Category Archives: Fraud Reporting - Page 2

Tailoring Difficult Conversations

Posted by on March 20, 2018 Comments Off on Tailoring Difficult Conversations

We CFE’s and forensic accountants, like other investigative professionals, are often called upon to be the bearers of bad news; it just goes with the territory.  CFE’s and forensic accountants are somewhat unique, however, in that, since fraud is ubiquitous, we’re called upon to communicate negative messages to such a diverse range of client types; today the chairman of an audit committee, tomorrow a corporate counsel, the day after that an estranged wife whose spouse has run off after looting the family business.

If there is anything worse than getting bad news, it may be delivering it. No one relishes the awkward, difficult, anxiety-producing exercise of relaying messages that may hurt, humiliate, or upset someone with whom the deliverer has a professional relationship. And, what’s more,  it often proves a thankless task. This was recognized in a Greek proverb almost 2,500 years ago, “Nobody loves the messenger who brings bad news.”

Physicians, who are sometimes required to deliver worse news than most CFE’s ever will, often engage in many hours of classwork and practical experience studying and role-playing how to have difficult conversations with patients and their families They know that the message itself, may be devastating but how they deliver it can help the patient and his or her family begin to process even the most painful facts.   CFE’s are in the fortunate position of typically not having to deliver news that is quite so shattering.  Nevertheless, there is no question that certain investigative results can be extremely difficult to convey and to receive.  The ACFE tells us that learning how to prepare for and deliver such messages can create not only a a better investigator but facilitate a better investigative outcome.

Preparation to deliver difficult investigative results should begin well in advance, even before there is such a result to deliver. If the first time an investigator has a genuine interaction with the client is to confirm the existence of a fraud, that fact in itself constitutes a problem.  On the other hand, if the investigator has invested time in building a relationship before that difficult meeting takes place, the intent and motivations of both parties to the interaction are much better mutually understood. Continuous communication via weekly updates to clients from the moment irregularities are noted by examination is vital.

However, despite best efforts in building relationships and staying in regular contact with clients, some meetings will involve conveying difficult news. In those cases, preparation is critical to accomplishing objectives while dealing with any resultant fallout.  In such cases, the ACFE recommends focusing on investigative process as well as on content. Process is professionally performing the work, self-preparation for delivering the message, explaining the conclusions in meaningful and realistic ways, and for anticipating the consequences and possible response of the person receiving the message. Content is having the right data and valid conclusions so  the message is correct and complete.

Self-preparation involves considering the type of person who is receiving the difficult message and in determining the best approach for communicating it. Some people want to hear the bottom line first and the supporting information after that; others want to see a methodical building of the case item by item, with the conclusion at the end. Some are best appealed to via logic; others need a more empathetic delivery. Discussions guided by the appropriate approach are more likely to be productive. Put as much effort as possible into getting to know your client since personality tends to drive how he or she wants to receive information, interact with others, and, in turn, values things and people. When there is critical investigative information that has to be understood and accepted, seasoned examiners consider delivery tailored specifically to the client to be paramount.

Once the ground work has been laid, it’s time to have the discussion. It’s important, regarding the identified fraud, to remember to …

–Seek opportunities to balance the discussion by recognizing the client’s processes that are working well as well as those that have apparently failed;

–Offer to help or ask how you can help to address the specific issues raised in the discussion;

–Make it clear that you understand the client’s challenges. Be precise and factual in describing the causes of the identified irregularity;

–Maintain open body language. Avoid crossing your arms, don’t place your hands over your mouth or on your face, and keep your palms facing each other or slightly upwards instead of downwards. Don’t lean forward as this appears extra aggressive. Breathe deeply and evenly. If possible, mimic the body language of the message recipient, if the recipient is remaining calm. If the recipient begins to show signs of defensiveness or strong aggression, and your efforts to calm
the situation are not successful, you might suggest a follow-up meeting after both of you have digested what was said and to consider mutually acceptable options to move forward.

–Present the bottom-line message three times in different ways so your listener has time to absorb it.

–Let the client vent if he or she wishes. The ACFE warns against a tendency to interrupt the client’s remarks of explanation or sometimes of denial; “we don’t hire people who would do something like that!” Allowing the client time to vent frees him or her to get down to business moving afterward.

–Focus on problems with the process as well as on the actions of the suspect(s) to build context for the fraud scenario.

–Always demonstrate empathy. Take time to think about what’s going through your hearer’s mind and help him or her think through the alleged scenario and how it occurred, what’s going to happen next with the investigation, and how the range of issues raised by the investigation might be resolved.

Delivering difficult information is a minefield, and there are ample opportunities to take a wrong step and see explosive results. Emotional intelligence, understanding how to read people and relate to them, is vital in delivering difficult messages effectively. This is not an innate trait for many people, and it is a difficult one to learn, as are many of the other so-called soft skills. Yet they can be critical to the successful practice of fraud examination. Examiners rarely get in trouble over their technical skills because such skills are generally easier for them to master.  Examiners tend to get in trouble over insufficient soft skills. College degrees and professional certifications are all aimed at the technical skills. Sadly, very little is done on the front end to help examiners with the equally critical soft skills which only arise after the experience of actual practice.  For that reason, watching a mentor deliver difficult messages or deal with emotional people is also an effective way to absorb good practices. ACFE training utilizes the role-playing of potentially troublesome presentations to a friendly group (say, the investigative staff) as another way to exercise one’s skills.

Delivering bad news is largely a matter of practice and experience, and it’s not something CFEs and forensic accountants have the choice to avoid. At the end of the day, examiners need to deliver our news verbally and in writing and to facilitate our clients understanding of it. The underlying objective is to ensure that the fact of the alleged fraud is adequately identified, reported and addressed, and that the associated risk is understood and effectively mitigated.

A Blueprint for Fraud Risk Assessment

Posted by on November 27, 2017 Comments Off on A Blueprint for Fraud Risk Assessment

It appears that several of our Chapter members have been requested these last few months to assist their employers in conducting several types of fraud risk assessments. They usually do so as the Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE) member of their employing company’s internal audit-lead assessment team.   There is a consensus emerging among anti-fraud experts that conducting a fraud risk assessment (FRA) is critical to the process of detecting, and ultimately designing controls to prevent the ever-evolving types of fraud threatening organizations.

The ACFE tells us that FRAs do not necessarily specify what types of fraud are occurring in an organization. Instead, they are designed to focus detection efforts on specific fraud schemes and scenarios that could occur as well as on incidents that are known to have occurred in the past. Once these are identified, the audit team can proceed with the series of basic and specific fraud detection exercises that broad experience has shown to be effective. The objective of these exercises is to hopefully reveal the specific fraud schemes to which the organization is most exposed. This information will enable the organization’s audit team to recommend to management and to support the implementation of antifraud controls designed to address exactly those risks that have been identified.  It’s important to emphasize that fraud risk assessments are not meant to prevent fraud directly in and of themselves. They are exercises for identifying those specific fraud schemes and scenarios to which an organization is most vulnerable. That information is in turn used to conduct fraud audit exercises to highlight the circumstances that have allowed actual, known past frauds to occur or to blueprint future frauds that could occur so that the necessary controls can be put in place to prevent similar future illegal activity.

In the past, those FRAs that were conducted were usually performed by the firm’s external auditors. Increasingly, however, internal audit departments are being pressured by senior management to conduct FRAs of their own. Since internal audit departments are increasingly employing CFEs or have their expertise available to them through other company departments (like loss prevention or security), this effort can be effective since internal auditors have the tenure and experience with their organizations to know better than anyone how its financial and business operations function and can understand more readily how fraud could occur in particular processes, transactions, and business cycles.

Internal audit employed CFE’s and CIA’s aren’t involved by requirement of their professional standards in daily operations and can, therefore, provide an independent check on their organization’s overall risk management process. Audits can be considered a second channel of information on how well the enterprise’s anti-fraud controls are functioning and whether there are any deficiencies that need to be corrected.  To ensure this channel remains independent, it is important that the audit function report directly to the Audit Committee or to the board of directors and not to the chief executive officer or company president who may have responsibility for her company’s internal controls.

The Institute of Internal Auditors has endorsed audit standards that outline the techniques and procedures for conducting an FRA, specifically those contained in Statement of Auditing Standards 99 (SAS 99). By this (and other) key guidelines, an FRA is meant to assist auditors and/or fraud examiners in adjusting their audit and investigation plans to focus on gathering evidence of potential fraud schemes and scenarios identified by the FRA.

Responding to FRA findings requires the auditor to adjust the timing, nature, and extent of testing in such ways as:

• Performing procedures at physical locations on a surprise or unannounced basis by, for example, counting cash at different subsidiary locations on a surprise basis or reviewing loan portfolios of random loan officers or divisions of a savings and loan on a surprise basis;
• Requesting that financial performance data be evaluated at the end of the reporting period or on a date closer to period-end, in order, for example, to minimize the risk of manipulation of records in the period between the dates of account closings and the end of the reporting period;
• Making oral inquiries of major customers and vendors in addition to sending written confirmations, or sending confirmation requests to a specific party within vendor or customer organization;
• Performing substantive analytical procedures using disaggregated data by, for example, comparing gross profit or operating margins by branch office, type of service, line of business, or month to auditor-developed expectations;
• Interviewing personnel involved in activities in areas where a risk of material misstatement due to fraud has been identified in the past (such as at the country or regional level) to obtain their insights about the risk and how controls could address the risk.

CFE team members can make a substantial contribution to the internal audit lead team effort since it’s essential that financial operations managers and internal audit professionals understand how to conduct an FRA and to thoroughly assess the organization’s exposure to specific frauds. That contribution can add value to management’s eventual formulation and implementation of specific, customized controls designed to mitigate each type of fraud risk identified in the FRA. These are the measures that go beyond the basic, essential control checklists followed by many external auditors; they optimize the organization’s defenses against these risks. As such, they must vary from organization to organization, in accordance with the particular processes and procedures that are identified as vulnerable to fraud.

As an example, company A may process invoices in such a tightly controlled way, with double or triple approvals of new vendors, manual review of all invoices, and so on, that an FRA reveals few if any areas where red flags of vendor fraud can be identified. Company B, on the other hand, may process invoices simply by having the appropriate department head review and approve them. In the latter case, an FRA would raise red flags of potential fraud that could occur through double billing, sham company schemes, or collusion between a dishonest vendor and a company insider. For that reason, SAS 99 indicates that some risks are inherent in the environment of the entity, but most can be addressed with an appropriate system of internal control. Once fraud risk assessment has taken place, the entity can identify the processes, controls, and other procedures that are needed to mitigate the identified risks. Effective internal controls will include a well-developed control environment, an effective and secure information system, and appropriate control and monitoring activities. Because of the importance of information technology in supporting operations and the processing of transactions, management also needs to implement and maintain appropriate controls, whether automated or manual, over computer generated information.

The ACFE tells us that the heart of an effective internal controls system and the effectiveness of an anti-fraud program are contingent on an effective risk management assessment.  Although conducting an FRA is not terribly difficult, it does require careful planning and methodical execution. The structure and culture of the organization dictate how the FRA is formulated. In general, however, there is a basic, generally accepted form of the FRA that the audit and fraud prevention communities have agreed on and about which every experienced CFE is expected to be knowledgeable. Assessing the likelihood and significance of each potential fraud risk is a subjective process that should consider not only monetary significance, but also significance to an organization’s reputation and its legal and regulatory compliance requirements. An initial assessment of fraud risk should consider the inherent risk of a particular fraud in the absence of any known controls that may address the risk. An organization can cost-effectively manage its fraud risks by assessing the likelihood and significance of fraudulent behavior.

The FRA team should include a senior internal auditor (or the chief internal auditor, if feasible) and/or an experienced inside or outside certified fraud examiner with substantial experience in conducting FRAs for organizations in the company’s industry.  The management of the internal audit department should prepare a plan for all the assignments to be performed. The audit plan includes the timing and frequency of planned internal audit work. This audit plan is based on a methodical control risk assessment A control risk assessment documents the internal auditor’s understanding of the institution’s significant activities and their associated risks. The management of the internal audit department should establish the principles of the risk assessment methodology in writing and regularly update them to reflect changes to the system of internal control or work process, and to incorporate new lines of business. The risk analysis examines all the entity’s activities, and the complete internal control system. Based on the results of the risk analysis, an audit plan for several years is established, considering the degree of risk inherent in the activities. The plan also considers expected developments and innovations, the generally higher degree of risk of new activities, and the intention to audit all significant activities and entities within a reasonable time period (audit cycle principle for example, three
years). All those concerns will determine the extent, nature and frequency of the assignments to be performed.

In summary…

• A fraud risk assessment is an analysis of an organization’s risks of being victimized by specific types of fraud;
• Approaches to FRAs will differ from organization to organization, but most FRAs focus on identifying fraud risks in six key categories:
— Fraudulent financial reporting;
— Misappropriation of assets;
— Expenditures and liabilities for an improper purpose;
— Revenue and assets obtained by fraud;
— Costs and expenses avoided by fraud;
— Financial misconduct by senior management.
• A properly conducted FRA guides auditors in adjusting their audit plans and testing to focus specifically on gathering evidence of possible fraud;
• The capability to conduct an FRA is essential to effective assessment of the viability of existing anti-fraud controls and to strengthen the organization’s inadequate controls, as identified by the results of the FRA;
• In addition to assessing the types of fraud for which the organization is at risk, the FRA assesses the likelihood that each of those frauds might occur;
• After the FRA and subsequent fraud auditing work is completed, the FRA team should have a good idea of the specific controls needed to minimize the organization’s vulnerability to fraud;
• Auditing for fraud is a critical next step after assessing fraud risks, and this requires auditing for evidence of frauds that may exist according to the red flags identified by the FRA.

Write & Wrong

Posted by on November 20, 2017 Comments Off on Write & Wrong

It’s an adage in the auditing world that examination results that can’t be effectively communicated might as well not exist.  Unlike a financial statement audit report, the CFE’s final report presents a unique challenge because there is no standardized format. Our Chapter receives more general inquiries from new practitioners about the form and content of final examination reports than about almost any other topic.

Each fraud investigation report is different in structure and content, depending on the nature and results of the assignment and the information that needs to be communicated, as well as to whom the results are being directed. To be effective, therefore, the report must communicate the findings in an accurate and concise form. Corporate counsel, law enforcement, juries, an employing attorney and/or the audit committee and management of the victimized organization must all be able to delineate and understand the factual aspects of the fraud as well as the related risks and control deficiencies discovered so that appropriate actions can be taken timely. Thus, the choice of words used and the tone of the CFE’s final report are as important as the information presented within it. To help ensure their reports are persuasive and bring positive results, CFEs should strive to keep them specific, meaningful, actionable, results oriented, and timely.

Because the goal of the final report is to ensure that the user can interpret the results of the investigation or analysis with accuracy and according to the intentions of the fraud examiner or forensic accountant, the report’s tone and structure are paramount. The report should begin by aligning issues and recommendations with applicable ACFE and with any other applicable professional standards and end with results that are clearly written and timely presented. To ensure quality and accuracy, there are some basic guidelines or ground rules that authorities recommend should be considered when putting together a final report that adds value.

The CFE should consider carefully what specifically to communicate in the report, including the conditions, cause, effect, and “why” of each of the significant fraud related facts uncovered.  Fraud investigators should always identify and address issues in a specific context rather than in broad or general terms. For example, stating that the fraud resulted from weaknesses in the collection and processing of vendor payment receipts is too broad. The report should identify the exact circumstances and the related control issues and risk factors identified, the nature of the findings, an analysis of the specific actions constituting the fraud and some discussion (if the CFE has been requested to do so) of possible corrective actions that might be taken.

To force the writing toward more specificity, each paragraph of the report should express only one finding, with major points enumerated, or bulleted, and parallel structure should be used for each itemized statement of a listing of items. Further, the most important findings should be listed in the first sentence of a paragraph. Once findings are delineated, the explanatory narration of facts aligned to each finding should be presented. Being specific means leaving nothing to the
user’s interpretation beyond that which is intended by the writer.  Another way to achieve specificity is to align the writing of the report to an existing control framework like the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission’s (COSO’s) internal control or risk management frameworks. When issues are aligned with existing standards or to a framework, it can be easier for the CFE to explain the weaknesses in the client’s control environment that made the fraud possible.

The question to be answered is: Can the client(s) readily tell what the issues are by reading the investigative report alone? If the answer is “no,” how will they satisfactorily address areas the client will eventually deem important in moving forward toward either remediation or possible prosecution? This aspect of the writing process requires the practitioner to, first, identify to whom the final report is specifically directed and, second, determine what is to be communicated that will add value for the client. For example, the report may a communication to an employing attorney, to corporate counsel, to the client’s management or audit committee or to all three. What are their expectations? Is the report the result of a routine investigation requested by client management of possible accounts payable fraud or a special investigation to address a suspected, specifically identified fraud? The answer to these and related questions will help determine the appropriate technical level and tone for the report.

When there are different readers of the report, the process necessarily becomes more complex under the necessity to meet the expectations, understandings and eventual usages of all the parties. Finding the right words to address the identified fraud related facts in a positive tone, especially when client conditions surrounding the fraud are sometimes sensitive or at least not favorable, is crucial to making the report meaningful as well as persuasive. The investigative findings must be clear and logical. If the reported results are understood and meaningful actions that add value to the position of the various users are taken because of the findings, then the purpose and meaning of the CFE’s report (and work) will be realized.

What about investigative situations in which the CFE or forensic accountant is asked to move beyond a straight-forward presentation of the facts and, as an expert on fraud and on fraud prevention, make recommendations as to corrective actions that the client might take to forestall the future commission of frauds similar to those dealt with in the final report? In such cases (which are quite common, especially with larger clients), the final report should strive to demonstrate to the extent possible the capacity of the entity to implement the recommendations the CFE has included in the report and still maintain an acceptable level of operation.  To this end, the requested recommended actions should be written in a way that conveys to management that implementing the recommendations will strengthen the organization’s overall fraud prevention capability. The writing, as well as the complexity of the corrective action, should position the client organization to implement recommendations to strengthen fraud prevention. The report should begin with the most critical issue and progress to the least important and move from the easiest recommended corrective steps to the most difficult, or to the sequence of steps to implement a recommendation. The cost to correct the fraud vulnerability should be
apparent and easily determined in the written report. Additionally, the report should provide management with a rubric to evaluate the extent to which a deficiency is corrected (e.g., minimally corrected, fully corrected). Such a guide can be used to gauge the fraud prevention related decisions of management and serve as a basis for future fraud risk assessments.

Developing the CFE’s final report is a process that involves four stages: outlining, drafting, revising, and editing. In the outlining stage, the practitioner should gather and organize the information so that, when converted to a report, it is easy for the reader to follow. This entails reviewing the working papers and making a list of the fraud related facts to be addressed and of their related chronologies. These should be discussed with the investigative team (if any) and the
client attorney, if necessary, to ensure that there is a clear understanding of the underlying facts of the case. Any further work or research should be completed at this stage. This process may be simple or complicated, depending on the extent of the investigation, the unit or operation that is under examination, and the number of fraud related facts that must be addressed.

Once all information has been gathered, the next stage is writing the draft of the report. In completing the draft, concise and coherent statements with sufficient detail should enable the reader to understand the chronology and related facts of the fraud, the fraud’s impact on operations, and the proposed corrective actions (if requested by the client). After completing the draft, revisions may be necessary to make sure that the evidence supports the results and is written in a specific context.

The final stage involves proofreading and editing for correct grammar, sentence structure, and word usage to ensure that the facts and issues related to the fraud are effectively and completely presented and that the report is coherent. Reviewers should be used at this stage to give constructive feedback. Several iterations may be necessary before a final report is completed.

In summary, the CFE’s final report should be designed to add value and to guide the client organization’s subsequent steps to a satisfactory overall fraud response and conclusion. If the CFE’s report is deficient in communicating results, critical follow-on steps requiring immediate action may be skipped or ignored. This can be costly for any company in lost opportunities for loss recoveries, botched prosecutions and damaged reputation.

A CDC for Cyber

Posted by on October 16, 2017 Comments Off on A CDC for Cyber

I remember reading somewhere a few years back that Microsoft had commissioned a report which recommended that the U.S. government set up an entity akin to its Center for Disease Control but for cyber security.  An intriguing idea.  The trade press talks about malware and computer viruses and infections to describe self -replicating malicious code in the same way doctors talk about metastasizing cancers or the flu; likewise, as with public health, rather than focusing on prevention and detection, we often blame those who have become infected and try to retrospectively arrest/prosecute (cure) those responsible (the cancer cells, hackers) long after the original harm is done. Regarding cyber, what if we extended this paradigm and instead viewed global cyber security as an exercise in public health?

As I recall, the report pointed out that organizations such as the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta and the World Health Organization in Geneva have over decades developed robust systems and objective methodologies for identifying and responding to public health threats; structures and frameworks that are far more developed than those existent in today’s cyber-security community. Given the many parallels between communicable human diseases and those affecting today’s technologies, there is also much fraud examiners and security professionals can learn from the public health model, an adaptable system capable of responding to an ever-changing array of pathogens around the world.

With cyber as with matters of public health, individual actions can only go so far. It’s great if an individual has excellent techniques of personal hygiene, but if everyone in that person’s town has the flu, eventually that individual will probably succumb as well. The comparison is relevant to the world of cyber threats. Individual responsibility and action can make an enormous difference in cyber security, but ultimately the only hope we have as a nation in responding to rapidly propagating threats across this planetary matrix of interconnected technologies is to construct new institutions to coordinate our response. A trusted, international cyber World Health Organization could foster cooperation and collaboration across companies, countries, and government agencies, a crucial step required to improve the overall public health of the networks driving the critical infrastructures in both our online and our off-line worlds.

Such a proposed cyber CDC could go a long way toward counteracting the technological risks our country faces today and could serve a critical role in improving the overall public health of the networks driving the critical infrastructures of our world. A cyber CDC could fulfill many roles that are carried out today only on an ad hoc basis, if at all, including:

• Education — providing members of the public with proven methods of cyber hygiene to protect themselves;
• Network monitoring — detection of infection and outbreaks of malware in cyberspace;
• Epidemiology — using public health methodologies to study digital cyber disease propagation and provide guidance on response and remediation;
• Immunization — helping to ‘vaccinate’ companies and the public against known threats through software patches and system updates;
• Incident response — dispatching experts as required and coordinating national and global efforts to isolate the sources of online infection and treat those affected.

While there are many organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, that focus on the above tasks, no single entity owns them all. It is through these gaps in effort and coordination that cyber risks continue to mount. An epidemiological approach to our growing technological risks is required to get to the source of malware infections, as was the case in the fight against malaria. For decades, all medical efforts focused in vain on treating the disease in those already infected. But it wasn’t until epidemiologists realized the malady was spread by mosquitoes breeding in still pools of water that genuine progress was made in the fight against the disease. By draining the pools where mosquitoes and their larvae grow, epidemiologists deprived them of an important breeding ground, thus reducing the spread of malaria. What stagnant pools can we drain in cyberspace to achieve a comparable result? The answer represents the yet unanswered challenge.

There is another major challenge a cyber CDC would face: most of those who are sick have no idea they are walking around infected, spreading disease to others. Whereas malaria patients develop fever, sweats, nausea, and difficulty breathing, important symptoms of their illness, infected computer users may be completely asymptomatic. This significant difference is evidenced by the fact that the overwhelming majority of those with infected devices have no idea there is malware on their machines nor that they might have even joined a botnet army. Even in the corporate world, with the average time to detection of a network breach now at 210 days, most companies have no idea their most prized assets, whether intellectual property or a factory’s machinery, have been compromised. The only thing worse than being hacked is being hacked and not knowing about it. If you don’t know you’re sick, how can you possibly get treatment? Moreover, how can we prevent digital disease propagation if carriers of these maladies don’t realize they are infecting others?

Addressing these issues could be a key area of import for any proposed cyber CDC and fundamental to future communal safety and that of critical information infrastructures. Cyber-security researchers have pointed out the obvious Achilles’ heel of the modern technology infused world, the fact that today everything is either run by computers (or will be) and that everything is reliant on these computers continuing to work. The challenge is that we must have some way of continuing to work even if all the computers fail. Were our information systems to crash on a mass scale, there would be no trading on financial markets, no taking money from ATMs, no telephone network, and no pumping gas. If these core building blocks of our society were to suddenly give way, what would humanity’s backup plan be? The answer is simply, we don’t now have one.

Complicating all this from a law enforcement and fraud investigation perspective is that black hats generally benefit from technology long before defenders and investigators ever do. The successful ones have nearly unlimited budgets and don’t have to deal with internal bureaucracies, approval processes, or legal constraints. But there are other systemic issues that give criminals the upper hand, particularly around jurisdiction and international law. In a matter of minutes, the perpetrator of an online crime can virtually visit six different countries, hopping from server to server and continent to continent in an instant. But what about the police who must follow the digital evidence trail to investigate the matter?  As with all government activities, policies, and procedures, regulations must be followed. Trans-border cyber-attacks raise serious jurisdictional issues, not just for an individual police department, but for the entire institution of policing as currently formulated. A cop in Baltimore has no authority to compel an ISP in Paris to provide evidence, nor can he make an arrest on the right bank. That can only be done by request, government to government, often via mutual legal assistance treaties. The abysmally slow pace of international law means it commonly takes years for police to get evidence from overseas (years in a world in which digital evidence can be destroyed in seconds). Worse, most countries still do not even have cyber-crime laws on the books, meaning that criminals can act with impunity making response through a coordinating entity like a cyber-CDC more valuable to the U.S. specifically and to the world in general.

Experts have pointed out that we’re engaged in a technological arms race, an arms race between people who are using technology for good and those who are using it for ill. The challenge is that nefarious uses of technology are scaling exponentially in ways that our current systems of protection have simply not matched.  The point is, if we are to survive the progress offered by our technologies and enjoy their benefits, we must first develop adaptive mechanisms of security that can match or exceed the exponential pace of the threats confronting us. On this most important of imperatives, there is unambiguously no time to lose.

Asked and Answered

Posted by on July 13, 2017 Comments Off on Asked and Answered

Some months ago, I was involved as a member of an out-of-town fraud examination team during which the question of note taking during an investigative interview arose. A younger member of the team (a junior internal auditor) wanted to know about approaches to the documentation of not just one, but possibly of the several prospective interview sessions it initially appeared might be necessary regarding the examination.

As the ACFE tells us, notes, whether handwritten or recorded, always send an unambiguous signal to the subject that the interviewer is memorializing his or her comments. Interviews without notes are significantly limited in their value and may even signal to the interview subject that it may later be just a question of her word against the interviewer’s. If the interviewer takes only cryptic or shorthand notes and later reviews those notes with the subject to confirm what was said, the interviewer should recognize that the notes, while confirmed and edited to a certain extent, will still be less than complete.

On the other hand, tape recording an interview is a significant obstacle to full cooperation. People are reluctant to be recorded. For the most part, the use of tape recorders to take notes is not recommended in situations involving a potential fraud. Most subjects will resist the use of recorders and, even in circumstances where the subject may have agreed to their use, their responses will be more guarded than if a recorder was not used. If a recorder is used, be sure to begin the taping by recording the date, time, names of the individuals present, and an acknowledgment by the subject that they know the interview is being recorded and they have agreed to be recorded.

Once the interviewer has determined how s/he will document the interview, s/he should ask the subject if it is okay to take notes or record the session. It is the polite and professional thing to do and it serves two purposes:

–It is part of the process by which the subject is encouraged to be a participant;
–If the subject balks or tells the interviewer she does mind that the interviewer takes notes, it can open a line of questioning by the interviewer to determine the exact cause of the subject’s objections;

The subject should always be advised that note taking is critical to the integrity of the process and that notes ensure that what the subject says is documented properly. Failure to take notes limits the information to the memory and interpretation of the interviewer.  In a professional setting, most subjects will understand the critical nature of notes. Very few people will say it is not all right to take notes, regardless of how they feel about it. If they are absolutely opposed to the taking of notes, find out why and concentrate on what the subject says and reduce the interview to notes as quickly as possible after the interview. With a hostile subject who opposes note taking, the interviewer can ask if it is okay for her to make selected notes regarding dates or things the interviewer might not remember later. The interviewer can explain that it is important that s/he understand the subject’s position or communication correctly. If the subject is still adamant about the interviewer not taking notes, it should be documented in the interviewer’s report.

As the fraud interviewer develops his or her interviewing skill set, s/he should concentrate on taking verbatim notes which, among other things, include, at a minimum, nouns, pronouns, and verbs. Some practitioners recommend that the interviewer not attempt to write everything down. The argument is that, in doing so, the interviewer will not have an opportunity to observe the subject’s nonverbal communications.

The generally accepted recommendation is, therefore, where feasible, that the interviewer take down verbatim as much of what the subject says as is possible. This includes repeated words and parenthetical comments. This practice allows the interviewer to later review what the subject said as opposed to what the interviewer thought the subject said. Note taking also provides additional documentation of what the subject is communicating and (when reviewed after the fact in the light of additional knowledge) of what the subject has excluded.

During the act of taking notes, the interviewer should exercise caution. Taking notes intermittently can signal to the subject that the interviewer takes notes only when the information is important. Conversely, if, during the interview, a very sensitive area is broached, or if the subject indicates that s/he is uncomfortable with an area or issue, the interviewer can put her pencil down, lean forward, establish good eye contact, and listen to the subject. The simple suspension of note taking may place the subject at ease. As soon as the interview moves to a less sensitive area, the interviewer should try to reduce the previously mentioned sensitive area to notes. If the subject associates note taking with core interview information, the subject may interpret continued note taking as encouragement to continue talking.

The interviewer should not write down interpretive comments while taking notes. The interviewer should however make notes, where appropriate, in cases where verbal and
nonverbal indications of both resistance or cooperation are found.

The interviewer should always take notes with the possibility in mind that the notes may be subjected to third party scrutiny. This scrutiny may extend to opposing counsel in the event of litigation. The interviewer’s notes may or may not be privileged materials. With this in
mind, the interviewer should consider the following:

–Begin each separate set of interview notes on a clean page;
–Identify the date, time, and place of the interview and all the individuals present at the interview;
–Obtain as much background data on the subject as possible, including telephone numbers, and identify means of contacting him or her, including alternate numbers for family and friends;
–Initial and date the notes;
–Document the interviewer’s questions;
–Take verbatim notes if possible. Concentrate, but do not limit notes of the subject’s responses to:
• Nouns
• Pronouns
• Verb tense
• Qualifiers
• Indicators of responsibility, innocence, or guilt
–Do not document conclusions or interpretations;
–Report any unusual change in body language in an objective manner. Document the changes in body language and tone, if applicable, in conjunction with notes of what the subject or interviewer said at the time the body language or tone changed;
–At the conclusion of the interview, review the notes with the subject to confirm what the subject has said.

Finally, following the interview, your notes should be reproduced in printed form as quickly as possible.  Enough cannot be said for the value of a well-documented set of interview notes for every aspect of a subsequent investigation; their presence or absence can make or break your entire case.

The Facts Speak for Themselves

Posted by on November 13, 2016 Comments Off on The Facts Speak for Themselves

fact-findingOne of the most frequent topics our Chapter receives questions about from new members and from our on-line guests concerns the documenting and reporting of investigative results.  What types of reports do fraud examiners and forensic accountants typically produce based on what types of documentation? What should be included in the various types of documentation and reports and what should be avoided?

The ACFE tells us that documenting an investigation is as important as performing it. A poorly documented case file can lead to a disappointing conclusion, a dissatisfied client, and can even damage the investigator’s reputation. Various means by which the fraud examiner or forensic accounting investigator may report her findings have been established by over two decades of practice.  The form of the report, whether oral or written, is always a matter to be discussed with the client and with counsel. While it’s not the responsibility of the fraud examiner to advise on the legal perils associated with various forms of reporting, there are certain issues of which new investigators should be aware as their clients debate the form of reporting that will conclude the investigator’s examination.

The ACFE suggests that practitioners try to determine at the outset whether a written report is expected and, if so, its form and timing. In the usual circumstance that this point can’t be decided at the inception of the engagement, the examiner should conduct the investigation in a manner that will facilitate a comprehensive oral report, including the key documents and any exhibits necessary to illustrate the findings. Many investigations begin small, but there’s no way to know with certainty where they will lead and what will be required at the conclusion. Although the client may not have requested a report at the outset of the investigation, some event during the investigation may change the client’s mind, and the investigator should to be prepared to respond. For example, you may determine during an investigation that an officer of the company violated a law or regulation, thereby requiring the company to consider self-reporting and possibly

bringing a civil action against the officer and other third parties. Alternatively, you may be subpoenaed for your part in an investigation that has captured the attention of regulatory agencies or law enforcement. While you can testify only as to what procedures you recall performing and the attendant findings, your client, and your own reputation, will be better served if you always have through and proper documentation. Try to perform an investigation as if you might be asked later to report formally on your findings and on the exact procedures performed.

Members also ask about the types of reports.  The most common reports are:

Written reports

  • Report of investigation. This form of written report is given directly to the client, which may be the company’s management, board, audit committee of the board, in-house counsel or outside counsel. The report should stand on its own; that is, it should identify all the relevant evidence that was used in concluding on the allegations under investigation. This is important because the client may rely on the report for various purposes such as corporate filings, lawsuits, employment actions, or alterations to procedures and controls.
  • Expert report filed in a civil court proceeding. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) publishes an excellent practice aid on the full range of expert reports.
  • Affidavits. These are voluntary declarations of facts and are communicated in written form and sworn to by the witness (declarant) before an officer authorized by the court.
  • Informal reports. These consist of memos to file, summary outlines used in delivery of an oral report, interview notes, spreadsheets listing transactions along with explanatory annotations, and other less-formal written material prepared by the investigation team.

Oral reports

  • Oral reports are usually delivered by the investigation engagement leader to those overseeing an investigation, such as a company’s board, or to those who represent the company’s interests, such as outside counsel.
  • Oral reports involve giving a deposition, as a fact witness or expert witness, during which everything that is said, by all parties to the deposition, is transcribed by a court reporter.

Reports documenting an investigation differ considerably from audit opinions issued under generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS). The investigative report writer is not constrained by the required language of a governing standard, and investigative reports differ from one another in organization and content depending on the client’s stated needs. In contrast, financial audit reports adhere to set formula prescribed by GAAS. The uses of written reports also differ. The client could do any of the following things with an investigative report:

  • Distribute the report to a select group of individuals associated with the company in various capacities;
  • Voluntarily give the report to a prosecutor as a referral for prosecution;
  • Enter the report as evidence in a civil fraud proceeding;
  • Give the report to outside counsel for use in preparing regulatory findings, entering negotiations, or providing other legal services on behalf of the company.

However the client decides to use the report, its basic elements usually include the following organizaton:

  • Identify your client;
  • In the case of a lawsuit, identify the parties;
  • State in broad terms what you were asked to do;
  • Describe your scope, including the period examined;
  • Include mention of any restriction as to distribution and use of the report;
  • Identify the professional standards under which the work was conducted;
  • Identify exclusions in the reliance on your report (the report is not a financial audit, etc.);
  • State that your work should not be relied on to detect all fraud;
  • Include the procedures you performed, technical pronouncements relied upon, and findings.

Although a summary can be helpful to the reader it may be perilous for the report writer in terms of keeping critical information and perspectives intact. Caution is advised when preparing two types of summary sections: executive summary and conclusion.  If you do write a summary, be careful not to offer an opinion on the factual findings unless specifically requested to do so by the client. The facts should speak for themselves.

It may be appropriate to include in a concluding section of the Report of Investigation certain recommendations for additional investigative procedures or a description of control breakdowns you have observed. Also, a carefully written executive summary at the beginning of the report can be extremely helpful to the reader, especially when it precedes a long and complex report. The executive summary should offer in simple, straightforward language an accurate statement of significant findings. Each summarized finding should include a reference to the full description of findings included in the complete Report of Investigation.

Fraud examination reports are powerful tools which can assist client management in a myriad of ways but, like anything else, if ineptly prepared, represent a minefield for the beginning practitioner.

Of Estimates, Errors & Fraud

Posted by on September 19, 2016 Comments Off on Of Estimates, Errors & Fraud

fraud-warningThere was a local case of embezzlement in the news last week in which the suspected perpetrator claimed that a number of her seemingly fraudulent transactions, as identified by her company’s external auditors, were in reality ‘mistakes’ (mostly either accounting or estimating errors) or, in other cases, just simple missteps occasioned by ignorance of her company’s accounting policies. Somewhat surprisingly, this all too common defense seemed to cast some doubt, at least from the newspaper’s point of view, on the overall propriety of the entire prosecution. For me, the case brought to mind, on one hand, the differing roles of external auditors and forensic accountants and, on the other, the often critical role played in investigations by the introduction of the foggy elements of accounting estimates, simple errors and ignorance.

Unlike the external auditors in this case, the forensic accounting investigator’s concern is not limited to reaching a general opinion on financial statements taken as a whole, derived from reasonable efforts within a reasonable materiality boundary. Instead, the forensic accounting investigator’s concern is, at a much more granular level, with the detailed development of factual information—derived from both documentary evidence and testimonial evidence—about the who, what, when, where, how, and why of a specific, suspected or known impropriety.  In my opinion, it’s the lack of such investigative granularity in the follow-up to the simple discovery of the individual fraud by the auditors in this recent case that resulted in the ‘ambiguity’ expressed by the newspaper.

The auditors discovered the suspected fraud through their routine sampling procedures, which predication of the existence of an impropriety would have furnished the starting point for the work of a forensic accountant had one been called in. Think of it like the relationship between the accountant and the financial analyst.  The financial analyst’s work typically begins when that of the accountant ends; the audited financial statements are the foundation on which the work of the financial analyst rests.  So too do discoveries of improprieties by auditors often lead to a subsequent investigative hand off to forensic investigators.  The forensic investigator starts by seeking and examining all relevant evidence concerning the particular case made available, not only by the auditors, but by all the concerned parties.  Based on the investigative findings, the forensic accounting investigator then assesses and measures losses or other forms of damage to the organization and recommends and implements corrective actions, often including changes in accounting processes and policies and/or personnel actions. In addition, the forensic accounting investigator assists management in taking preventive actions to eliminate recurrence of the problem. In contrast to the external auditors, the forensic accounting investigator’s more complete findings and recommendations may form the basis of testimony in litigation proceedings or criminal actions against the perpetrators. They may also be used in testimony to government agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission in the United States or the Serious Fraud Office in the United Kingdom. Accordingly, the scope of the investigation and the evidence gathered and documented must be capable of withstanding challenges that may be brought by adversely affected parties on both sides of the prosecution or by skeptical regulators.

Clearly, there are many commonalities between auditing and forensic accounting which, at best , can support the formation of a close working partnership. Both rely on:

  • Knowledge of the industry and the company, including its business practices and processes;
  • Knowledge of the generally accepted accounting principles of the jurisdiction in question;
  • Interpretation of business documents and records;
  • Independence and objectivity—perhaps the most important commonality.

The foggy nature of estimates and errors arises in financial transactions and statements due to the continuous nature of business. Unlike a footrace that ends at the finish line or an athletic contest that ends with the final buzzer, a business and its transactions are continually in varying stages of completion. There are many items in a financial statement for which the final outcome is not known with precision. Given the complexity and continuity of business, it’s difficult to capture a clear snapshot of a company’s financial position and performance at a random point in time. As a general matter, estimates are most commonly made concerning the final amounts of cash that will be received or paid once assets or liabilities are finally converted into cash. Such estimates can encompass, for example, allowances for uncollectible customer receivables, estimates of liabilities for claims or lawsuits brought against a company, the amount of profit or loss on a long-term contract, and the salability of inventory that is past its prime. Most estimates are based on three types of information: past performance of the same or similar items, what is currently occurring, and what management perceives as the probable outcome. Further complicating matters, the weight to assign each type of information varies depending on the particular circumstances. But no matter how determined, unlike the score of a sporting contest, an estimate on the books or in financial statements is a prediction of what will happen, not the objective tally of what has already taken place.  For all these and a host of other reasons, the ACFE tells us that accounting estimates are always a fertile ground for every type of financial fraud.

What the forensic investigator brings into this mix is his or her informed, holistic approach (as outline above) to the detailed analysis of any specific, predicated fraud.   Legitimate assertion of managerial confidence in the business’s ability to achieve certain estimated results is one thing. A deceptive misinterpretation that is intended to generate a favorable estimate is another thing altogether and may pose a substantial investigative challenge well beyond the scope of most routine financial audits. Practicing forensic accounting investigators are trained to address the often vexing complexities and alternative rationales that may be offered to explain the difference between an estimate and an actual result. Given that estimates often constitute the cause of material differences in financial statement presentations, the ability to distinguish between the manipulatively self-serving and the merely incorrect is a critical element of many forensic investigations.

To get back to our newspaper case, U.S. auditing standards state that the main difference between fraud and error is intent. Errors are unintentional misstatements or omissions of amounts or disclosures in financial statements. So, errors may involve:

  • Mistakes in gathering or processing data from which financial statements are prepared;
  • Unreasonable accounting estimates arising from oversight or misinterpretation of facts;
  • Mistakes in the application of accounting principles related to amount, classification, manner of presentation, or disclosure.

Fraud, on the other hand, is defined in SAS 99 as an intentional act that results in a material misstatement. The motive or intent of an individual in making accounting entries is not the primary focus of the external auditor’s procedures as it is of the forensic investigators. Auditors direct their efforts toward determining objectively measurable criteria regarding account balances and transactions by asking: Do the assets exist? How much was paid? What is the basis of the estimate? Is it reasonable? How much was collected? Were the goods shipped to the customer? By asking questions such as these and obtaining evidence to support the estimate where appropriate, auditors can be better positioned to ascertain that the amounts in the books are correct. Thus, given the focus of the auditor, intent is not uniformly relevant; evaluation of intent is a subjective as opposed to an objective evaluation, and ascertaining intent is a difficult exercise at which the trained forensic accountant is highly skilled.

For the foreseeable future, corporate fraud will continue to present substantial challenges and opportunities for fruitful partnership between auditors and forensic accounting investigators. However, it must be recognized that the complexities of the business world and the ingenuity of highly educated, white-collar criminals will always manage to produce schemes that unfortunately go undetected until they reach significant proportions. Forensic accounting investigators will investigate, prosecutors will convict, and regulators will react with new and more requirements … and, without question,  the fraudsters will always be with us.

Who’s the Client?

Posted by on August 12, 2016 Comments Off on Who’s the Client?

lawyer_1While I was away on vacation last week our Chapter received an on-line comment-request from a CFE practitioner currently working on a fraud investigation for an attorney on the legal staff of a major international corporation.   The commenter was seeking some overview information relating to the protection of the content of her soon to be completed investigative report under U.S. law.  As I’m sure most of you remember, the attorney-client privilege applies where there is a (1) confidential (2) communication (3) between attorneys and their clients (4) made for the purpose of rendering or receiving legal advice.

To protect the report of an internal investigation, the report should be communicated to the lawyer (preferably the lawyer should initiate the investigation), it should not be distributed to anyone else, and it should be for the purpose of providing the lawyer information he or she needs to render a legal opinion or provide legal advice. The key element is that the attorney (whether in-house counsel-or outside counsel) is having the investigation conducted for the purpose of providing legal advice to the company.  The privilege generally extends to information gathered by investigators like our CFE enquirer if the investigator is acting at the direction of the attorney.

The ACFE tells us that the existence of the following will help ensure that communications gathered during the investigation will be protected under the attorney-client privilege:

–The communications were made by corporate employees to counsel;
–The communications were made at the direction of corporate superiors in order for the company to obtain legal advice from counsel;
–The employees were aware that the communications were being made in order for the company to obtain legal advice;
–The information needed was not available from upper management;
–The communications concerned matters within the scope of the employees’ corporate duties;
–The communications were confidential when made and were kept confidential by the company.

CFE’s and forensic accountants should not make the mistake of believing that just because an attorney is involved all reports and communications are protected by the attorney-client privilege. The privilege protects only those communications related to the attorney providing legal advice. Often courts will seek to determine whether the attorney was actually rendering legal advice or merely performing investigative services. Some courts have taken a narrow view of the privilege and have held that if the investigation could have been conducted just as easily by a private investigator, then the lawyer was acting as just that, an investigator, not as a lawyer; therefore, the privilege would not apply.

The ACFE cautions that the most often overlooked requirement is that the CFE’s report remain confidential. Even if a report meets all of the other requirements (prepared by a CFE for the attorney for the purpose of providing legal advice), the privilege will be lost if it is disclosed to anyone other than “the client.” In the corporate setting, it’s often hard to determine just who “the client” is. However, it’s generally clear that senior officials within the company are authorized to seek advice from an attorney on behalf of the company and to act on such advice. Accordingly, most courts have held that communications between an attorney and senior-level management are protected, while communications between an attorney and lower-level employees may not be.  Therefore, special care should be taken to ensure that the attorney-client privilege is not waived inadvertently by giving documents or communicating information to anyone outside the investigation team, including members of law enforcement. If information gathered during an investigation is shared with law enforcement, then the privilege may be waived not only as to the information given, but also to any other information relating to the same subject matter. This is known as “horizontal” waiver. Some courts have held that waiver of the privilege as to one document implies waiver as to all documents concerning the same subject matter.

If a fraud examiner or forensic accountant feels that a case should be recommended for criminal prosecution, the examiner should consult with the attorney before providing any information to government or law enforcement authorities. For example, if an investigator submits a copy of his report to the prosecutor who initiates criminal proceedings based on the findings in the report, the criminal defendant may be able to require the investigator to provide all the documents he or she used in writing the report. In such an instance, the investigator may be considered to have waived the privilege. Likewise, if law enforcement requests the results of an investigation or information gathered during an investigation, the attorney should be consulted before turning over the information. Some courts have held that the privilege is not waived if a company is subpoenaed to produce the information.

The work product doctrine protects materials that are prepared in anticipation of litigation.  the Supreme Court has set forth some protection for materials prepared with an eye toward litigation. The Court has stated that the doctrine promoted the “orderly prosecution and defense of legal claims” by providing attorneys with a zone of privacy that was essential to their role as an adversary.  People often mistakenly believe that the work product doctrine is connected to, or is part of, the attorney-client privilege. It is not. One of the main differences between the work product doctrine and the attorney-client privilege is that the work product doctrine is not a privilege. The work product doctrine is a provision of the discovery rules which provides that in certain instances, items will be protected from discovery. As such, the work product doctrine is really a “qualified immunity” from discovery. It differs from an evidentiary privilege (such as attorney-client privilege) in that even if the document falls within the definition of “work product,” the judge still can order that the document be produced if the opposing party can show “substantial need” for the protected information and that the information cannot be obtained from another source. However, even if “substantial need” is shown, the mental impressions and opinions of an attorney concerning the litigation are not subject to disclosure under any circumstances.

In virtually every lawsuit, there will be disputes about what must be produced and what is protected from discovery. The rules are not always clear, and they are not applied consistently in either the federal or state courts. One good, but not foolproof protection, is to put the phrase “PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL” at the top of every document produced regarding the case. Of course, this statement is not evidence the document is legally privileged or protected, but it does show an intention to keep the communication confidential, and will alert others that the document contains sensitive information.

Some general exceptions to the privilege rule are:

–Only the holder of a privilege, or the holder’s designated representative, can assert the privilege.
–If the holder, after having notice and opportunity, fails to assert it, the privilege is waived.
–If the holder discloses significant information to someone outside the protected relationship, the privilege does not hold.
–The communication must be pertinent to the protected relationship (a physician and a patient must be discussing health issues), or there is no privilege. Ordinary discussion not deemed confidential is not protected.

War Stories

Posted by on April 30, 2016 Comments Off on War Stories

war-stories_2

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I like to collect war stories from fellow fraud examiners and auditors.  This one is a story a long time member of our Chapter and a personal friend shared with me not too long ago over lunch.  It has to do with a case he investigated during the mid-nineties.  One of his client companies at the time was the wholly owned subsidiary of a prominent medical equipment wholesaler which sold primarily to local pharmacies.  It seems the subsidiary maintained a large sales force, the superstar of which was a sales manager I’ll call Drew Paul.  Paul’s division brought in over 50% of the subsidiary’s revenue and, even in a sales force of above average performers, Paul stood out.

Our Chapter member got involved with the subsidiary when a member of the parent’s audit committee requested a routine fraud vulnerability study of all the parent’s principal subs.  Paul’s sub was the second our Chapter member evaluated.  As part of the general review’s kick-off process, my friend met with the human resources head to obtain an organization chart and to familiarize himself with the sub and its operations.  Review of the data supplied by HR revealed high turnover in the sales division, turnover that was predominantly related to one sales manager, Drew Paul. He also discovered that the HR department didn’t routinely conduct exit interviews when employees left either the sales division or the company. Our member was immediately concerned because the lack of such a routine personnel procedure was unusual in a sub of such a progressive company.  Our member then scheduled a follow up meeting with the HR head which yielded some interesting observations. The HR head noted that Paul Drew didn’t seem to care about HR policies. His attitude seemed to stem from his assertion that the sales team was the “bread and butter” and that the rest of the company was dependent on it. The HR head had the impression that the sub’s CEO seemed to agree, not requiring the sales division to adhere to company policy and procedure. At our friend’s request, the HR head handed over copies of the sales senior management team’s personnel files for his review. The HR head also mentioned, as an aside, that, in her opinion, Paul’s income would not begin to support the level of his apparent lifestyle. Our member additionally found that the HR head had issued a warning letter to Paul for violating company policy by recruiting entry-level data clerks to collect checks from the subs retail pharmacy customers without HR’ s knowledge.

Given these red flags, and with the parent’s permission, our Chapter member decided to start the sales vulnerability assessment portion of the general assessment immediately. He met with the sub’s CEO and quietly put a small upper management team together to begin the review.  The first week of the assessment was spent reading company/division policies and procedures; reviewing the sales department’s structure, authority matrix, sales process, and analysis of the past two years’ sales, as well as the portion of the market (sales territories) allotted to each of the managers; and the access level controls on the sales module of the general ledger system. The review team planned the engagement to cover both compliance and substantive testing of the entire sales process. Two deficiencies came out clearly during the initial review testing: There were loose controls around issuing promotional and bonus products to pharmacies, and there were few controls on sales returns. Bonus and promotional products were used by the wholesaler to reward pharmacies that met or exceeded their sales targets, launch a new product, or successfully push a slow-moving product.

Our friend reviewed the list of past employees who were terminated or had resigned from the sales force in the last year. His eyes fell on Billy Preston who had been terminated at the end of the second quarter.  After consulting with the parent’s corporate legal counsel and obtaining consent from the audit committee, our member invited Preston to lunch the next week. Preston conveyed some astonishing things about Paul and even provided a copy of a check from a pharmacy written out to Paul (while collecting checks for the subsidiary from the pharmacy, Preston was handed the check made out to Paul). When Preston confronted Paul about the suspicious check, Paul terminated Preston on behavioral grounds and threatened to withhold severance pay if he went to HR. Considering Paul’s intimidating stature and apparent influence with the CEO and within the company generally, Preston decided to just leave the company quietly and begin looking for another job.

Apparently, Paul was using bonus and promotional products for personal gain. The value of bonus and promotional products given out to pharmacy customers amounted to 9 percent and 12 percent of total sales respectively. The lack of strictly defined policies and guidelines for the use of promotional and bonus products at the parent and sub left the distribution of them to the discretion of managers. Unfortunately, it also made it possible for Paul and (it later developed) a corrupt distribution manager at the parent working together to exploit the internal control deficiency. The bonus and promotional products program was transparent only to the two managers but not to the individual pharmacies. Keeping pharmacies in the dark about the details of how much they should be getting in bonus and promotional products if they reached sales targets, the two managers could favor the pharmacies of their choice.  With this additional information, our member further analyzed how a small number of pharmacies were favored with extra bonus and promotional items compared to other pharmacies, though the other pharmacies were giving the same amount of business to the parent. Not surprisingly, sales returns were also higher for the pharmacies receiving the extra bonus and promotional items than the average sales returns of all the other pharmacies put together. By colluding with pharmacies, Paul pushed sales at month end and arranged with the pharmacies to return their purchases by the first week of the next month so the pharmacy would not be overburdened with stock. By doing this, Paul received more commission from the parent, which was, at the time, based on gross sales and not on net sales (gross sales minus sales returns).

Our member wrote a confidential report and delivered his findings to the audit committee of the parent. After a thorough review, the audit committee chairman summoned Paul. As part of the review, Paul’s bank statements were legally obtained. The chairman asked Paul to explain why his bank records showed deposits from seven out of the 35 pharmacies he was handling. After initial denials, Paul admitted to accepting kickbacks in the amount of $175,00 by favoring certain pharmacies. He also came clean on the sales-returns routing that was conveniently altered so that certain of his sales team members would receive higher commissions than those to which they were entitled. Paul also revealed the names of several employees in his department who were helping him in the scheme. The parent decided not to press charges against Paul and the others because they agreed to repay monies received as kickbacks from the pharmacies.

For our member the takeaways are that CFE’s should tell their clients not to lose control of their subs.  Policies, procedures, and guidelines should be established in all sub departments, especially in those areas where more discretionary powers are involved. Keep the whistle blowing process transparent, approachable, and user-friendly. There also should be a mechanism in place to protect whistle blowers like Billy Preston. Management should engage CFE’s to perform regular fraud risk assessments, especially of semi-independent subsidiaries.  Finally, high turnover in a department should always be perceived as a red flag. Exit interviews should be thoroughly conducted to get to the root of a problem which can often turn out to be fraud related.

The Fire Alarm & the Bottom Line

Posted by on March 11, 2016 Comments Off on The Fire Alarm & the Bottom Line

fire-alarmI was having lunch with a couple of colleagues yesterday and the topic of ‘pulling the fire alarm’ came up.  Specifically, ‘pulling the fire alarm’ relates to a corporate employee alerting management about the suspected fraudulent activity of a fellow employee.  Everyone at the table agreed that the main reason management is often deprived of this vital intelligence is that your typical employee has a very hard time getting his or her head around the fact that their personally well-known co-worker can even be deceptive or dishonest, let alone actually steal something.

CFE’s are trained to know that good people can be, and often are, deceptive.  When people think of deception, they often envision being tricked or having the wool pulled over their eyes. Although fraudulent acts are frequently acts of deception, the fallacy lies in believing that individuals within “our organization” would never commit a deceptive act. After all, our conflicted employee tells herself, our organization goes to great lengths to hire top-notch talent who will be loyal and faithful. Our potential whistle-blower is aware that company employees are promoted through the ranks into leadership roles only because they’ve displayed some unique attributes related to their individual knowledge or talent.

ACFE interviews with fraudsters tell us that the psychological impact of events on professionals in today’s world is difficult to predict. Individuals who’re typically reasonable and display high integrity can frequently be placed in situations where both personal and professional stress can impact their decisions and actions in ways they may have never imagined. This is where the almost universal tendency to bestow the dangerous gift of the benefit of the doubt must be countered.  No question that organizations must encourage that general openness and transparency in everyday actions be practiced by their employees at all levels. But employees must also be made to understand that if someone questions an action or event, established outlets are available to report those concerns without the fear of repercussions. A specific example that unintentionally supports the benefit of the doubt syndrome is an instance where an employee repeatedly performs an inappropriate action among a group of co-workers within the corporate setting. Someone who witnesses the act may not feel comfortable speaking up at the time of the occurrence, especially if the person performing the action is his or her superior in the corporate hierarchy. However, that doesn’t mean it’s okay to walk away from the situation and say nothing. The outlets to report concerns may be as simple as speaking to a supervisor, contacting a human resources representative, or even calling the employee hotline. Employees must be encouraged to speak up whenever they see activity occurring that they believe is inappropriate. If they don’t, they’re perpetuating a culture of denial and silent acceptance.

Such a culture of silent acceptance can grow almost imperceptibly until the organization can irrationally come to unconsciously believe it’s immune to fraud.   My luncheon companions agreed that this syndrome is entirely natural given that all organizations want to believe they’re immune to fraud; then the table talk turned to the following interesting and related points…

It’s unfortunate that it takes some shattering event like a major embezzlement to make some organizations face the fact that fraud doesn’t discriminate; it can happen anywhere, any time. Just as individuals may rationalize why it’s okay to commit fraud, organizations sometimes attempt to rationalize the “whys” that support their belief that fraud won’t happen to them. Every CFE has seen instances of this defensive stance even during on-going fraud examinations! There can be multiple beliefs within corporate cultures that contribute to this act of rationalization. What one person views as a very strict policy, another person may see as a simple guideline open to interpretation. It’s always important to maintain several levels of defense against fraud, including multiple-preventive and detective controls. Because it is not possible to provide absolute assurance against fraud, it becomes even more critical to ensure that controls in place are sufficient to place periodic roadblocks, warning signs, or the proverbial fire alarm in appropriate places. It also is important that those controls and warning signs are uniformly applied to all employees within the organizational ranks.

Then there’s the old canard about materiality. Almost the first question you get about a suspected fraud, especially in my experience from financial personnel, is “Is it material?” meaning is it material to the financial statements. The implication is that the discovered fraud isn’t that important because it will have little or no effect on the bottom line. The ACFE tells us that fraud is dynamic and often can occur long before there is any significant impact to the financial statements. For example, frauds resulting in identity and information theft may eventually prove to have financial ramifications. However, the initial ramifications are breach of identity and information confidentiality. The question about materiality is one of the signs that management may not fully understand the variance between control gaps, which may create opportunity for inappropriate actions or actual control failures. When it comes to fraud prevention, the question shouldn’t be, “How much was taken or how much did we lose?” but instead, “What fraud opportunity has been created from the control gap identified?” Thus, no fraud is ever immaterial because even a small amount of identified stolen money may only be the tip of the iceberg. Where one fraud has been identified, there may be several related others operative but not yet detected.

In today’s technological world sophisticated information systems include workflow, authority delegation, acceptance reporting, system alerts, and intrusion technology. These processes rely on programming controls and periodic monitoring techniques to ensure access is in line with company objectives. Although these system enhancements have improved efficiency in many ways, there are often loopholes that provide a knowledgeable, often high-level, individual with the opportunity to rationalize or take advantage of poorly designed procedures to support a wide range of fraudulent activity. So, “authorized” can represent a danger if managements place too much reliance on system-established fraud prevention controls and then don’t build in mechanisms to appropriately monitor and manage those controls.  The simplest example of unauthorized transactions is illustrated in how delegation of authority is established and maintained within systems. If authority delegations are established with no end-date, or extended to individuals at a lower responsibility level than the true need, then expenditures may not be approved in line with corporate guidelines. This may seem like a minor control gap, but the potential for fraud, waste and abuse can be significant. And, if this trend goes undetected for an extended period, the risk can become even greater.

Another example may be the use of administrative user IDs for management, granting administrative access to systems and financial accounts. There is a very distinct and established purpose for granting this type of access; however, if the granting of the IDs is not well-controlled or monitored, there can be a significant internal control exposure that creates the opportunity for a potentially high level of fraudulent behavior to occur. This doesn’t mean that just because a company has excessive administrative IDs, it can expect that fraud is occurring within its corporate environs. However, those of us around the table agreed that this is why senior management and the board need to understand the reality of an administrative fraud control gap. In case after case, overuse and poor monitoring of these types of IDs by senior corporate officials (like CFO’s and CEO’s) have created the threat or opportunity for some activity that may not be acceptable to the organization.

Fraudsters are continually evolving, just like the rest of society. As CFE’s, we’re painfully aware that unauthorized transactions don’t always occur just because of external hacking, although the very real hacking threat seems the current obsession. Assurance professionals mustn’t overlook all of the internal fraud possibilities and probabilities that are present due to sophisticated business systems. Fraud in the digital age continues to expand and mature. We have to assist our client organizations to take an on-going, proactive approach to the examination and identification of ways that a myriad type of unauthorized transactions can slip through their internal firewalls and control procedures.