liable for her misconduct, and the corporation may simply be jointly and severally liable together with her. Whether the wrongful conduct was that of the corporation or that of an individual shareholder usually is a question of fact to be decided by the jury.

The second reflects the corporation’s ability, as a separate legal entity, to own its own property. If the corporation owns the property, then the individual shareholder does not.  Since both pre-judgement attachment writs and writs of execution can only reach a defendant’s interest in leviable assets, a wrongdoer can appear without assets and judgment proof – and your client can be unable to satisfy a money judgment against her- if the wrongdoer/shareholder has transferred title in her personal assets to the corporation. This does not apply to a non-money judgment to recover specific money or property which can reach proceeds or property in the hands of the wrongdoer or of third persons. Of course, if the wrongdoer’s transfer of assets to the corporation was to defraud creditors, the injured party can seek to have the transfers set aside.

However, even where a corporation apparently shields the defendant or his or her property, the wrongdoer and her leviable property can still be reached if the court can be convinced to disregard the corporation or to regard it merely as her alter ego. The court may do so if it can be proved that the corporation is merely a sham whose sole purpose is to help the wrongdoer fraudulently avoid liability for her conduct. This is sometimes called piercing the corporate veil.

If the corporation is found to be the alter ego of the shareholder, then either or both of the following consequences apply, depending on the goal in piercing the corporate veil:

–The wrongdoer is no longer shielded from liability for the corporation’s misconduct because the wrongdoer and the corporation are viewed by the court as one and the same.

–Corporate property can be reached to satisfy a judgment against the wrongdoer because the property is now regarded, properly, as the wrongdoer/shareholder’s property.

One of the factors to consider in attempting to pierce the corporate veil is whether the corporation is closely held; i.e. owned or directed by one or by a small or limited number of shareholders, officers, and directors (often all the members of the same family). Obviously, the larger the number of shareholders, and the more broadly the corporation’s directing positions are distributed, the less likely it is to be a sham or alter ego for one person. However, given the lawful goals and purposes of incorporation, even a small, closely held corporation may be legitimate. Conversely, the existence of other shareholders or other directors and officers may not mean that the corporation is not a sham.

The ACFE tells us that there is no hard and fast test to determine whether a corporation is a sham. Instead, courts will look at a variety of factors to determine whether to pierce the corporate veil. These factors include:

–As in this case, does the wrongdoer exercise sole or ultimate control over the activities of the corporation?

–Does the corporation’s charter describe the approved activities of the corporation with some specificity, or is it left largely to the discretion of the wrongdoer?

–Does the corporation fail to hold director’s and shareholder’s meetings, record minutes of those meetings, and otherwise observe the formalities of corporate existence?

–Is the corporation so undercapitalized as to raise questions about its viability as a separate entity?

–Are the corporation’s finances so intertwined or identifiable with those of the wrongdoer as to raise questions about its separate existence?

–Does the corporation own property which does not seem to reasonably relate to its activities, particularly as described in its charter?

–Does the wrongdoer use the corporation’s property as if they were her own, personal assets, including but not limited to whether she uses them for purposes not within the corporation’s approved activities?

These and similar or related facts can indicate that the corporation is a sham and has no true, separate existence from the wrongdoer/shareholder. In that case, the court would be justified in ruling that the corporation should be regarded as an alter ego of the wrongdoer and that the corporation and the wrongdoer be considered as one and the same ‘person’ for purposes of determining liability or levying on assets to satisfy a money judgment.

Many thanks to our member for bringing this case to our attention!

Empty Shells

I attended an out of town presentation not too long ago on investment and tax avoidance scams targeting well-to-do retirees. An especially interesting portion of the CFE presenter’s presentation (a recent retiree himself), focused on the use of paper or shell corporations and companies as tools by the perpetrators of such schemes.

Our presenter emphasized that regulators and other law enforcement personnel attempt to identify instances of fraud against retirees and others in order to prosecute the perpetrator and return the fraudulently obtained goods to the victims. However, such frauds tend to be an under-reported crime as victims may be embarrassed that they easily fell prey to the fraudster or may remain connected to the offender because of the engendered trust cultivated. Reluctance to report the crime can stem from a belief that the fraudster will ultimately do the right thing and return any fees or funds. In order to stop such fraud, regulators and law enforcement must be able to detect and identify crime, caution potential investors, and prevent future frauds by taking appropriate legal actions against the perpetrators.

He went on to say that one of the foremost reasons for the existence of the underground economy is to escape taxation, which in some countries can be as high as 51 percent of a person’s nominal income. Swiss bankers have a saying, “There would be no tax havens without tax hells.” As the rate of taxation increases, so does the cost of honesty. The higher the tax burden, the more incentive people have to attempt evading those taxations. Because it is illegal, tax evasion always involves financial secrecy.

Every few years the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) releases its top 12 most blatant tax scams affecting American taxpayers. Over the years the Service has repeatedly warned retirees not to fall for schemes peddled by scammers for the avoidance of taxes featuring the use of dummy corporations (or shells) associated with off-shore accounts in tax havens and emphasizing that there is no secret trick that can eliminate any senior’s tax obligations. Every tax payer should be wary of anyone peddling any of these scams.

The IRS aggressively pursues taxpayers and promoters involved in promoting abusive offshore transactions to wealthy seniors. Such promoters pitch seniors in the use of methods to avoid or evade U.S. income tax by hiding income through shells with accounts in offshore banks, brokerage accounts, or through other entities. Such actively promoted scams feature the use of offshore debit cards, credit cards, wire transfers, foreign trusts, employee-leasing schemes, and private annuities or life insurance plans. The IRS has also identified the use of shells in abusive offshore schemes including those that involve use of electronic funds transfer and payment systems, offshore business merchant accounts and private banking relationships.

But, as our speaker pointed out, shell companies aren’t just for big and medium-sized tax evaders anymore. They have become the financial and deception vehicle of choice for some of the most corrupt, dangerous and ruthless individuals and entities on the planet. Arms dealers, drug cartels, corrupt politicians, scammers, terrorists and cybercriminals are just a few of the most creative and frequent users of shells.

It’s also important to emphasize that not all shell companies are used for nefarious purposes; assurance professionals and investigators need to be aware that there are legitimate uses for these entities, such as using one as a holding company or creating a shell company (in name) to preserve future business rights or opportunities. Not every shell is involved in a criminal conspiracy, so it’s important to understand why someone might use a shell for criminal purposes.

The primary purpose of the use of a shell in a fraud scheme is like that of the fraud itself: to conceal fraudulent activity. This may include the nature, origin, or destination of misappropriated funds and/or concealment of the true owners and decision-makers of a criminal act or conspiracy.

In many instances, one shell company isn’t enough; fraudsters create networks. Dozens of shells, nominee directors, addresses and fake shareholders might be required to fully conceal a scheme or criminal plot. Big-time criminal conspirators will utilize shell incorporators to do the heavy lifting and help create a corporate web of disguise that can perplex and confuse even the best of investigators.

Shells can come in all different shapes and sizes, and the jurisdiction in which they reside can help further the concealment. Some fraudsters create shell companies for single uses and then discard them. Or they may use them repeatedly and have them change hands multiple times. They also may form what our speaker dubbed shelf companies and not use them for a period of time. A shelf company has a better chance of appearing legitimate and fooling a novice investigator or basic due diligence mechanisms because it appears to have existed longer than it really has. An older shelf could have a creation date predating any specific areas of investigative concern, which would allow it to engage in business activities when it otherwise couldn’t without arousing suspicion.

Given the intent, with a small sum of money, time and patience, fraudsters can set up a very elaborate web of shell companies in little time. But establishing the company name is only the first step in creating a shell network of deception. The company needs nominee directors and shareholders, often illegitimate, to further the concealment.

Scammers use nominee directors, and in some instances, other shell companies, to disguise true owners of entities while giving the appearance of legitimacy. Some nominees simply sell their names to fraudsters who use them on company documents. Others actually provide limited services for the shell companies such as processing corporate records, signing for company documents and forwarding mail. These nominee directors are the linchpins to linking and disguising international criminal organizations and operatives. Their use is so widespread that IRS conducted searches among entities frequently disclose nominee directors crossing paths. Some are even listed as directors for the same shell entities.

So what does our speaker recommend that individual CFEs do if we think that one of our clients may be unwittingly doing business with a nefarious shell?

— A shell company can be set up practically anywhere, but successful incorporators have learned to use particular countries and regions. Advantages can include lack of government enforcement or specific laws protecting corporate secrecy. A good source of a high-risk country list is the U.S. State Department’s annual list of major money-laundering countries.
— Use SWIFT codes – a SWIFT code is a unique identifier that’s associated with particular financial and non-financial institutions around the world. If you can identify the SWIFT code for the financial entities the suspected shell is dealing with, you might consider monitoring for any funds originating from or being disbursed to these banks or check to see if any of your client’s customers/vendors have bank accounts associated with these specific institutions.
–Review all available internal data that contains contact, banking, address and ownership information, such as vendor/customer data, wire transfer data, ship to/ship from locations for sales and purchases, purchase orders and invoice support documentation.

Look for :

• Information that doesn’t make sense given the nature of the business relationship with the entity.
• Entity information mismatch: address, phone, fax, ship to, bank, cell contact, etc. in different geographic locations.
• No discernible online presence when compared to the goods/services and the amount of money changing hands.
• The entity “representative” is associated with numerous other companies.
• Payment is made to or received from an unrelated third party. Review incoming/outgoing wire transfer documents.

Our speaker summarized that involvement with shell companies and those associated with them can be very bad news for any of our client companies. Fraudsters within your client organization might make use of them as vehicles of corruption or asset diversion. External perpetrators can passively use them as money-laundering vehicles against your client organization.

All assurance professionals should attempt to stay current with the latest types of abuse associated with the shell company model, trends in international corruption, fraud and asset diversion, and money laundering. ACFE training is, as usual, an excellent resource to do this. To the extent possible, try to screen information on your client’s customers, vendors and employees on an on-going basis. Cross-reference known bad actors and shell companies in the news against the entities with which your clients are doing business. Contact authorities if you and/or your client determine that it has become the victim of a shell company related scheme.

Inventory of Fraud

One of the first frauds I worked on early in my career was a scheme by management to overstate the periodic inventory of the Prison Industries system of a state Department of Corrections.   In that case the manipulation was carried out by creating false inventory counts and altering records after the physical count.

What made this an especially interesting case of management fraud were the various reasons that the audit report subsequently revealed why accounting management had decided to overstate the inventory:

• To overstate the income of Prison Industries.
• To achieve internally projected goals.
• To increase Prison Industry’s perceived value in the eyes of  the State government administration.
• To meet Department of Corrections stiff goals for Prison Industry management.
• To hide poor operational performance.
• To enhance the perceived performance of individual members of management.
• To hide the theft of some inventory.

These reasons are in contrast to fraudster goals if a fraud scheme’s overall objective is to show reduced inventory:

• To reduce income.
• The entity has achieved its goals and wants to show reduced results for the reporting period.
• To reduce the overall value of the business or enterprise.
• A new management team is in place and wants to defer reporting additional performance to the future.

Such inventory counting related schemes are likely to occur with inventory components perceived to be less likely of being counted or in conjunction with a planned reason for the false count. The hope is that any examiner/auditor will view the false count as an error versus an intentional plan to misstate the inventory. Therefore, the examiner needs to ensure that management has no record of the test counts. Certain types of inventory counts are more susceptible to being false, such as:

• Periodic Inventory. This particular inventory is susceptible to false counting because the auditor has no inventory reports to determine what the inventory should have been prior to the count.
• Perpetual Inventory. Variances or in-transit items are often used as an explanation for any deviations.
• Multiple Inventory locations. The non-tested sites are susceptible to false counts because the auditor is not performing procedures at those locations. Management may also use other scams in conjunction with the false-count fraud schemes.

As every accounting student knows, inventory is tangible property that either (1) is held for sale in the ordinary course of business (finished goods); (2) is in the process of production for such sale (work in process); or (3) is currently consumed either directly or indirectly in the production of goods or services available for sale (raw materials). The primary basis of accounting for inventory is cost. By definition, inventory excludes long-term assets subject to depreciation accounting.

The inventory records at Prison Industries were complex. Inventory was constantly being transferred between manufacturing processes, was often dispensed in several locations across the state’s correctional system, and normally comprised a significantly large amount of items. For these reasons, as well as the variety of decisions made about direct valuations, inventory was an appealing place for management to decide to commit financial statement fraud, in this case by manipulating and altering the physical inventory count.

Inventory falsification occurred at Prison Industries when the entity showed inventory on its financial statements that both did not exist and was improperly valued;  the two methods were  used simultaneously.  Techniques used to inflate the value of inventory included the creation of false documents, such as inventory count sheets, receiving reports, and manipulation of the actual physical inventory. During the fraud, it was common for management to insert phony inventory count sheets during the inventory observation or to alter the quantities on the count sheets. There where instances where management created the illusion that inventory existed with the help of phony inventory items. Simply put, some items of inventory that appeared real on paper were actually fake.

The fraud examination was originated as a result of predication provided by a Hot Line tip and featured the application of a number of procedures. Interviews were conducted with management and personnel. Questions asked included the following to determine whether the inventory represented by management actually existed and whether it was properly valued:

– Do the inventories included in the Prison Industries balance sheet physically exist?
– Does the inventory represent items held for use in the ordinary course of production?
– Do inventory quantities include all items on hand or in transit?
– Are inventory listings accurately compiled and are they properly included in the inventory accounts?
– Does the State have legal title or ownership rights to the inventory items?
– Does the inventory exclude items billed to customers or owned by others?
– Are inventory costs the result of an acceptable method consistently applied?
– Are inventories properly classified in the balance sheet and are the related disclosures adequate?

The examiners calculated the inventory turnover ratio. The inventory turnover ratio measures how fast inventory was moving through the entity. If the inventory is inflated, then the average inventory balance will be overstated, causing the inventory turnover ratio to decline. The  inventory turnover ratio was compared with the results from prior years and with industry averages for reasonableness.

Price tests were performed. A fraud examiner must determine whether the pricing of the inventory is reasonable. Price testing employs vouching, tracing, and re-computation procedures to test the auditee’s  pricing of its inventory. An examiner should test the application of prices by vouching items to vendors’ invoices and to cost accounting records to verify that the inventory is properly priced. For example, an examiner selects from the inventory detail item L243, classified as a raw material. According to the company’s records as of the balance sheet date, there are twenty L243s at $120 apiece. The examiner reviews the last invoice representing the purchase of L243s and discovers that the company purchased the L243s at $60 apiece. This price discrepancy is a sign that management might be trying to inflate the value of its inventory. Vendors’ invoices should also be traced to the books to confirm proper price recording. Examiners should recompute the quantities indicated on-hand by the observation with vendor prices to determine that the inventory, balances on the balance sheet are correct.

Following the fraud examination inventory was re-performed. The physical inventory was re-performed to ensure that the enterprise’s application of corrective action to methods for counting inventory would result in an accurate and reliable count in future. The re-examination of physical inventory included observation, as well as inquiries and physical examination (i.e., test counts). It is important to remember that management is responsible for the propriety of the inventory. The examiner observed the re-taking of the inventory to satisfy his/her reliance on management’s representations of the quantities and prices.

Cut off tests were performed. A cut-off test is a procedure to control the shipping and receiving activities at the physical inventory date. For the time of the physical inventory, the examiner  noted the numbers of the last pre-numbered shipping and receiving documents because purchases of inventory often are recorded when received and sales recorded when shipped. Identifying the document numbers helped the examiner determine whether the inventory was properly or improperly included or excluded from the inventory counts. For instance, if management indicated that the last shipping document for 1991 was #2500, then the examiner would assume that #2501 was shipped in January 1992. If, upon review of shipping document #2501, the examiner notices that the inventory was shipped in 1991, then there is the possibility that management is inflating the quantity and value of the company’s inventory at year-end. Therefore, inquiry and further testing are warranted. These cut-off numbers are often used in conjunction with the cut-off test used in accounts receivable and accounts payable testing. If cut-off procedures appear unclear or indicate possible inclusions in inventory of goods sold, then cut-off tests should be expanded.

There are several other audit procedures that can be used in detecting inventory fraud scenarios. These include:

• Reviewing the statement of cash flows and asking whether the increases and decreases in cash make sense in relation to the inventory account balances and changes.
• Computing the inventory turnover ratio and days-to-sell ratio. Do these ratios make sense in relation to what the auditor has verified regarding the physical aspects of the inventory?
• Computing the percentage of gross profit and the related percentage of the cost of goods sold, and then the trend to look for understatement of the cost of goods sold percentage.
• Ensuring there is a consistent use of the inventory cost flow assumption. For example, the use of first-in-first out (FIFO) gives a higher net income in an inflationary environment.

It was the large number of items comprising the inventory that made it an attractive target for fraudulent manipulation at Prison Industries. Theft and misuse are the actions of choice when it comes to inventory fraud. The rationale typically Is: “Who is going to miss a few hundred widgets in an inventory of thousands, perhaps millions?” The size of inventory as a percentage of the amount of total assets also makes it an easy target for management-initiated financial reporting misstatement. Having the possibility of two types of fraudulent acts ganging up on inventories at the same time, the CFE doesn’t want to waste time going down the wrong path, so it’s very important to determine which fraudulent act is likely occurring.

Any discussion of fraud likelihood involves the concepts of concealment, conversion, and opportunity. So, in addition to “how” the Inventory fraud took place, other questions need to be addressed, such as: How sophisticated is the concealment strategy? Who has the most benefit to gain by the theft, misuse, or misstatement of the inventories? Who has and where are the opportunities to divert/misstate inventories? These are the questions that need to be answered by the CFE/auditor, and fortunately, the tools and guidance are available from the ACFE to achieve the right answers when faced with almost any pattern of inventory fraud.

Concealment Strategies & Fraud Scenarios

I remember Joseph Wells mentioning at an ACFE conference years ago that identifying the specific asset concealment strategy selected by a fraudster was often key to the investigator’s subsequent understanding of the entire fraud scenario the fraudster had chosen to implement. What Joe meant was that a fraud scenario is the unique way the inherent fraud scheme has occurred (or can occur) at an examined entity; therefore, a fraud scenario describes how an inherent fraud risk will occur under specific circumstances. Upon identification, a specific fraud scenario, and its associated concealment strategy, become the basis for fraud risk assessment and for the examiner’s subsequent fraud examination program.

Fraud concealment involves the strategies used by the perpetrator of the fraud scenario to conceal the true intent of his or her transaction(s). Common concealment strategies include false documents, false representations, false approvals, avoiding or circumventing control levels, internal control evasion, blocking access to information, enhancing the effects of geographic distance between documents and controls, and the application of both real and perceived pressure. Wells also pointed out that an important aspect of fraud concealment pertains to the level of sophistication demonstrated by the perpetrator; the connection between concealment strategies and fraud scenarios is essential in any discussion of fraud risk structure.

As an example, consider a rights of return fraud scenario related to ordered merchandise. Most industries allow customers to return products for any number of reasons. Rights of return refers to circumstances, whether as a matter of contract or of existing practice, under which a product may be returned after its sale either in exchange for a cash refund, or for a credit applied to amounts owed or to be owed for other products, or in exchange for other products. GAAP allows companies to recognize revenue in certain cases, even though the customer may have a right of return. When customers are given a right of return, revenue may be recognized at the time of sale if the sales price is substantially fixed or determinable at the date of sale, the buyer has paid or is obligated to pay the seller, the obligation to pay is not contingent on resale of the product, the buyer’s obligation to the seller does not change in the event of theft or physical destruction or damage of the product, the buyer acquiring the product for resale is economically separate from the seller, the seller does not have significant obligations for future performance or to bring about resale of the product by the buyer, and the amount of future returns can be reasonably estimated.

Sales revenue not recognizable at the time of sale is recognized either once the return privilege has substantially expired or if the conditions have been subsequently met. Companies sometimes stray by establishing accounting policies or sales agreements that grant customers vague or liberal rights of returns, refunds, or exchanges; that fail to fix the sales price; or that make payment contingent upon resale of the product, receipt of funding from a lender, or some other future event. Payment terms that extend over a substantial portion of the period in which the customer is expected to use or market the purchased products may also create problems. These terms effectively create consignment arrangements, because, no economic risk has been transferred to the purchaser.

Frauds in connection with rights of return typically involve concealment of the existence of the right, either by contract or arising from accepted practice, and/or departure from GAAP specified conditions. Concealment usually takes one or more of the following forms:

• Use of side letters: created and maintained separate and apart from the sales contract, that provide the buyer with a right of return;

• Obligations by oral promise or some other form of understanding between seller and buyer that is honored as a customary practice but arranged covertly and hidden;

• Misrepresentations designed to mischaracterize the nature of arrangements, particularly in respect of:

–Consignment arrangements made to appear to be final sales;

–Concealment of contingencies, under which the buyer can return the products, including failure to resell the products, trial periods, and product performance conditions;

–Failure to disclose the existence, or extent, of stock rotation rights, price protection concessions, or annual returned-goods limitations;

–Arrangement of transactions, with straw counterparties, agents, related parties, or other special purpose entities in which the true nature of the arrangements is concealed or obscured, but, ultimately, the counterparty does not actually have any significant economic risk in the “sale”.

Sometimes the purchaser is complicit in the act of concealment, for example, by negotiating a side letter, and this makes detection of the fraud even more difficult. Further, such frauds often involve collusion among several individuals within an organization, such as salespersons, their supervisors, and possibly both marketing and financial managers.

It’s easy to see that once a CFE has identified one or more of these concealment strategies as operative in a given entity, the process of developing a descriptive fraud scenario, completing a related risk assessment and constructing a fraud examination program will be a relatively straight forward process. As a working example, of a senario and related concealment strategies …

Over two decades ago the SEC charged a major computer equipment manufacturer with overstating revenue in the amount of $500,000 on transactions for which products had been shipped, but for which, at the time of shipment, the company had no reasonable expectation that the customer would accept and pay for the products. The company eventually accepted back most of the product as sales returns during the following quarter.

The SEC noted that the manufacturer’s written distribution agreements generally allowed the distributor wide latitude to return product to the company for credit whenever the product was, in the distributor’s opinion, damaged, obsolete, or otherwise unable to be sold. According to the SEC, in preparing the manufacturer’s financial statements for the target year, company personnel submitted a proposed allowance for future product returns that was unreasonably low in light of the high level of returns the manufacturer had received in the first several months of the year.

The SEC determined that various officers and employees in the accounting and sales departments knew the exact amount of returns the company had received before the year end, when the company’s independent auditors finished their fieldwork on the annual audit. Had the manufacturer revised the allowance for sales returns to reflect the returns information, the SEC concluded it would have had to reduce the net revenue reported for the fiscal year. Instead, the SEC found that several of the manufacturer’s officers and employees devised schemes to prevent the auditors from discovering the true amount of the returns, including 1), keeping the auditors away from the area at the manufacturer’s headquarters where the returned goods were stored, and 2), accounting personnel altering records in the computer system to reduce the level of returns. After all the facts were assembled, the SEC took disciplinary action against several company executives.

As with side agreements, a broad base of inquiry into company practices may be one of the best assessment techniques the CFE has regarding possible concealment strategies supporting fraud scenarios involving returns and exchanges. In addition to inquiries of this kind, the ACFE recommends that CFE’s may consider using analytics like:

• Compare returns in the current period with prior periods and ask about unusual increases.

• Because companies may slow the return process to avoid reducing sales in the current period, determine whether returns are processed in timely fashion. The facts can also be double-checked by confirming with customers.

• Calculate the sales return percentage (sales returns divided by total sales) and ask about any unusual increase.

• Compare returns after a reporting period with both the return reserve and the monthly returns to determine if they appear reasonable.

• Determine whether sales commissions are paid at the time of sale or at the time of collection. Sales commissions paid at the time of sale provide incentives to inflate sales artificially to meet internal and external market pressures.

• Determine whether product returns are adjusted from sales commissions. Sales returns processed through the so-called house account may provide a hidden mechanism to inflate sales to phony customers, collect undue commissions, and return the product to the vendor without being penalized by having commissions adjusted for the returned goods.

Basic Cash Concealment Strategies

One of the topics in which readers of this blog have expressed consistent interest over the years regards the many strategies of cash asset concealment employed by fraudsters; especially by embezzlers of relatively small sums from employers, who seem particularly creative at such manipulations.  Regardless of the method used to hide ill-gotten assets, one fact remains constant; proceeds from illicit activities must be disguised in some way to avoid being discovered. Those the ACFE dubs ‘asset hiders’ have developed many sophisticated techniques for working the system and accomplishing the goal of concealing their gains; in attempting to track down and recover secret stores of cash, the fraud examiner is presented with a true challenge, and the first step in meeting this challenge is to understand how asset hiders work. This post will concentrate on the concealment of raw cash.

There are three primary ways to hide cash assets. They are:

— Currency hoards;
— Cashier’s checks and traveler’s checks;
— Deposits to financial institutions.

The most basic method for hiding cash is the currency hoard, in which a person simply stores cash in a hidden location, usually in his or her home or on her property. This is the proverbial ‘cash under the mattress’ technique. In a typical home, hiding places for currency or other valuables can range from the obvious to the ingenious.

For example, precious metals and jewelry can easily be hidden in a layer of cooking grease at the bottom of a pot. The space beneath the bottom drawer of bureaus, chests, and cabinets is also a commonly used hiding place. Loose bricks in the wall or fireplace can disguise small spaces for hiding things. A more complex scheme is to build a false ceiling below the original ceiling and then use the space between the two as a hiding place.

Another place to hoard currency is in furniture. The hollow spaces of upholstered furniture make these pieces a good hiding place. Many people find false bottoms in drawers or inside stereo speakers useful places for hiding cash.

The basic structure of the home itself provides many opportunities for creating hiding places. One of the most common spots for hiding objects is in the walls. Cunning hiders may construct false walls in closets or pantries, or they may build large cavities into a wall, which is then covered with a mirror or a painting. Installing false light switch plates and electrical outlets provides easy access to spaces between walls and generally appear quite normal, although amateurs often leave tell-tale marks on the plate screws. These marks often provide searchers with signs of tampering and can lead to the discovery of a cache. An even simpler method is to hide currency inside the electrical boxes behind real electrical plates. If a larger space is needed, hiders sometimes remove the box from the wall and build a shelf below it. Significant amounts of currency can be hidden in these spaces. Currency hoards can also be hidden above ceiling light boxes in the space below the attic.

The plumbing system provides other natural hiding places. For example, many bathrooms have access holes under the sink, which are usually covered with a removable chrome disk. These access holes are designed so a cleaning ‘snake’ can be inserted into the main drain when the lines are clogged. This space is easily utilized as a hiding space. Floor drains are also used for hiding currency. Excellent hiding places can be created by installing false pipes that appear to be part of the home’s plumbing. Some individuals hide objects and money in shower curtain rods. Other places frequently used for hiding are air ducts, doors, and stairways. Heating and cooling system ducts are generally easy to access and have plenty of empty space. Hollow core doors are easily rigged for hiding. The top surface of the door can simply be cut away, allowing access to the natural secret compartment inside. Enclosed staircases have dead space underneath that is accessible. If the staircase is not enclosed, there may be usable space for small objects behind each of the risers. Stairs can be hinged, creating a hidden compartment underneath.

Cashier’s and traveler’s checks are another method used to hide assets. These instruments are useful for several reasons:

–They allow asset hiders to easily disguise their financial dealings from asset seekers like law enforcement, CFEs and forensic accountants;
–They help disguise the asset hider’s financial dealings and reduce the amount of currency physically carried;
–Cashier’s checks or traveler’s checks in denominations of less than $10,000 are negotiable financial instruments that can be exchanged almost any place in the world.

Whilst efforts to control the use of wire transfers for money laundering have traditionally been focused on banks, examiners also need to be aware that there are non-bank money transmitters that fraudsters often use to conceal cash assets.  These non-bank transmitters specialize in money transfers for individuals rather than businesses. In addition to other services, most non-bank transmitters sell money orders and traveler’s checks. These companies range from large international enterprises like Western Union to small mom-and-pop neighborhood check cashing businesses.

There are several reasons fraudsters like using non-bank transmitters. First, non-bank transmitters allow individuals to cash personal checks or wire money to family members nationally or in other countries. Check cashing companies and other sellers of money orders, such as convenience stores and grocery stores, provide a much-needed service to people without bank accounts. Second, non-bank transmitters allow individuals to obtain many individual traveler’s checks and money orders in amounts less than $10,000 each. Most states regulate check cashing and the sale of money orders with licensing and bonding requirements. The Money Laundering Suppression Act of 1994 required all money transmitters to register with the U.S. Department of Treasury. Furthermore, like other financial institutions, these businesses are required to file currency transaction reports (CTRs) for transactions of $10,000 or more in currency and coins, and they are required to file Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) with the Treasury Department for certain classes of suspect transactions.

Check cashing companies have been known to receive illegally earned or stolen currency and use it to cash legitimate checks for their customers, thus avoiding CTRs or to structure transmittals by issuing multiple traveler’s checks and money orders for less than $10,000 each. Third, the transactions of non-bank transmitters will not trigger a mechanism for identifying unreported cash. Although money transmitters are classified as financial institutions, they are not depository institutions but operate through accounts with commercial banks. And, unlike bank accounts, which contain copies of deposits and canceled checks used in locating assets, non-bank money transmitters do not maintain copies of deposits and canceled checks. Unless the money order or traveler’s check appears in the financial records of the asset hider, it will likely go undetected since there is no place for the investigator to begin a search. However, once a money order or traveler’s check has been specifically identified, it can be traced back like any other financial instrument.

Banks and other financial institutions are frequently utilized by secrecy seekers as vehicles for hiding or disguising currency. The methods used may be as simple as renting a safe-deposit box and storing currency or valuables inside.  Searching the safe-deposit box of a suspected embezzler for evidence is not easily accomplished. It requires a court order. But; even if access to the box is denied, the investigator in a hidden asset case can often make educated guesses as to the contents by observing the movements of the hider. For instance, if the subject makes a visit to her safe-deposit box after attending an antique jewelry collector’s exposition, the examiner could surmise a collection of jewelry items is stored therein. Trips made to a safe-deposit box before foreign travel may indicate that the hider is moving money from his or her native country to a foreign location.

The banking system is, without question, the most important vehicle of both lawful and unlawful financial transactions. While most bankers are not active participants in asset hiding, it can be extremely difficult to distinguish between legitimate transactions and those conducted by secrecy seekers. Some bankers even prefer to close their eyes to the sources of their deposits and, in doing so, knowingly accept tainted funds. It’s important to understand how secrecy seekers use bank deposits and funds transfers to hide assets.  For the examiner, it’s important to know that most large banks have computer programs that can retrieve a specific wire transfer record. Many medium-sized banks cannot electronically retrieve specific wire data more than a month old, and some banks would have to search manually for records. However, even small banks usually send their international money transfers through one of the large Money Center banks, thus creating a record. Many large banks have enhanced their record-keeping systems to assure themselves and bank regulators that they are in full compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act. Some institutions have systems that monitor the wire transfer activity of certain accounts and generate periodic reports highlighting the consolidation of incoming wires followed by an outgoing wire transfer. Most of these systems are designed to monitor only customer accounts and do not record funds transfer services provided for non-depositors for which the bank serves only as an intermediary.

To conduct a successful wire transfer search, the examiner should have as much information as possible relating to the transfer in question when contacting the appropriate entity. Having the following information on hand will help make the search much more efficient:

— Date of transfer
— Amount of transfer
— Names of sending and receiving institutions
— Routing numbers of sending and receiving institutions
— Identity of sender and designated receiver
— Input sequence and/or output sequence

While most banks do not actively participate in fraudulent transfers, some signs for the examiner that could indicate collusion between a bank and its customer are:
— Allowing clients whose funds are not of foreign origin to make investments limited to foreigners;
— Acting without power of attorney to allow clients to manage investments or to transmit funds
on behalf of foreign-registered companies or local companies acting as laundries;
— Participating in sequential transactions that fall under the government reporting thresholds;
–Allowing telephone transfers of funds without written authorization and failing to keep a record of such transfers;
— Entering false foreign account number designations with regard to wire transfers.

Financing Death One BitCoin at a Time

Over the past decade, fanatic religious ideologists have evolved to become hybrid terrorists demonstrating exceptional versatility, innovation, opportunism, ruthlessness, and cruelty. Hybrid terrorists are a new breed of organized criminal. Merriam-Webster defines hybrid as “something that is formed by combining two or more things”. In the twentieth century, the military, intelligence forces, and law enforcement agencies each had a specialized skill-set to employ in response to respective crises involving insurgency, international terrorism, and organized crime. Military forces dealt solely with international insurgent threats to the government; intelligence forces dealt solely with international terrorism; and law enforcement agencies focused on their respective country’s organized crime entities. In the twenty-first century, greed, violence, and vengeance motivate the various groups of hybrid terrorists. Hybrid terrorists rely on organized crime such as money laundering, wire transfer fraud, drug and human trafficking, shell companies, and false identification to finance their organizational operations.

Last week’s horrific terror bombing in Manchester brings to the fore, yet again, the issue of such terrorist financing and the increasing role of forensic accountants in combating it. Two of the main tools of modern terror financing schemes are money laundering and virtual currency.

Law enforcement and government agencies in collaboration with forensic accountants play key roles in tracing the source of terrorist financing to the activities used to inflict terror on local and global citizens. Law enforcement agencies utilize investigative and predictive analytics tools to gather, dissect, and convey data to distinguish patterns leading to future terrorist events. Government agencies employ database inquiries of terrorist-related financial information to evaluate the possibilities of terrorist financing and activities. Forensic accountants review the data for patterns related to previous transactions by utilizing data analysis tools, which assist in tracking the source of the funds.

As we all know, forensic accountants use a combination of accounting knowledge combined with investigative skills in litigation support and investigative accounting settings. Several types of organizations, agencies, and companies frequently employ forensic accountants to provide investigative services. Some of these organizations are public accounting firms, law firms, law enforcement agencies, The Internal Revenue Service (IRS), The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI).

Locating and halting the source of terrorist financing involves two tactics, following the money and drying up the money. Obstructing terrorist financing requires an understanding of both the original and supply source of the illicit funds. As the financing is derived from both legal and illegal funding sources, terrorists may attempt to evade detection by funneling money through legitimate businesses thus making it difficult to trace. Charitable organizations and reputable companies provide a legitimate source through which terrorists may pass money for illicit activities without drawing the attention of law enforcement agencies. Patrons of legitimate businesses are often unaware that their personal contributions may support terrorist activities. However, terrorists also obtain funds from obvious illegal sources, such as kidnapping, fraud, and drug trafficking. Terrorists often change daily routines to evade law enforcement agencies as predictable patterns create trails that are easy for skilled investigators to follow. Audit trails can be traced from the donor source to the terrorist by forensic accountants and law enforcement agencies tracking specific indicators. Audit trails reveal where the funds originate and whether the funds came from legal or illegal sources. The ACFE tells us that basic money laundering is a specific type of illegal funding source, which provides a clear audit trail.

Money laundering is the process of obtaining and funneling illicit funds to disguise the connection with the original unlawful activity. Terrorists launder money to spend the unlawfully obtained money without drawing attention to themselves and their activities. To remain undetected by regulatory authorities, the illicit funds being deposited or spent need to be washed to give the impression that the money came from a seemingly reputable source. There are types of unusual transactions that raise red flags associated with money laundering in financial institutions. The more times an unusual transaction occurs, the greater the probability it is the product of an illicit activity. Money laundering may be quite sophisticated depending on the strategies employed to avoid detection. Some identifiers indicating a possible money-laundering scheme are: lack of identification, money wired to new locations, customer closes account after wiring or transferring copious amounts of money, executed out-of-the-ordinary business transactions, executed transactions involving the customer’s own business or occupation, and executed transactions falling just below the threshold trigger requiring the financial institution to file a report.

Money laundering takes place in three stages: placement, layering, and integration. In the placement stage, the cash proceeds from criminal activity enter the financial system by deposit. During the layering stage, the funds transfer into other accounts, usually offshore financial institutions, thus creating greater distance between the source and origin of the funds and its current location. Legitimate purchases help funnel the money back into the economy during the integration stage, the final stage.

Complicating all this is for the investigator is virtual currency. Virtual currency, unlike traditional forms of money, does not leave a clear audit trail for forensic accountants to trace and investigate. Cases involving the use of virtual currency, i.e. Bitcoins and several rival currencies, create anonymity for the perpetrator and create obstacles for investigators. Bitcoins have no physical form and provide a unique opportunity for terrorists to launder money across international borders without detection by law enforcement or government agencies. Bitcoins are long strings of numbers and letters linked by mathematical encryption algorithms. A consumer uses a mobile phone or computer to create an online wallet with one or more Bitcoin addresses before commencing electronic transactions. Bitcoins may also be used to make legitimate purchases through various, established online retailers.

Current international anti-money laundering laws aid in fighting the war against terrorist financing; however, international laws require actual cash shipments between countries and criminal networks (or at the very least funds transfers between banks). International laws are not applicable to virtual currency transactions, as they do not consist of actual cash shipments. According to the website Bitcoin.org, “Bitcoin uses peer-to-peer technology to operate with no central authority or banks”.

In summary, terrorist organizations find virtual currency to be an effective method for raising illicit funds because, unlike cash transactions, cyber technology offers anonymity with less regulatory oversight. Due to the anonymity factor, Bitcoins are an innovative and convenient way for terrorists to launder money and sell illegal goods. Virtual currencies are appealing for terrorist financiers since funds can be swiftly sent across borders in a secure, cheap, and highly secretive manner. The obscurity of Bitcoin allows international funding sources to conduct exchanges without a trace of evidence. This co-mingling effect is like traditional money laundering but without the regulatory oversight. Government and law enforcement agencies must, as a result, be able to share information with public regulators when they become suspicious of terrorist financing.

Forensic accounting technology is most beneficial when used in conjunction with the analysis tools of law enforcement agencies to predict and analyze future terrorist activity. Even though some of the tools in a forensic accountant’s arsenal are useful in tracking terrorist funds, the ability to identify conceivable terrorist threats is limited. To identify the future activities of terrorist groups, forensic accountants, and law enforcement agencies should cooperate with one another by mutually incorporating the analytical tools utilized by each. Agencies and government officials should become familiar with virtual currency like Bitcoins. Because of the anonymity and lack of regulatory oversight, virtual currency offers terrorist groups a useful means to finance illicit activities on an international scale. In the face of the challenge, new governmental entities may be needed to tie together all the financial forensics efforts of the different stake holder organizations so that information sharing is not compartmentalized.

Overhanging Liabilities

Most experienced CFE’s are familiar with financial fraud cases involving the overhanging liabilities represented by artfully constructed schemes to avoid income taxes since multiple ACFE training courses over the years have focused on the topic in detail.  But for those new to fraud examination and to the Central Virginia Chapter, a little history.  Before 2002, accounting firms would provide multiple services to the same firm. Hired by the shareholders, they would audit the financial statements that were prepared by management, while also providing consulting services to those same managers. Some would also provide tax advice to the managers of audit clients. However, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) restricted the type and the intensity of consulting services that could be provided to the management of audit clients because the provision of such services might compromise the objectivity of the auditor when auditing the financial statements prepared by client management on behalf of the shareholders. Nevertheless, both before and after the passage of SOX, as subsequently reported in the financial press, both the major accounting firms Ernst & Young (E&Y) and KPMG were offering very aggressive tax shelters to wealthy taxpayers as well as to the senior managers of their audit clients.

In the 1990s, E&Y had created four tax shelters that they were selling to wealthy individuals. One Of them, called E.C.S., for Equity Compensation Strategy, resulted in little or no tax liability for the taxpayer. The complicated tax plan was a means of delaying, for up to thirty years, paying taxes on the profits from exercising employee stock options that would otherwise be payable in the year in which the stock options were exercised. E&Y charged a fee of 3 percent of the amount that the taxpayer invested in the tax shelter, plus $50,000 to a law firm for a legal opinion that said that it was “more likely than not” that the shelter would survive a tax audit. E&Y had long been the auditor for Sprint Corporation. They also took on as clients William Esrey and Ronald LeMay, the top executives at Sprint. In 2000 E&Y received:

  • $2.5 million for the audit of Sprint,
  • $2.6 million for other services related to the audit;
  • $63.8 million for information technology and other consulting services, and
  • $5.8 million from Esrey and LeMay for tax advice.

In 1999 Esrey announced a planned merger of Sprint with WorldCom that potentially would have made the combined organization the largest telecommunications company in the world. The deal was not consummated because it failed to obtain regulatory approval. Nevertheless, Esrey and LeMay were awarded stock options worth about $3ll million. E&Y sold an E.C.S. to each of the two executives. In the three years from 1998 to 2000, the options profits for Esrey were $159 million and the tax that would have been payable had he not bought the tax shelter amounted to about $63 million. The options profits for LeMay were $152.2 million and the tax thereon about $60.3 million.

Subsequently, the Internal Revenue Service rejected the E&Y tax shelter of each man. Sprint then asked the two executives to resign, which they did. Sprint also dismissed E&Y as the company’s auditor. On July 2, 2003, E&Y reached a $15 million settlement with the IRS regarding their aggressive marketing of tax shelters. Then, in 2007, four E&Y partners were charged with tax fraud. These four partners worked for an E&Y unit called VIPER, “value ideas produce extraordinary results,” later renamed SISG, “strategic individual solutions group.” Its purpose was to aggressively market tax shelters, known as Cobra, Pico, CDS, and CDS Add-Ons, to wealthy individuals, many of whom acquired their fortunes in technology-related businesses. These four products were sold to about 400 wealthy taxpayers from 1999 to 2001 and generated fees of approximately $121 million. The government claims that the tax shelters were bogus and taxpayers were reassessed for taxes owed as well as for related penalties and interest.

On August 26, 2005, KPMG in turn agreed pay a fine of $456 million for selling tax shelters from 1996 through 2003 that fraudulently generated $11 billion in fictitious tax losses that cost the government at least $2.5 billion in lost taxes. The four tax shelters went by the acronyms FLIP, OPIS, BLIPS, and SOS.  Under the Bond Linked Premium Issue Structure (BLIPS), for example, the taxpayer would borrow money from an offshore bank and invest in a joint venture that would buy foreign currencies from that same offshore bank. About two months later, the joint venture would then sell the foreign currency back to the bank, creating a tax loss. The taxpayer would then declare. a loss for tax purposes on the BLIPS investment. The way that BLIPS were structured, the taxpayer only had to pay $1.4 million to declare a $20 million loss for tax purposes. BLIPS were targeted at wealthy executives who would normally pay between $10 million and $20 million in taxes.

Buying a BLIPS, however, effectively reduced the investor’s taxable income to zero. They were sold to 186 wealthy individuals and generated at least $5 billion in tax losses. The FLIP and OPIS involved investment swaps through the Cayman Islands, and SOS was a currency swap like the BLIPS. The government contended that these were sham transactions since the loans and investments were risk-free. Their sole purpose was to artificially reduce taxes. Some argued that the KPMG tax shelters were so egregious that the accounting firm should be put out of business. However, Arthur Andersen had collapsed in 2002, and if KPMG failed, then there would be only three large accounting firms remaining: Deloitte, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and Ernst & Young. KPMG Chairman, Timothy Flynn, said “the firm regretted taking part in the deals and sent a message to employees calling the conduct inexcusable. KPMG remained in business, but the firm was fined almost a half billion dollars.

Because of the Ernst & Young and KPMG tax fiascos, the large accounting firms have become wary of marketing very aggressive tax shelters. Now, most shelters are being sold by tax “boutiques” that operate on a much smaller scale and so are less likely to be investigated by the IRS.  The question that remains, however, is to what extent should professional accountants be selling services that directly or indirectly abet even lawful tax avoidance which, as the ACFE tells us,  can so easily shade into what the IRS calls tax evasion?

Financing in the Dark

money-laundering_1A reader of our last blog post on risk assessment, a CFE employed as an internal auditor by a large overseas financial services firm, has been asked, (in light of the Panama Papers), and as a member of an evaluation team, to perform a review of the controls comprising his company’s anti-money laundering program.  I thought his various questions about ACFE guidance on money laundering might furnish interesting matter for a blog post.  The ACFE has long identified money laundering, including terrorist financing, as a global problem.

Due to government concerns globally, laws have been enacted in countries such as the United States (the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), Canada (Proceeds of Crime, Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Act), and Australia (Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act, 2006) to combat money laundering and financing of terrorist activities. Such legislation embodies recommendations from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a Paris-based intergovernmental body formed in 1989 by the Group of Seven industrialized nations. As a result, financial institutions in many countries have taken initiatives to implement appropriate policies and infrastructure for ensuring compliance with applicable money laundering requirements and practices. One such step has been to implement anti -money laundering/ counter-terrorist financing programs based on FATF recommendations.  Our reader’s company is to be commended for undertaking the review since independent testing by knowledgeable assurance professionals (including CFE’s) is a critical component in ensuring existing anti-money laundering programs remain robust and fully aligned with regulatory requirements. The testing of these programs should be cohesive and integrated and include a well-defined strategy that takes a risk-based, enterprise wide perspective.

According to the ACFE, an effective anti-money laundering program includes:

–Appointment of a senior officer responsible for ensuring risks are understood, addressed, and mitigated enterprise-wide;
–Development of formal policies, procedures, and controls that are aligned with Federal and local regulations;
–Implementation of a risk-based approach for identifying risks by client, geography, product, and delivery channels;
–Implementation of a program of dynamic rules-based transaction monitoring for purposes of identifying and reporting suspicious activities;
–Implementation of training programs customized to specific functions and activities;
–Independent, periodic testing of the program.

The ACFE stresses that to be successful it’s necessary that the review team understand the organization’s products and delivery channels as well as its types of clients and their geographic location(s). It’s also necessary to understand the company’s organizational structure, infrastructure, policies, procedures, and controls for mitigating money laundering and terrorist financing risks. Also as part of the audit strategy, auditors should list all anti-money laundering regulatory requirements in the countries in which the organization does business. Once these components are clearly defined and understood, a risk profile can be developed (using the interviewing strategy featured in our last post) to ascertain risk levels and enable the creation of appropriate audit programs, staffing, and overall management of the review assignment. Needless to say, the audit strategy should always be formally approved by the organization’s chief audit executive.

The temptation to use boilerplate or template audit programs should be minimized by the development of tailored audit programs fitted to the specific nature of the business process being audited. One of the biggest challenges in developing such audit programs for money laundering is determining appropriate sampling methodologies for performing the required testing and validation. Inappropriate sampling will lead to incorrect and unsupportable conclusions. Sampling criteria and attributes must be defined clearly and be consistent with audit objectives. Once again, the audit manager should approve the sampling methodology before execution.

Our reader’s audit team will need to verify compliance with local regulations, which is not an easy task due to the high transaction volumes characteristic of industries like his. However, in most financial organizations, transaction-based processes must be automated to work and queries can be developed to create exception reports where deviations from expected outcomes exist. Out reader asked for examples of such automated exception reports and some common ones recommended by the ACFE are:

–Cash deposits of US $10,000 or greater where the required regulatory reporting has not been completed. (This threshold applies to Canada and the United States and may vary in other countries);
–Transactions with countries where trade sanctions exist;
–Industry codes listing clients in high risk industries to assess the level of enhanced due diligence performed;
–List of employees who have not completed required anti-money laundering training;
–List of clients with Post Office box addresses;
–List of clients with missing Taxpayer Identification Numbers;
–List of wire transfers from accounts owned by governments into accounts of private investment companies and politically exposed persons;
–Validating that “know your client” and customer identification requirements are compliant with local regulatory requirements;
–Validating that enhanced due diligence is performed on high-risk businesses.

Business culture has traditionally revolved around management of risks relative to sales, markets, economic trends, and reputation. Only relatively recently has regulatory risk as it relates to money laundering requirements received more intense scrutiny. Regulators have adopted a zero tolerance position, as evidenced by penalties against financial institutions for noncompliance with the ever growing body of legislation.  Financial institutions like our reader’s are considered an integral defense in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. It’s thus imperative that these organizations implement effective independent testing programs to assess the quality of controls relative to their anti-money laundering programs.  Sound independent testing by assurance professionals who have in-depth knowledge of fraud and regulation, as well as of risks, controls, and business processes in general is considered a key control within any organization. Fraud risk assessment review work of the anti-money launder business process provides management with the necessary intelligence for proactively managing deficiencies and ensuring that a well-aligned top-to-bottom control environment with appropriate resources and infrastructure is in place for mitigating money laundering risk.

Because fraudsters and criminals are creative and money laundering methods and techniques change constantly in response to evolving countermeasures, a useful reference for CFE’s and for auditors of all kinds is always the ACFE which provides live seminars and on-line training insights into emerging money laundering related threats as well as on-going suggestions for new areas for investigation and testing.

It’s Not Just About Tax Avoidance

off-shoring

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The ACFE tells us that countries in virtually all parts of the world, but especially those located in the Caribbean and South Pacific, are commonly regarded as tax havens.  A tax haven is a country whose laws, regulations, traditions, and treaty arrangements make it possible for a person to reduce his or her overall tax burden. Secrecy is basically supplied by such countries in two ways.

1) Domestic bank secrecy laws: Laws which bar insight by outsiders;2) Blocking statutes: Statutes which effectively prevent the disclosure, copying, inspection, or removal of documents located in the host country in compliance with orders issued by foreign authorities.

Moreover, in many countries, legal depositions may not be taken on national territory in connection with judicial proceedings being undertaken abroad. Many countries, such as the United Kingdom, France, South Africa, Germany, Australia, Norway, and Canada have comprehensive statutes to guard their sovereignty from the extraterritorial reach of foreign authorities. Although these countries are not generally thought of as tax havens they have laws which can be used by the asset hider. In addition to asset hiding, some foreign countries have a legal, banking, or economic climate that provides an excellent site for laundering money. Historically, places such as Panama, the Cayman Islands, the Bahamas, Switzerland, and the Netherlands Antilles have been associated with hidden bank accounts, fictitious corporations, and money laundering.

The most popular off-shore jurisdictions in the news recently are:

–Switzerland
–Panama
–Cayman Islands
–Netherlands Antilles

Countries like Panama with relatively small, open economies have often embraced the financial secrecy business as a way of promoting economic development. With some notable exceptions, these countries are geographically isolated with a narrow production concentrated on a few major commodities, usually for export. This tends to make them vulnerable to adverse climatic conditions and international market development. It also limits their ability to produce an adequate domestic market, invest in an infrastructure, attract foreign direct investment, and gain access to a diversified mix of importers and exporters.

It’s important for CFE’s to understand the general concept of a financial center with regard to financial havens.  Financial centers are of two types:

–A functional center is defined as country where transactions are actually undertaken and the value added is created in the design and delivery of financial services. Examples of functional centers include New York, London, Singapore, Bahrain, and Hong Kong.
–A booking center is defined as a country where transactions are recorded but the value added involved is actually created elsewhere. Examples in this category include Panama, the Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Seychelles, and Vanuatu.

Accordingly, the ACFE classifies the tax havens of the world into four broad categories:

No Tax Havens – these countries have no income, capital gains or wealth taxes. It’s legal to incorporate and/or form a trust. The governments of these countries do earn revenue from corporate registration fees, annual fees and a charge on the value of corporate shares. Examples of “no tax” havens are the Bahamas, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Nauru, the Turks, Caicos and Vanuatu.

No Tax on Foreign Income Havens – These countries impose income taxes, but only on locally derived income. Any income earned from foreign sources that involves no local business activity (apart from simple housekeeping and bookkeeping matters) is exempt from taxation. There are two types of “no tax on foreign income” havens. Those that:

–allow corporations to conduct both internal and external business, taxing only the income from internal sources;
–require a decision at the time of incorporation as to whether the company will conduct local business or will act only as a foreign corporation. If the company elects the latter option, it will be exempt from taxation. If it chooses to conduct local business, it incurs the appropriate tax liabilities. Examples are Panama, Liberia, Jersey, Guernsey, the Isle of Man, Gibraltar, Costa Rica and Hong Kong.

Low Tax Havens – These are countries that impose some income tax on company income, wherever it is earned. However, most have double taxation agreements with “high tax” countries. This agreement can reduce the withholding tax on the income derived from a high tax country by local corporations. Examples of “low tax” havens are Cypress, the British Virgin Islands and the Netherlands Antilles.

Special Tax Havens – Special tax havens are countries that impose all or most of the usual taxes, but either allow concessions to certain types of companies, or allow specialized types of corporate organizations such as the flexible corporate arrangements offered by Liechtenstein. Tax havens offering special privileges for holding companies are Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Austria.

Understanding the role of tax havens, involves distinguishing between two basic sources of income:

–Return on labor
–Return on capital

The return on labor refers to earnings from salary, wages, and professional services – your work. Return on capital describes the return from investments such as dividends from shares of stocks; interest on bank deposits, loans or bonds; rental income; and royalties on patents. Placing “return on capital” income in certain tax havens can benefit the secrecy seeker. By forming a corporation or trust in a tax haven this income may become tax-free or be taxed at such a low rate that the taxation is hardly noticeable.

In the case of Panama, for example, off-shore banking and incorporation are a major source of revenue. It’s also a good country for laundering drug money through its banks. It was reported by the financial trade press some years ago that at one time $200-$300 million a month was laundered through Panamanian banks. Panama is one of the most effective off-shore havens for money-launderers, offering tremendous secrecy. As the Panama papers seem to bear out, its banking haven business has always been regarded as supplemental to its status as a tax haven.

Before asset hiders and money launderers can utilize off-shore secrecy havens, they must first establish secret off-shore bank accounts. The off-shore account provides asset protection because the existence of such an account will not readily be known by someone seeking to collect against assets. Foreign banks, regulated by their own authorities, are under no obligation to inform the fraudster’s home country bank examiners of the ownership of the accounts they hold. Even if the existence of an off-shore account does come to light, judgments from home country courts are generally invalid in foreign countries, so creditors normally have to get a judgment in the country where the account is located. This allows time for the individual to fight the action or, unless the court immediately issues an order prohibiting the transfer of assets, simply move the assets out of the account.

So why do fraudsters and others secretly move money off-shore?  Not just tax avoidance. There are many additional benefits of doing so, extending well beyond simple tax avoidance:

–Off-shore bank accounts allow an individual to invest in foreign stocks and mutual funds that are not registered with home country government agencies;
–In some instances, off-shore bank accounts offer more flexible customer options than home country accounts;
–The account can be used to profit from currency fluctuations, buy stocks from mutual funds, purchase foreign real estate, and earn the high interest rates available in many foreign countries;
–Foreign accounts are used to trade precious metals and other assets through the banking system;
–For U.S. citizens, off-shore banking income is not presently considered “subpart F income” on U.S. tax returns. The profits accumulate in the off-shore bank and are compounded free of U.S. taxes;
–Most off-shore banks allow transactions to be conducted by mail, fax, or telex.

Keeping money in off-shore bank accounts is generally considered to be a safe move. On the rare occasion when a bank fails, in most developed countries the major banks in the country will take over its business to ensure that depositors do not lose any money. Some countries even have stronger capital requirements for banks than the United States.

The off-shore financial safe haven sector constantly evolves and adds more attractive customer services over time, just like every other dynamic market place that wants to retain and grow its customer base.  To effectively investigate the role off-shoring plays in many high profile frauds, CFE’s need to realize that tax avoidance is often just the tip of the concealment iceberg.