Category Archives: Anti-Fraud Policy - Page 2

Forensic Data Analysis

As a long term advocate of big data based solutions to investigative challenges, I have been interested to see the recent application of such approaches to the ever-growing problem of data beaches. More data is stored electronically than ever before, financial data, marketing data, customer data, vendor listings, sales transactions, email correspondence, and more, and evidence of fraud can be located anywhere within those mountains of data. Unfortunately, fraudulent data often looks like legitimate data when viewed in the raw. Taking a sample and testing it might not uncover fraudulent activity. Fortunately, today’s fraud examiners have the ability to sort through piles of information by using special software and data analysis techniques. These methods can identify future trends within a certain industry, and they can be configured to identify breaks in audit control programs and anomalies in accounting records.

In general, fraud examiners perform two primary functions to explore and analyze large amounts of data: data mining and data analysis. Data mining is the science of searching large volumes of data for patterns. Data analysis refers to any statistical process used to analyze data and draw conclusions from the findings. These terms are often used interchangeably. If properly used, data analysis processes and techniques are powerful resources. They can systematically identify red flags and perform predictive modeling, detecting a fraudulent situation long before many traditional fraud investigation techniques would be able to do so.

Big data are high volume, high velocity, and/or high variety information assets that require new forms of processing to enable enhanced decision making, insight discovery, and process optimization. Simply put, big data is information of extreme size, diversity, and complexity. In addition to thinking of big data as a single set of data, fraud investigators and forensic accountants are conceptualizing about the way data grow when different data sets are connected together that might not normally be connected. Big data represents the continuous expansion of data sets, the size, variety, and speed of generation of which makes it difficult for investigators and client managements to manage and analyze.

Big data can be instrumental to the evidence gathering phase of an investigation. Distilled down to its core, how do fraud examiners gather data in an investigation? They look at documents and financial or operational data, and they interview people. The challenge is that people often gravitate to the areas with which they are most comfortable. Attorneys will look at documents and email messages and then interview individuals. Forensic accounting professionals will look at the accounting and financial data (structured data). Some people are strong interviewers. The key is to consider all three data sources in unison.

Big data helps to make it all work together to bring the complete picture into focus. With the ever-increasing size of data sets, data analytics has never been more important or useful. Big data requires the use of creative and well-planned analytics due to its size and complexity. One of the main advantages of using data analytics in a big data environment is that it allows the investigator to analyze an entire population of data rather than having to choose a sample and risk drawing erroneous conclusions in the event of a sampling error.

To conduct an effective data analysis, a fraud examiner must take a comprehensive approach. Any direction can (and should) be taken when applying analytical tests to available data. The more creative fraudsters get in hiding their breach-related schemes, the more creative the fraud examiner must become in analyzing data to detect these schemes. For this reason, it is essential that fraud investigators consider both structured and unstructured data when planning their engagements.

Data are either structured or unstructured. Structured data is the type of data found in a database, consisting of recognizable and predictable structures. Examples of structured data include sales records, payment or expense details, and financial reports. Unstructured data, by contrast, is data not found in a traditional spreadsheet or database. Examples of unstructured data include vendor invoices, email and user documents, human resources files, social media activity, corporate document repositories, and news feeds. When using data analysis to conduct a fraud examination, the fraud examiner might use structured data, unstructured data, or a combination of the two. For example, conducting an analysis on email correspondence (unstructured data) among employees might turn up suspicious activity in the purchasing department. Upon closer inspection of the inventory records (structured data), the fraud examiner might uncover that an employee has been stealing inventory and covering her tracks in the record.

Recent reports of breach responses detailed in social media and the trade press indicate that those investigators deploying advanced forensic data analysis tools across larger data sets provided better insights into the penetration, which lead to more focused investigations, better root cause analysis and contributed to more effective fraud risk management. Advanced technologies that incorporate data visualization, statistical analysis and text-mining concepts, as compared to spreadsheets or relational database tools, can now be applied to massive data sets from disparate sources enhancing breach response at all organizational levels.

These technologies enable our client companies to ask new compliance questions of their data that they might not have been able to ask previously. Fraud examiners can establish important trends in business conduct or identify suspect transactions among millions of records rather than being forced to rely on smaller samplings that could miss important transactions.

Data breaches bring enhanced regulatory attention. It’s clear that data breaches have raised the bar on regulators’ expectations of the components of an effective compliance and anti-fraud program. Adopting big data/forensic data analysis procedures into the monitoring and testing of compliance can create a cycle of improved adherence to company policies and improved fraud prevention and detection, while providing additional comfort to key stakeholders.

CFEs and forensic accountants are increasingly being called upon to be members of teams implementing or expanding big data/forensic data analysis programs so as to more effectively manage data breaches and a host of other instances of internal and external fraud, waste and abuse. To build a successful big data/forensic data analysis program, your client companies would be well advised to:

— begin by focusing on the low-hanging fruit: the priority of the initial project(s) matters. The first and immediately subsequent projects, the low-hanging investigative fruit, normally incurs the largest cost associated with setting up the analytics infrastructure, so it’s important that the first few investigative projects yield tangible results/recoveries.

— go beyond usual the rule-based, descriptive analytics. One of the key goals of forensic data analysis is to increase the detection rate of internal control noncompliance while reducing the risk of false positives. From a technology perspective, client’s internal audit and other investigative groups need to move beyond rule-based spreadsheets and database applications and embrace both structured and unstructured data sources that include the use of data visualization, text-mining and statistical analysis tools.

— see that successes are communicated. Share information on early successes across divisional and departmental lines to gain broad business process support. Once validated, success stories will generate internal demand for the outputs of the forensic data analysis program. Try to construct a multi-disciplinary team, including information technology, business users (i.e., end-users of the analytics) and functional specialists (i.e., those involved in the design of the analytics and day-to-day operations of the forensic data analysis program). Communicate across multiple departments to keep key stakeholders assigned to the fraud prevention program updated on forensic data analysis progress under a defined governance program. Don’t just seek to report instances of noncompliance; seek to use the data to improve fraud prevention and response. Obtain investment incrementally based on success, and not by attempting to involve the entire client enterprise all at once.

—leadership support will gets the big data/forensic data analysis program funded, but regular interpretation of the results by experienced or trained professionals are what will make the program successful. Keep the analytics simple and intuitive; don’t try to cram too much information into any one report. Invest in new, updated versions of tools to make analytics sustainable. Develop and acquire staff professionals with the required skill sets to sustain and leverage the forensic data analysis effort over the long-term.
Finally, enterprise-wide deployment of forensic data analysis takes time; clients shouldn’t be lead to expect overnight adoption; an analytics integration is a journey, not a destination. Quick-hit projects might take four to six weeks, but the program and integration can take one to two years or more.

Our client companies need to look at a broader set of risks, incorporate more data sources, move away from lightweight, end-user, desktop tools and head toward real-time or near-real time analysis of increased data volumes. Organizations that embrace these potential areas for improvement can deliver more effective and efficient compliance programs that are highly focused on identifying and containing damage associated with hacker and other exploitation of key high fraud-risk business processes.

Authority Figures

As fraud examiners and forensic accountants intimately concerned with the on-going state of health of our client’s fraud management programs, we find ourselves constantly looking at the integrity of the critical data that’s truly (as much as financial capital) the life blood of today’s organizations. We’re constantly evaluating the network of anti-fraud controls we hope will help keep those pesky, uncontrolled, random data driven vulnerabilities to fraud to a minimum. Every little bit of critical financial information that gets mishandled or falls through the cracks, every transaction that doesn’t get recorded, every anti-fraud policy or procedure that’s misapplied has some effect on the client’s overall fraud management picture and on our challenge.

When it comes to managing its client, financial and payment data, almost every small to medium sized organization has a Sandy. Sandy’s the person to whom everyone goes to get the answers about data, and the state of system(s) that process it; quick answers that no one else ever seems to have. That’s because Sandy is an exceptional employee with years of detailed hands-on-experience in daily financial system operations and maintenance. Sandy is also an example of the extraordinary level of dependence that many organizations have today on a small handful of their key employees. The now unlamented great recession, during which enterprises relied on retaining the experienced employees they had rather than on traditional hiring and cross-training practices, only exacerbated an existing, ever growing trend. The very real threat to the Enterprise Fraud Management system that the Sandy’s of the corporate data world pose is not so much that they will commit fraud themselves (although that’s an ever-present possibility) but that they will retire or get another job across town or out of state, taking their vital knowledge of company systems and data with them.

The day after Sandy’s retirement party and, to an increasing degree thereafter, it will dawn on Sandy’s management that it’s lost a large amount of information about the true state of its data and financial processing system(s). Management will also become aware, if it isn’t already, of its lack of a large amount of system critical data documentation that’s been carried around nowhere else but in Sandy’s head. The point is that, for some smaller organizations, their reliance on a few key employees for day to day, operationally related information goes well beyond what’s appropriate and constitutes an unacceptable level of risk to their entire fraud prevention programs. Today’s newspapers and the internet are full of stories about hacking and large-scale data breeches, that only reinforce the importance of vulnerable data and of the completeness of its documentation to the on-going operational viability of our client organizations.

Anyone whose investigated frauds involving large scale financial systems (insurance claims, bank records, client payment information) is painfully aware that when the composition of data changes (field definitions or content) surprisingly little of change related information is formally documented. Most of the information is stored in the heads of some key employees, and those key employees aren’t necessarily involved in everyday, routine data management projects. There’s always a significant level of detail that’s gone undocumented, left out or to chance, and it becomes up to the analyst of the data (be s/he an auditor, a management scientist, a fraud examiner or other assurance professional) to find the anomalies and question them. The anomalies might be in the form of missing data, changes in data field definitions, or changes in the content of the fields; the possibilities are endless. Without proper, formal documentation, the immediate or future significance of these types of anomalies for the fraud management system and for the overall fraud risk assessment process itself become almost impossible to determine.

If our auditor or fraud examiner, operating under today’s typical budget or time constraints, is not very thorough and misses the identification of some of these anomalies, they can end up never being addressed. How many times as an analyst have we all tried to explain something (like apparently duplicate transactions) about the financial system that just doesn’t look right only to be told, “Oh, yeah. Sandy made that change back in February before she retired; we don’t have too many details on it.” In other words, undocumented changes to transactions and data, details of which are now only existent in Sandy’s no longer available head. When a data driven system is built on incomplete information, the system can be said to have failed in its role as a component of the origination’s fraud prevention program. The cycle of incomplete information gets propagated to future decisions, and the cost of the missing or inadequately explained data can be high. What can’t be seen, can’t ever be managed or even explained.

In summary, it’s a truly humbling to experience to be confronted with how much critical financial information resides in the fading (or absent) memories of past or present key employees; what the ACFE calls authority figures. As fraud examiners we should attempt to foster a culture among our clients supportive of the development of concurrent systems of transaction related documentation and the sharing of knowledge on a consistent basis about all systems but especially regarding the recording of changes to critical financial systems. One nice benefit of this approach, which I brought to the attention of one of my audit clients not too long ago, would be to free up the time of one of these key employees to work on more productive fraud control projects rather than serving as the encyclopedia for the rest of the operational staff.

The Client Requested Recommendation

We fraud examiners must be very circumspect about drawing conclusions. But who among us has not found him or herself in a discussion with a corporate counsel who wants a recommendation from us about how best to prevent the occurrence of a fraud in the future?  In most situations, the conclusions from a well conducted examination should be self-evident and should not need to be pointed out in the report. If the conclusions are not obvious, the report might need to be clarified. Our job as fraud examiners is to obtain sufficient relevant and reliable evidence to determine the facts with a reasonable degree of forensic certainty. Assuming facts without obtaining sufficient relevant and reliable evidence is generally inappropriate.

Opinions regarding technical matters, however, are permitted if the fraud examiner is qualified as an expert in the matter being considered (many fraud examiners are certified not only as CFE’s but also as CPA’s, CIA’s or CISA’s).  For example, a permissible expert opinion, and accompanying client requested recommendation, might address the relative adequacy of an entity’s internal controls. Another opinion (and accompanying follow-on recommendation) might discuss whether financial transactions conform to generally accepted accounting principles. So, recommended remedial measures to prevent future occurrences of similar frauds are also essentially opinions, but are acceptable in fraud examination reports.

Given that examiners should always be cautious in complying with client examination related requests for recommendations regarding future fraud prevention, there is no question that such well-considered recommendations can greatly strengthen any client’s fraud prevention program.  But requested recommendations can also become a point of contention with management, as they may suggest additional procedures for staff or offend members of management if not presented sensitively and correctly. Therefore, examiners should take care to consider ways of follow-on communication with the various effected stakeholders as to how their recommendations will help fix gaps in fraud prevention and mitigate fraud risks.  Management and the stakeholders themselves will have to evaluate whether the CFE’s recommendations being provided are worth the investment of time and resources required to implement them (cost vs. benefit).

Broadly, an examination recommendation (where included in the final report or not) is either a suggestion to fix an unacceptable scenario or a suggestion for improvement regarding a business process.  At management’s request, fraud examination reports can provide recommendations to fix unacceptable fraud vulnerabilities because they are easy to identify and are less likely to be disputed by the business process owner. However, recommendations to fix gaps in a process only take the process to where it is expected to be and not where it ideally could be. The value of the fraud examiner’s solicited recommendation can lie not only in providing solutions to existing vulnerability issues but in instigating thought-provoking discussions.  Recommendations also can include suggestions that can move the process, or the department being examined to the next level of anti-fraud efficiency.  When recommendations aimed at future prevention improvements are included, examination reports can become an additional tool in shaping the strategic fraud prevention direction of the client being examined.

An examiner can shape requested recommendations for fraud prevention improvement using sources both inside and outside the client organization. Internal sources of recommendations require a tactful approach as process owners may not be inclined to share unbiased opinions with a contracted CFE, but here, corporate counsel can often smooth the way with a well-timed request for cooperation. External sources include research libraries maintained by the ACFE, AICPA and other professional organizations.

It’s a good practice, if you expect to receive a request for improvement recommendations from management, to jot down fraud prevention recommendation ideas as soon as they come to mind, even though they may or may not find a place in the final report. Even if examination testing does not result in a specific finding, the CFE may still recommend improvements to the general fraud prevention process.

If requested, the examiner should spend sufficient time brainstorming potential recommendations and choosing their wording carefully to ensure their audience has complete understanding. Client requested recommendations should be written simply and should:

–Address the root cause if a control deficiency is the basis of the fraud vulnerability;
–Address the business process rather than a specific person;
–Include bullets or numbering if describing a process fraud vulnerability that has several steps;
–Include more than one way of resolving an issue identified in the observation, if possible. For example, sometimes a short-term manual control is suggested as an immediate fix in addition to a recommended automated control that will involve considerable time to implement;
–Position the most important observation or fraud risk first and the rest in descending order of risk;
–Indicate a suggested priority of implementation based on the risk and the ease of implementation;
–Explain how the recommendation will mitigate the fraud risk or vulnerability in question;
–List any recommendations separately that do not link directly to an examination finding but seek to improve anti-fraud processes, policies, or systems.

The ACFE warns that recommendations, even if originally requested by client management, will go nowhere if they turn out to be unvalued by that management. Therefore, the process of obtaining management feedback on proposed anti-fraud recommendations is critical to make them practical. Ultimately, process owners may agree with a recommendation, agree with part of the recommendation, and agree in principle, but technological or personnel resource constraints won’t allow them to implement it.  They also may choose to revisit the recommendation at a future date as the risk is not imminent or disagree with the recommendation because of varying perceptions of risk or mitigating controls.

It’s my experience that management in the public sector can be averse to recommendations because of public exposure of their reports. Therefore, CFEs should clearly state in their reports if their recommendations do not correspond to any examination findings but are simply suggested improvements. More proposed fraud prevention recommendations do not necessarily mean there are more faults with the process, and this should be communicated clearly to the process owners.

Management responses should be added to the recommendations with identified action items and implementation timelines whenever possible. Whatever management’s response, a recommendation should not be changed if the response tends to dilute the examiner’s objectivity and independence and becomes representative of management’s opinions and concerns. It is the examiner’s prerogative to provide recommendations that the client has requested, regardless of whether management agrees with them. Persuasive and open-minded discussions with the appropriate levels of client management are important to achieving agreeable and implementable requested fraud prevention recommendations.

The journey from a client request for a fraud prevention recommendation to a final recommendation (whether included in the examination report or not) is complex and can be influenced by every stakeholder and constraint in the examination process, be it the overall posture of the organization toward change in general, its philosophy regarding fraud prevention, the scope of the individual fraud examination itself, views  of the effected business process owner, experience and exposure of the examination staff, or available technology. However, CFEs understand that every thought may add value to the client’s fraud prevention program and deserves consideration by the examination team. The questions at the end of every examination should be, did this examination align with the organization’s anti-fraud strategy and direction? How does our examination compare with the quality of practice as seen elsewhere? And finally, to what degree have the fraud prevention recommendations we were asked to make added value?

The Ideal Employee

It was late on a dark November evening in 2002 when the corporate counsel of the Victoria Paper Corporation contacted our Chapter member Jay Magret, CFE, CIA about a suspected irregularity involving the team of Tim Clark, the world-wide maintenance manager for Victoria’s most complex automated paper manufacturing equipment.

Clark had been hired after a long exhaustive search by one of Victoria’s many employment contractors, Global Image, Inc. Clark was hired to oversee the entire maintenance program at Victoria’s plants worldwide.  Victoria’s management was elated because Clark seemed ideal for the position, seemingly having spent half of his professional life providing automated systems savvy support to major paper companies around the world. He was used to working in foreign locals and had collected an array of impressive skills that enabled him to be appreciated as a through professional. Once hired, Tim requested four additional staff members for his unit, whom he said he personally knew, and contracted for through Global Image. The names and resumes of the four new staff members were subsequently provided by Grayson Employment, another job agency that also specialized in providing labor to the paper industry. Because the four new staff members were already registered in Grayson’s employee database and were explicitly requested by Tim Clark, Victoria and Global Image didn’t feel the need to complete the usual background verifications.

Such a chain of job agencies is common in the labor market: international paper companies, like companies in other industries, manage large projects in disparate, sometimes isolated locales around the globe, and they are stressed by production deadlines. Accordingly, companies find themselves continuously short on the highly specialized people who are qualified to manage and support such projects. Such international companies rely heavily on job agencies to provide contractors already skilled in the business and available to work in remote destinations.

When a business sector is booming, it becomes crowded with personnel interested in exploiting opportunity and, in the resulting complicated labor market, the temptation to cut personnel supply corners in response to tight deadlines often emerges. The result is that, with a plethora of job agencies providing labor, sometimes to a single project, the final employer sometimes doesn’t know with precision what the hourly fee paid to each individual contractor is after it is redistributed along the chain of multiple job agencies.

Under Clark’s direction, his team was charged with the ambitious task of assuring the continuous performance of maintenance activities at Victoria’s paper plants around the world. On paper, Clark’s team worked long hours each week and most weekends, sometimes flying throughout Europe and Asia with little rest. Each hour worked by a member of the maintenance team was certified and signed off on personally by Clark, on behalf of Victoria.

During their year-and-a-half of service, the four individuals hired by Tim Clark claimed to have worked an excessive number of hours, which triggered an internal review by Grayson Employment’s personnel management. During their review, personnel management found that the four employees’ employment files did not include appropriate identification documents. When the agency requested copies of their passports, the four employees immediately submitted their resignations, and soon after Clark did the same. The day after Clark resigned, Grayson contacted Victoria whose corporate counsel, alarmed, contacted our Jay Magret.

Setting to work immediately and working closely with Victoria’s auditors and the corporate counsel, Magret quickly uncovered evidence that Clark had falsified records and documents for three of the individuals on his team. It became apparent to Jay that those individuals were ghost employees; they did not exist. Clark had created fake resumes for three ghost employees, falsified contracts, signed time sheets, and forged the resignation letters. Further analysis showed that the fourth individual did indeed exist, was related to Clark, and had collaborated on the scheme. Clark and his accomplice had to work hard to carry out the duties of four employees.

Jay’s analysis also showed that Omega’s employee interviews were sometimes conducted solely by line managers involved in the hiring process, without the support of the Human Resources Department. The same line managers were then responsible for certifying the time sheets of their employees, including contractors, while their identification documents weren’t systematically collected or retained. Moreover, the contracts and procedures in use didn’t clearly establish or document each step of the selection and job assignment process.

Magret’s final report specified that the fraud was possible, and profitable, because the paper company client paid the wages of each ghost employee through the chain of job agencies and directly into the accounts of the contractors, which were registered in the name of a private company and managed by Clark. By the time Victoria realized the scope of the fraud scenario with Magret’s help, Clark and his associate had already disappeared with more than a million dollars paid to them during their year-and-a-half scheme. The paper company later discovered that even Clark was not who he claimed to be. He had used a fake identity and was untraceable, leaving little to no chance of recovery of the stolen money.

In response to management’s request that he proactively suggest controls to strengthen Victoria’s anti-fraud program, Magret suggested, as a matter of normal practice, that:

–Companies should perform time assessments to ensure they know how long a job will take to complete.

–Strict procedures should be in place during the hiring process, especially regarding segregation of duties. Human resources should always be involved in the process and responsible for checking identification documents with the physical person.

–The company should limit the opportunity for line managers to recommend hiring people they know. In some cases, it is unavoidable, so managers should always try to guarantee a higher level of segregation, especially in the authorization of time sheets.

–When using a job agency, the company should be sure that the relationship with contractors will be directly between the company itself and the agency. By doing this, the company will save money and be more assured about the contracted personnel.

— Client inhouse auditors of the personnel function should perform a periodic analysis of office records by selecting a sample of employees and verifying their effective presence in the office or on the job site, making sure appropriate identification is included in their records.
–Excessive hours claimed is as a red flag, especially when it is common among off-site employees. Establishing key performance indicators for each department or business process can serve as a reference for red flag comparisons.

–A wide-ranging and fragmented work environment can make the ghost employee phenomenon possible. A strong internal control framework and strictly enforced personnel policies are the only ways to prevent and discourage this type of fraud scheme.

Analytics Confronts the Normal

The Information Audit and Control Association (ISACA) tells us that we produce and store more data in a day now than mankind did altogether in the last 2,000 years. The data that is produced daily is estimated to be one exabyte, which is the computer storage equivalent of one quintillion bytes, which is the same as one million terabytes. Not too long ago, about 15 years, a terabyte of data was considered a huge amount of data; today the latest Swiss Army knife comes with a 1 terabyte flash drive.

When an interaction with a business is complete, the information from the interaction is only as good as the pieces of data that get captured during that interaction. A customer walks into a bank and withdraws cash. The transaction that just happened gets stored as a monetary withdrawal transaction with certain characteristics in the form of associated data. There might be information on the date and time when the withdrawal happened; there may be information on which customer made the withdrawal (if there are multiple customers who operate the same account). The amount of cash that was withdrawn, the account from which the money was extracted, the teller/ATM who facilitated the withdrawal, the balance on the account after the withdrawal, and so forth, are all typically recorded. But these are just a few of the data elements that can get captured in any withdrawal transaction. Just imagine all the different interactions possible on all the assorted products that a bank has to offer: checking accounts, savings accounts, credit cards, debit cards, mortgage loans, home equity lines of credit, brokerage, and so on. The data that gets captured during all these interactions goes through data-checking processes and gets stored somewhere internally or in the cloud.  The data that gets stored this way has been steadily growing over the past few decades, and, most importantly for fraud examiners, most of this data carries tons of information about the nuances of the individual customers’ normal behavior.

In addition to what the customer does, from the same data, by looking at a different dimension of the data, examiners can also understand what is normal for certain other related entities. For example, by looking at all the customer withdrawals at a single ARM, CFEs can gain a good understanding of what is normal for that particular ATM terminal.  Understanding the normal behavior of customers is very useful in detecting fraud since deviation from normal behavior is a such a primary indicator of fraud. Understanding non-fraud or normal behavior is not only important at the main account holder level but also at all the entity levels associated with that individual account. The same data presents completely different information when observed in the context of one entity versus another. In this sense, having all the data saved and then analyzed and understood is a key element in tackling the fraud threat to any organization.

Any systematic, numbers-based system of understanding of the phenomenon of fraud as a past occurring event is dependent on an accurate description of exactly what happened through the data stream that got accumulated before, during, and after the fraud scenario occurred. Allowing the data to speak is the key to the success of any model-based system. This data needs to be saved and interpreted very precisely for the examiner’s models to make sense. The first crucial step to building a model is to define, understand, and interpret fraud scenarios correctly. At first glance, this seems like a very easy problem to solve. In practical terms, it is a lot more complicated process than it seems.

The level of understanding of the fraud episode or scenario itself varies greatly among the different business processes involved with handling the various products and functions within an organization. Typically, fraud can have a significant impact on the bottom line of any organization. Looking at the level of specific information that is systematically stored and analyzed about fraud in financial institutions for example, one would arrive at the conclusion that such storage needs to be a lot more systematic and rigorous than it typically is today. There are several factors influencing this. Unlike some of the other types of risk involved in client organizations, fraud risk is a censored problem. For example, if we are looking at serious delinquency, bankruptcy, or charge-off risk in credit card portfolios, the actual dollars-at-risk quantity is very well understood. Based on past data, it is relatively straightforward to quantify precise credit dollars at risk by looking at how many customers defaulted on a loan or didn’t pay their monthly bill for three or more cycles or declared bankruptcy. Based on this, it is easy to quantify the amount at risk as far as credit risk goes. However, in fraud, it is virtually impossible to quantify the actual amount that would have gone out the door as the fraud is stopped immediately after detection. The problem is censored as soon as some intervention takes place, making it difficult to precisely quantify the potential risk.

Another challenge in the process of quantifying fraud is how well the fraud episode itself gets recorded. Consider the case of a credit card number getting stolen without the physical card getting stolen. During a certain period, both the legitimate cardholder and the fraudster are charging using the card. If the fraud detection system in the issuing institution doesn’t identify the fraudulent transactions as they were happening in real time, typically fraud is identified when the cardholder gets the monthly statement and figures out that some of the charges were not made by him/her. Then the cardholder calls the issuer to report the fraud.  In the not too distant past, all that used to get recorded by the bank was the cardholder’s estimate of when the fraud episode began, even though there were additional details about the fraudulent transactions that were likely shared by the cardholder. If all that gets recorded is the cardholder’s estimate of when the fraud episode began, ambiguity is introduced regarding the granularity of the actual fraud episode. The initial estimate of the fraud amount becomes a rough estimate at best.  In the case in which the bank’s fraud detection system was able to catch the fraud during the actual fraud episode, the fraudulent transactions tended to be recorded by a fraud analyst, and sometimes not too accurately. If the transaction was marked as fraud or non-fraud incorrectly, this problem was typically not corrected even after the correct information flowed in. When eventually the transactions that were actually fraudulent were identified using the actual postings of the transactions, relating this back to the authorization transactions was often not a straightforward process. Sometimes the amounts of the transactions may have varied slightly. For example, the authorization transaction of a restaurant charge is sometimes unlikely to include the tip that the customer added to the bill. The posted amount when this transaction gets reconciled would look slightly different from the authorized amount. All of this poses an interesting challenge when designing a data-driven analytical system to combat fraud.

The level of accuracy associated with recording fraud data also tends to be dependent on whether the fraud loss is a liability for the customer or to the financial institution. To a significant extent, the answer to the question, “Whose loss is it?” really drives how well past fraud data is recorded. In the case of unsecured lending such as credit cards, most of the liability lies with the banks, and the banks tend to care a lot more about this type of loss. Hence systems are put in place to capture this data on a historical basis reasonably accurately.

In the case of secured lending, ID theft, and so on, a significant portion of the liability is really on the customer, and it is up to the customer to prove to the bank that he or she has been defrauded. Interestingly, this shift of liability also tends to have an impact on the quality of the fraud data captured. In the case of fraud associated with automated clearing house (ACH) batches and domestic and international wires, the problem is twofold: The fraud instances are very infrequent, making it impossible for the banks to have a uniform method of recording frauds; and the liability shifts are dependent on the geography.  Most international locations put the onus on the customer, while in the United States there is legislation requiring banks to have fraud detection systems in place.  The extent to which our client organizations take responsibility also tends to depend on how much they care about the customer who has been defrauded. When a very valuable customer complains about fraud on her account, a bank is likely to pay attention.  Given that most such frauds are not large scale, there is less need to establish elaborate systems to focus on and collect the data and keep track of past irregularities. The past fraud information is also influenced heavily by whether the fraud is third-party or first-party fraud. Third-party fraud is where the fraud is committed clearly by a third party, not the two parties involved in a transaction. In first-party fraud, the perpetrator of the fraud is the one who has the relationship with the bank. The fraudster in this case goes to great lengths to prevent the banks from knowing that fraud is happening. In this case, there is no reporting of the fraud by the customer. Until the bank figures out that fraud is going on, there is no data that can be collected. Also, such fraud could go on for quite a while and some of it might never be identified. This poses some interesting problems. Internal fraud where the employee of the institution is committing fraud could also take significantly longer to find. Hence the data on this tends to be scarce as well.

In summary, one of the most significant challenges in fraud analytics is to build a sufficient database of normal client transactions.  The normal transactions of any organization constitute the baseline from which abnormal, fraudulent or irregular transactions, can be identified and analyzed.  The pinpointing of the irregular is thus foundational to the development of the transaction processing edits which prevent the irregular transactions embodying fraud from even being processed and paid on the front end; furnishing the key to modern, analytically based fraud prevention.

Cyberfraud & Data Breaches May 2018 Training Event

On May 16th and 17th, our Chapter, supported by our partners national, ACFE and the Virginia State Police, will present our sixteenth Spring training event, this time on the subject of CYBERFRAUD AND DATA BREACHES.  Our presenter will be CARY E. MOORE, CFE, CISSP, MBA; ACFE Presenter Board member and internationally renowned author and authority on every aspect of cybercrime.  CLICK HERE  to see an outline of the training, the agenda and Cary’s bio.  If you decide to do so, you may REGISTER HERE.  Attendees will receive 16 CPE credits, and a printed manual of over 300 pages detailing every subject covered in the training.  In addition, as a door prize, we will be awarding, by drawing, a printed copy of the 2017 Fraud Examiners Manual, a $200 value!

As the relentless wave of cyberattacks continues, all our client organizations are under intense pressure from key stakeholders and regulators to implement and enhance their anti-fraud programs to protect customers, employees and the valuable information in their possession. According to research from IBM Security and the Ponemon Institute, the average total cost per company, per event of a data breach is US $3.62 million. Initial damage estimates of a single breach, while often staggering, may not consider less obvious and often undetectable threats such as theft of intellectual property, espionage, destruction of data, attacks on core operations or attempts to disable critical infrastructure. These knock-on effects can last for years and have devastating financial, operational and brand ramifications.

Given the broad regulatory pressures to tighten anti-fraud cyber security controls and the visibility surrounding cyber risk, a number of proposed regulations focused on improving cyber security risk management programs have been introduced in the United States over the past few years by various governing bodies of which CFEs need to be aware. One of the more prominent is a regulation issued by the New York Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) that prescribes certain minimum cyber security standards for those entities regulated by the NYDFS. Based on the entity’s risk assessment, the NYDFS law has specific requirements around data encryption, protection and retention, third party information security, application security, incident response and breach. notification, board reporting, and annual certifications.

However, organizations continue to struggle to report on the overall effectiveness of their cyber security risk management and anti-fraud programs. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) has released a cyber security risk management reporting framework intended to help organizations expand cyber risk reporting to a broad range of internal and external users, including the C-suite and the board of directors (BoD). The AICPA’s reporting framework is designed to address the need for greater stakeholder transparency by providing in-depth, easily consumable information about an organization’s cyber risk management
program. The cyber security risk management examination uses an independent, objective reporting approach and employs broader and more flexible criteria. For example, it allows for the selection and utilization of any control framework considered suitable and available in establishing the entity’s cyber security objectives and developing and maintaining controls within the entity’s cyber security risk management program, whether it is the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)’s Cybersecurity Framework, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO)’s ISO 27001/2 and related frameworks, or internally developed frameworks based on a combination of sources. The examination is voluntary, and applies to all types of entities, but should be considered a leading practice that provides the C-suite, boards and other key stakeholders clear insight into an organization’s cyber security program and identifies gaps or pitfalls that leave organizations vulnerable.

Cyber security risk management examination reports are vital to the fraud control program of any organization doing business on-line.  Such reports help an organization’s BoD establish appropriate oversight of a company’s cyber security risk program and credibly communicate its effectiveness to stakeholders, including investors, analysts, customers, business partners and regulators. By leveraging this information, boards can challenge management’s assertions around the effectiveness of their cyber risk management programs and drive more effective decision making. Active involvement and oversight from the BoD can help ensure that an organization is paying adequate attention to cyber risk management. The board can help shape expectations for reporting on cyber threats and fraud attempts while also advocating for greater transparency and assurance around the effectiveness of the program.

Organizations that choose to utilize the AICPA’s cyber security attestation reporting framework and perform an examination of their cyber security program may be better positioned to gain competitive advantage and enhance their brand in the marketplace. For example, an outsource retail service provider (OSP) that can provide evidence that a well-developed and sound cyber security risk management program is in place in its organization can proactively provide the report to current and potential customers, evidencing that it has implemented appropriate controls to protect the sensitive IT assets and valuable data over which it maintains access. At the same time, current and potential retailor customers of an OSP want the third parties with whom they engage to also place a high level of importance on cyber security. Requiring a cyber security examination report as part of the selection criteria would offer transparency into
outsourcers’ cyber security programs and could be a determining factor in the selection process.

The value of addressing cyber security related fraud concerns and questions by CFEs before regulatory mandates are established or a crisis occurs is quite clear. The knowledgeable CFE can help our client organizations view the new cyber security attestation reporting frameworks as an opportunity to enhance their existing cyber security and anti-fraud programs and gain competitive advantage. The attestation reporting frameworks address the needs of a variety of key stakeholder groups and, in turn, limit the communication and compliance burden. CFE client organizations that view the cyber security reporting landscape as an opportunity can use it to lead, navigate and disrupt in today’s rapidly evolving cyber risk environment.

Please decide to join us for our May Training Event on this vital and timely topic!  YOU MAY REGISTER 0N-LINE HERE.  You can pay with PayPal (you don’t need a PayPal account; you can use any credit card) or just print an invoice and submit your payment by snail mail!

Bribery & Deferred Prosecution

Between January and February 2015, a prominent trade organization focusing on American attorneys conducted a survey of 243 Chief Legal Officers of global companies to assess the corporate counsel’s opinion regarding the greatest threats to their organization’s growth. Respondents were asked to rank their top three concerns. Not surprisingly, economic uncertainty was at the top of the list with 57% of the respondents ranking it in their top three. The unexpected finding was that 53% of the respondents named regulatory compliance and enforcement as a top concern as well.

When asked to specify which laws caused them the most concern 28% identified the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and 15% identified the UK Bribery Act. This means 43% of the respondents named anti-bribery laws as one of their top three concerns, more than any other law or regulation identified. When asked about the resources spent on regulatory compliance and enforcement, the response was also surprising as only 38% of the corporate counsel who identified regulatory compliance and enforcement as a threat, are expending resources to address the threat. As a follow up to the 2015 survey, the same organization conducted a second survey in early 2017 to gain further insight into corporate counsels’ ability to address regulatory and compliance threats. This time 256 respondents were surveyed, 62% of whom stated that their organization is designing or building some type of robust internal compliance program. Although this is movement in the right direction, over a third of the organizations surveyed still may not be prepared to detect or deter bribery and corruption. Most significantly, they will not be prepared to meet government expectations if a violation occurs and self-reporting is required. Lastly, 54% of the respondents stated that they are building or expanding their in-house systems to address this threat. Many believe that compliance technology is the appropriate answer as regulators prefer technical solutions to these problems, because they are viewed to be sophisticated and ‘state of the art’.

This research should be of special interest to all CFEs because we work so frequently with corporate counsels, but indeed, to assurance professionals in general who like fraud examiners are on the front line in the fight against corruption.

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) was enacted in 1977 but aggressive enforcement did not really pick up until around 2005 when there were twelve enforcement actions.  The purpose of the FCPA was to prevent the bribery of foreign government officials when negotiating overseas contracts. The FCPA imposes heavy fines and penalties for both organizations and individuals. The two major provisions address: 1) bribery violations and 2) improper books and records and/or having inadequate internal controls. Methods of enforcement and interpretation of the law in the US have continued to evolve over the years.

The FCPA created questions of definition and interpretation, i.e., Who is a “foreign official?” What is the difference between a “facilitation” payment and a bribe? Who is considered a third party? How does the government define adequate internal controls to detect and deter bribery and corruption?

The enactment of the United Kingdom (UK) Bribery Act in July 2010 was the first attempt at an anti-bribery law to address some of these issues. The UK Bribery Act introduced the concept of adequate procedures, that if followed could allow affirmative defense for an organization if investigated for bribery. The UK Bribery Act recommended several internal controls for combating bribery and introduced the incentive of a more favorable result for those who could document compliance. These controls include:

• Established anti-bribery procedures
• Top level commitment to prevent bribery
• Periodic and documented risk assessments
• Proportionate due diligence
• Communication of bribery prevention policies and procedures
• Monitoring of anti-bribery procedures

The concept of an affirmative defense for adequate procedures creates quite a contrast to FCPA which only offers affirmative defense for payments of bona fide expenses or small gifts within the legal limits of the foreign countries involved.

The UK Bribery Act equated all facilitation and influence payments to bribery. Finally, the UK Bribery Act dealt with the problem of defining a foreign official by making it illegal to bribe anyone regardless of government affiliation. Several countries such as Russia, Canada and Brazil have enacted or updated their anti-bribery regulations to parallel the guidelines presented in the UK Bribery Act. The key to the effectiveness of all these acts remains enforcement.

In November 2012 the US Department of Justice and the Securities Exchange Commission released “A Resource Guide to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.” The guide book introduced several hallmarks of an effective compliance program. The Resource Guide provided companies with the tools to demonstrate a proactive approach to deter bribery and corruption. Companies in compliance may receive some consideration during the fines and penalty stage.

The guide’s hallmarks include:

• Establish a code of conduct that specifically addresses the risk of bribery and corruption.
• Set the tone by designating a Chief Compliance Officer to oversee all anti-bribery and corruption activities.
• Training all employees to be thoroughly prepared to address bribery and corruption risk.
• Perform risk assessments of potential bribery and corruption pitfalls by geography and industry.
• Review the anti-corruption program annually to assess the effectiveness of policies procedures and controls.
• Perform audits and monitor foreign business operations to assure compliance with the code of conduct.
• Ensure that proper legal contractual terms exist within agreements with third parties that address compliance with anti-bribery and corruption laws and regulations.
• Investigate and respond appropriately to all allegations of bribery and corruption.
• Take proper disciplinary action for violations of anti-bribery and corruption laws and regulations.
• Perform adequate due diligence that addresses the risk of bribery and corruption of all third parties prior to entering a business relationship.

The SEC and DOJ entered into the first ever Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) for Foreign Corrupt Practices violations in 2013. This decision was a harbinger from the DOJ and SEC with regard to future enforcement actions. The NPA highlighted the “extensive remedial measurements and cooperation efforts” that the defendant company demonstrated during the investigation. The corporation paid only $882,000 in fines because they were able to “demonstrate a strong tone from the top and a robust anti-corruption program”.

Under a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) the DOJ files a court document charging the organization while simultaneously requesting that prosecution be deferred to allow the company to demonstrate good conduct going forward. The DPA is an agreement by the organization to: cooperate with the government, accept the factual findings of the investigation, and admit culpability if so warranted. Additionally, companies may be directed to participate in compliance and remediation efforts, e.g., a court-appointed monitor.

If the company completes the term of the DPA, the DOJ will dismiss the charges without imposing fines and penalties. Under the Non-Prosecution Agreement, the DOJ maintains the right to file charges against the organization later should the organization fail to comply. The NPA is not filed with the courts but is maintained by both the DOJ and the company and is posted on the DOJ website. Like the DPA, the organization agrees to monetary penalties, ongoing cooperation, admission to relevant facts, as well as compliance and remediation of policies, procedures and controls. If the company complies with the agreement, the DOJ will drop all charges.

The key differences between a deferred prosecution case and one not featuring deferred prosecution is the initial response of the defendant company to the discovery of improper payments. In a deferred prosecution case the response usually features prompt self-reporting, full cooperation with the government and the quality of the serious remedial steps taken, including termination of implicated personnel and the modification of company behavior in the country where the violations occurred. Additionally, deferred prosecution defendants frequently discover the improper payments while in the process of enhancing their anti-bribery and corruption controls.

Originally allegations of FCPA violations were received through a company’s internal whistleblower hotline. That trend changed with the enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley Act in 2002 and the Dodd-Frank Act in 2012. These laws created other means and mechanisms for reporting suspicions of illegal activity and provided protections from retaliation against whistleblowers. The Dodd-Frank Act also has monetary incentives of 10% to 30% of the amounts recovered by the government to encourage whistleblowers to come forward. Companies considering whether to disclose potential anti-corruption problems to the SEC must now consider the possibility that a potential whistleblower may report it first to the government thus creating greater liability for the organization.

In conclusion, according to recent reporting by the ACFE, corporate compliance programs continue to mature, and are now accepted as a cost of conducting business in a global marketplace. The US government continues to clarify its expectations about corporate responsibility at home and abroad and works with international partners and their compliance programs. Increased cooperation between the public and private sectors to address these issues will assist in leveling the playing field in the global marketplace. Non-government and civil society organizations, i.e. World Bank and Transparency International play a key role in this effort. These organizations set standards, apply pressure on foreign governments to enact stricter anti-bribery and corruption laws, and enforce those laws. Coordination and cooperation among government, business and civil entities like the ACFE, reduce the incidences of bribery and corruption and increase opportunities for companies to compete fairly and ethically in the global marketplace.

Basic Cash Concealment Strategies

One of the topics in which readers of this blog have expressed consistent interest over the years regards the many strategies of cash asset concealment employed by fraudsters; especially by embezzlers of relatively small sums from employers, who seem particularly creative at such manipulations.  Regardless of the method used to hide ill-gotten assets, one fact remains constant; proceeds from illicit activities must be disguised in some way to avoid being discovered. Those the ACFE dubs ‘asset hiders’ have developed many sophisticated techniques for working the system and accomplishing the goal of concealing their gains; in attempting to track down and recover secret stores of cash, the fraud examiner is presented with a true challenge, and the first step in meeting this challenge is to understand how asset hiders work. This post will concentrate on the concealment of raw cash.

There are three primary ways to hide cash assets. They are:

— Currency hoards;
— Cashier’s checks and traveler’s checks;
— Deposits to financial institutions.

The most basic method for hiding cash is the currency hoard, in which a person simply stores cash in a hidden location, usually in his or her home or on her property. This is the proverbial ‘cash under the mattress’ technique. In a typical home, hiding places for currency or other valuables can range from the obvious to the ingenious.

For example, precious metals and jewelry can easily be hidden in a layer of cooking grease at the bottom of a pot. The space beneath the bottom drawer of bureaus, chests, and cabinets is also a commonly used hiding place. Loose bricks in the wall or fireplace can disguise small spaces for hiding things. A more complex scheme is to build a false ceiling below the original ceiling and then use the space between the two as a hiding place.

Another place to hoard currency is in furniture. The hollow spaces of upholstered furniture make these pieces a good hiding place. Many people find false bottoms in drawers or inside stereo speakers useful places for hiding cash.

The basic structure of the home itself provides many opportunities for creating hiding places. One of the most common spots for hiding objects is in the walls. Cunning hiders may construct false walls in closets or pantries, or they may build large cavities into a wall, which is then covered with a mirror or a painting. Installing false light switch plates and electrical outlets provides easy access to spaces between walls and generally appear quite normal, although amateurs often leave tell-tale marks on the plate screws. These marks often provide searchers with signs of tampering and can lead to the discovery of a cache. An even simpler method is to hide currency inside the electrical boxes behind real electrical plates. If a larger space is needed, hiders sometimes remove the box from the wall and build a shelf below it. Significant amounts of currency can be hidden in these spaces. Currency hoards can also be hidden above ceiling light boxes in the space below the attic.

The plumbing system provides other natural hiding places. For example, many bathrooms have access holes under the sink, which are usually covered with a removable chrome disk. These access holes are designed so a cleaning ‘snake’ can be inserted into the main drain when the lines are clogged. This space is easily utilized as a hiding space. Floor drains are also used for hiding currency. Excellent hiding places can be created by installing false pipes that appear to be part of the home’s plumbing. Some individuals hide objects and money in shower curtain rods. Other places frequently used for hiding are air ducts, doors, and stairways. Heating and cooling system ducts are generally easy to access and have plenty of empty space. Hollow core doors are easily rigged for hiding. The top surface of the door can simply be cut away, allowing access to the natural secret compartment inside. Enclosed staircases have dead space underneath that is accessible. If the staircase is not enclosed, there may be usable space for small objects behind each of the risers. Stairs can be hinged, creating a hidden compartment underneath.

Cashier’s and traveler’s checks are another method used to hide assets. These instruments are useful for several reasons:

–They allow asset hiders to easily disguise their financial dealings from asset seekers like law enforcement, CFEs and forensic accountants;
–They help disguise the asset hider’s financial dealings and reduce the amount of currency physically carried;
–Cashier’s checks or traveler’s checks in denominations of less than $10,000 are negotiable financial instruments that can be exchanged almost any place in the world.

Whilst efforts to control the use of wire transfers for money laundering have traditionally been focused on banks, examiners also need to be aware that there are non-bank money transmitters that fraudsters often use to conceal cash assets.  These non-bank transmitters specialize in money transfers for individuals rather than businesses. In addition to other services, most non-bank transmitters sell money orders and traveler’s checks. These companies range from large international enterprises like Western Union to small mom-and-pop neighborhood check cashing businesses.

There are several reasons fraudsters like using non-bank transmitters. First, non-bank transmitters allow individuals to cash personal checks or wire money to family members nationally or in other countries. Check cashing companies and other sellers of money orders, such as convenience stores and grocery stores, provide a much-needed service to people without bank accounts. Second, non-bank transmitters allow individuals to obtain many individual traveler’s checks and money orders in amounts less than $10,000 each. Most states regulate check cashing and the sale of money orders with licensing and bonding requirements. The Money Laundering Suppression Act of 1994 required all money transmitters to register with the U.S. Department of Treasury. Furthermore, like other financial institutions, these businesses are required to file currency transaction reports (CTRs) for transactions of $10,000 or more in currency and coins, and they are required to file Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) with the Treasury Department for certain classes of suspect transactions.

Check cashing companies have been known to receive illegally earned or stolen currency and use it to cash legitimate checks for their customers, thus avoiding CTRs or to structure transmittals by issuing multiple traveler’s checks and money orders for less than $10,000 each. Third, the transactions of non-bank transmitters will not trigger a mechanism for identifying unreported cash. Although money transmitters are classified as financial institutions, they are not depository institutions but operate through accounts with commercial banks. And, unlike bank accounts, which contain copies of deposits and canceled checks used in locating assets, non-bank money transmitters do not maintain copies of deposits and canceled checks. Unless the money order or traveler’s check appears in the financial records of the asset hider, it will likely go undetected since there is no place for the investigator to begin a search. However, once a money order or traveler’s check has been specifically identified, it can be traced back like any other financial instrument.

Banks and other financial institutions are frequently utilized by secrecy seekers as vehicles for hiding or disguising currency. The methods used may be as simple as renting a safe-deposit box and storing currency or valuables inside.  Searching the safe-deposit box of a suspected embezzler for evidence is not easily accomplished. It requires a court order. But; even if access to the box is denied, the investigator in a hidden asset case can often make educated guesses as to the contents by observing the movements of the hider. For instance, if the subject makes a visit to her safe-deposit box after attending an antique jewelry collector’s exposition, the examiner could surmise a collection of jewelry items is stored therein. Trips made to a safe-deposit box before foreign travel may indicate that the hider is moving money from his or her native country to a foreign location.

The banking system is, without question, the most important vehicle of both lawful and unlawful financial transactions. While most bankers are not active participants in asset hiding, it can be extremely difficult to distinguish between legitimate transactions and those conducted by secrecy seekers. Some bankers even prefer to close their eyes to the sources of their deposits and, in doing so, knowingly accept tainted funds. It’s important to understand how secrecy seekers use bank deposits and funds transfers to hide assets.  For the examiner, it’s important to know that most large banks have computer programs that can retrieve a specific wire transfer record. Many medium-sized banks cannot electronically retrieve specific wire data more than a month old, and some banks would have to search manually for records. However, even small banks usually send their international money transfers through one of the large Money Center banks, thus creating a record. Many large banks have enhanced their record-keeping systems to assure themselves and bank regulators that they are in full compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act. Some institutions have systems that monitor the wire transfer activity of certain accounts and generate periodic reports highlighting the consolidation of incoming wires followed by an outgoing wire transfer. Most of these systems are designed to monitor only customer accounts and do not record funds transfer services provided for non-depositors for which the bank serves only as an intermediary.

To conduct a successful wire transfer search, the examiner should have as much information as possible relating to the transfer in question when contacting the appropriate entity. Having the following information on hand will help make the search much more efficient:

— Date of transfer
— Amount of transfer
— Names of sending and receiving institutions
— Routing numbers of sending and receiving institutions
— Identity of sender and designated receiver
— Input sequence and/or output sequence

While most banks do not actively participate in fraudulent transfers, some signs for the examiner that could indicate collusion between a bank and its customer are:
— Allowing clients whose funds are not of foreign origin to make investments limited to foreigners;
— Acting without power of attorney to allow clients to manage investments or to transmit funds
on behalf of foreign-registered companies or local companies acting as laundries;
— Participating in sequential transactions that fall under the government reporting thresholds;
–Allowing telephone transfers of funds without written authorization and failing to keep a record of such transfers;
— Entering false foreign account number designations with regard to wire transfers.

What am I Bid!

A couple of recently reported high profile cases (one from the governmental and one from the private sector), involving bid rigging in the mid-western construction industry merit a consideration of the principle fraud scenarios involved.  The ACFE tells us that in a legitimate competitive bidding process, vendors submit confidential bids stating the price at which they will complete a contract or project, based on the specifications set forth by the purchasing company. Legally, all bidders are supposed to be able to bid under the same terms and conditions. Bid-rigging schemes occur when an employee fraudulently assists a vendor in winning a contract. The competitive bidding process can be tailor-made for bribery, as several suppliers or contractors vie for contracts in what can be a very cutthroat environment. An “inside influence” can ensure that a vendor wins the sought-after contract; thus, many vendors are willing to pay for this influence.

The way competitive bidding is rigged depends largely upon the level of influence of the corrupt employee. The more power a person has over the bidding process, the more likely the person will be able to influence the selection of a supplier. Therefore, employees who participate in bid-rigging schemes tend to have major influence over the competitive bidding process. Potential targets for accepting bribes include buyers, contracting officials, engineers and technical representatives, quality or product assurance representatives, subcontractor liaison employees, or anyone else with authority over the contract awards.

Bid-rigging schemes can be categorized based on the stage of bidding at which the fraudster exerts his or her influence. Thus, bid-rigging schemes can be separated into three categories: pre-solicitation phase, solicitation phase, and submission phase.

–Pre-solicitation fraud: This occurs before bids are officially sought for a project. There are two distinct types of pre-solicitation phase bid rigging scenarios. The first is a need recognition scenario in which an employee is paid to convince her company that a project is necessary. The result of such a scheme is that the victim company purchases unnecessary goods or services from a supplier at the direction of the corrupt employee. The second is a specifications scenario, in which a contract is tailored to the strengths of a supplier: the vendor and an employee set the specifications of the contract to accommodate the vendor’s capabilities.

–Solicitation fraud: During this phase, the purchaser requests bids from potential contractors. Fraudsters attempt to influence the selection of a contractor by restricting the pool of competitors from whom bids are sought. In other words, a corrupt vendor pays an employee to assure that one or more of the vendor’s competitors do not get to bid on the contract. Thus, the corrupt vendor can improve its chances of winning the job. There are several different variations of basic  solicitation schemes:

-Bid-pooling: Several bidders conspire to split up contracts, assuring that each gets a certain amount of work. Instead of submitting confidential bids, the vendors discuss what their bids will be, so they can guarantee that each vendor will win a share of the purchasing company’s business. Furthermore, since the vendors plan their bids in advance, they can conspire to raise their prices.

-Bid-splitting: Some companies and government divisions require that a purchase or contract over a certain dollar amount go through a formal bidding process. In these cases, a company pays an employee to split a contract into small dollar amounts that will not require a formal bid. Then, the employee simply gives the contract to the vendor offering the kickback, thus avoiding the bidding process altogether.

-Fictitious suppliers: Another way to eliminate competition is to solicit bids from fictitious suppliers. The perpetrator uses quotes from several fictitious companies to demonstrate competitive pricing on final contracts. In other words, bogus price quotes can validate actual (and inflated) pricing of an accepted contract.

-Time advantages: Competition can be limited by severely restricting the time for submitting bids. That way, certain suppliers are given advance notice of contracts before bid solicitation, so they have adequate time to prepare. These vendors have a decided advantage over the competition. A vendor can also pay an employee to turn over the specifications to him or her earlier than to his or her competitors.

-Limited scope of solicitations: Bids can be solicited in obscure publications or during holiday periods, so some vendors are unlikely to see them. This eliminates potential rivals and creates an advantage for corrupt suppliers. In more blatant cases, the bids of outsiders are accepted but are “lost” or improperly disqualified by the corrupt employee of the purchaser.

–Submission fraud: During this phase, bids are given to the buyer. Competitive bids are confidential and are supposed to remain sealed until the date all bids are opened and examined. People with access to sealed bids are often the targets of unethical vendors. Some vendors will pay to submit their bid last, knowing what others bid or to see competitors’ bids and adjust their own bid accordingly.

In bid-rigging scenarios, an employee sells his influence or access to confidential information. Since information can be copied or sold without taking it outside the organization, there is no missing asset to conceal. The perpetrator merely must conceal the use of influence or the transfer of information. S/he also needs to ensure that all of the appropriate documentation is available in case someone reviews his or her decisions. An illegally won contract results in profits that a vendor would not have earned under normal conditions. The vendor employee responsible for arranging the bid-rigging can be rewarded with cash, a promotion, power, or prestige.

Companies are far from defenseless in controlling for these types of abuses.  CFEs and other assurance professionals can proactively advise on the setting up of policies and on the establishment of controls over the bidding process and by helping to verify, through on-going testing, that they are enforced.  In reviewing the bid-letting process, management or its auditors should look for:

-Premature disclosure of information (by buyers or firms participating in design and engineering), indicating that information was revealed to one bidder and not the others.
-Limited time for submission of bids (so only those with advance information have adequate time to prepare bids or proposals).
-Failure to make potential competitors aware of the solicitation, e.g., by using obscure publications to publish bid solicitations or the publication of bid solicitations during holidays.
-Vague solicitations regarding time, place, or other requirements for submitting acceptable bids.
-Inadequate control over number and destination of bid packages sent to interested bidders.
-Purchasing employee helps contractor prepare a bid.
-Failure to amend solicitation to include necessary bid clarification, such as notifying one contractor of changes that can be made following the bid.

Clients should also be advised to examine contract specifications before bids are solicited and to check for any of the following conditions:

-Instances of unnecessary specifications, especially where they might limit the number of qualified bidders.
-Requirements inadequately described. A vendor might bribe an employee to prepare vague specifications with the intention of charging more money after being accepted as the approved vendor.
-Specifications developed with the help of a contractor or consultant who will be permitted to bid or work on the contract.

We can also advise our clients to closely review bid acceptances to ensure that all policies and controls were enforced. Specifically, they should look for the following:

-Specifications tailored to a particular vendor.
-Unreasonably restrictive pre-qualifications.
-An employee who defines a “need” that could only be met by one supplier.
-An employee who justifies a sole-source or noncompetitive procurement process.
-Changes in a bid once other bidders’ prices are known, sometimes accomplished through deliberate mistakes “planted” in a bid.
-Bids accepted after the due date.
-Low bidder withdraws to become a subcontractor on the same contract.
-Falsified documents or receipt dates (to get a late bid accepted).
-Falsification of contractor qualifications, work history, facilities, equipment, or personnel.

Clients are also well advised to examine contracts relative to other contracts. Determine if any of the following conditions exist:

-A large project condensed into smaller projects to avoid the bid process or other control procedures.
-Backup suppliers that are scarce or nonexistent (this may reveal an unusually strong attachment to a primary supplier that is bribing an employee).
-Large write-offs of surplus supplies (this may indicate excessive purchases from a supplier that is bribing a purchasing agent).

Clients might additionally look for indications that bidders are in collusion, such as:

-Improper communication by purchasers with contractors or their representatives at trade or professional meetings.
-A bidders’ conference, which permits improper communications between contractors, who then can rig bids.
-Determine if purchasing agents have a financial interest in the contractor or have had discussions regarding employment.

CFEs, equipped with their in-depth knowledge of fraud scenarios, can bring powerful antifraud controls to any enterprise habitually involved in a competitive bidding process as a core component of its business strategy.

People, People & People

Our Chapter’s Vice-President Rumbi Petrolozzi’s comment in her last blog post to the effect that one of the most challenging tasks for the forensic accountant or auditor working proactively is defining the most effective and efficient scope of work for a risk-based assurance project. Because resources are always scarce, assurance professionals need to make sure they can meet both quality and scheduling requirements whilst staying within our fixed resource and cost constraints.

An essential step in defining the scope of a project is identifying the critical risks to review and the controls required to manage those risks. An efficient scope focuses on the subset of controls (i.e., the key controls) necessary to provide assurance. Performing tests of controls that are not critical is not efficient. Similarly, failing to test controls that could be the source of major fraud vulnerabilities leads to an ineffective audit.  As Rumbi points out, and too often overlooked, the root cause of most risk and control failures is people. After all, outstanding people are required to make an organization successful, and failing to hire, retain, and train a competent team of employees inevitably leads to business failure.

In an interview, a few decades ago, one of America’s most famous business leaders was asked what his greatest challenges were in turning one of his new companies around from failure to success. He is said to have responded that his three greatest challenges were “people, people, and people.” Certainly, when assurance professionals or management analyze the reasons for data breaches and control failures, people are generally found to be the root cause. For example, weaknesses may include (echoing Rumbi):

Insufficiently trained personnel to perform the work. A common material weakness in compliance with internal control over financial reporting requirements is a lack of experienced financial reporting personnel within a company. In more traditional anti-fraud process reviews, examiners often find that control weaknesses arise because individuals don’t understand the tasks they have to perform.

Insufficient numbers to perform the work. When CPAs find that important reconciliations are not performed timely, inventories are not counted, a backlog in transaction processing exists, or agreed-upon corrective actions to address prior audit findings aren’t completed, managers frequently offer the excuse that their area is understaffed.

Poor management and leadership. Fraud examiners find again and again, that micromanagers and dictators can destroy a solid finance function. At the other end of the spectrum, the absence of leadership, motivation, and communication can cause whole teams to flounder. Both situations generally lead to a failure to perform key controls consistently. For example, poor managers have difficulty retaining experienced professionals to perform account reconciliations on time and with acceptable levels of quality leading directly to an enhanced level of vulnerability to numerous fraud scenarios.

Ineffective human resource practices. In some cases, management may choose to accept a certain level of inefficiency and retain individuals who are not performing up to par. For instance, in an example cited by one of our ACFE training event speakers last year, the financial analysis group of a U.S. manufacturing company was failing to provide management with timely business information. Although the department was sufficiently staffed, the team members were ineffective. Still, management did not have the resolve to terminate poor performers, for fear it would not be possible to hire quality analysts to replace the people who were terminated.

In such examples, people-related weaknesses result in business process key control failures often leading to the facilitation of subsequent frauds. The key control failure was the symptom, and the people-related weakness was the root cause. As a result, the achievement of the business objective of fraud prevention is rendered at risk.

Consider a fraud examiner’s proactive assessment of an organization’s procurement function. If the examiner finds that all key controls are designed adequately and operating effectively, in compliance with company policy, and targeted cost savings are being generated, should s/he conclude the controls are adequate? What if that department has a staff attrition rate of 25 percent and morale is low? Does that change the fraud vulnerability assessment? Clearly, even if the standard set of controls were in place, the function would not be performing at optimal levels.  Just as people problems can lead to risk and control failures, exceptional people can help a company achieve success. In fact, an effective system of internal control considers the adequacy of controls not only to address the risks related to poor people-related management but also to recognize reduction in fraud vulnerability due to excellence in people-related management.

The people issue should be addressed in at least two phases of the assurance professional’s review process: planning and issue analysis (i.e., understanding weaknesses, their root cause, and the appropriate corrective actions).  In the planning phase, the examiner should consider how people-related anti-fraud controls might impact the review and which controls should be included in the scope. The following questions might be considered in relation to anti-fraud controls over staffing, organization, training, management and leadership, performance appraisals, and employee development:

–How significant would a failure of people-related controls be to the achievement of objectives and the management of business risk covered by the examination?
–How critical is excellence in people management to the achievement of operational excellence related to the objectives of the review?

Issue analysis requires a different approach. Reviewers may have to ask the question “why” three or more times before they get to the root cause of a problem. Consider the following little post-fraud dialogue (we’ve all heard variations) …

CFE: “Why weren’t the reconciliations completed on time?”
MANAGER. “Because we were busy closing the books and one staff member was on vacation.”
CFE: “You are still expected to complete the reconciliations, which are critical to closing the books. Even with one person on vacation, why were you too busy?”
MANAGER: “We just don’t have enough people to get everything done, even when we work through weekends and until late at night.”
CFE: “Why don’t you have enough people?”
MANAGER: “Management won’t let me hire anybody else because of cost constraints.”
CFE: “Why won’t management let you hire anybody? Don’t they realize the issue?”
MANAGER: “Well, I think they do, but I have been so busy that I may not have done an effective job of explaining the situation. Now that you are going to write this up as a control weakness, maybe they will.”

The root cause of the problem in this scenario is that the manager responsible for reconciliations failed to provide effective leadership. She did not communicate the problem and ensure she had sufficient resources to perform the work assigned. The root cause is a people problem, and the reviewer should address that directly in his or her final report. If the CFE only reports that the reconciliations weren’t completed on time, senior management might only press the manager to perform better without understanding the post-fraud need for both performance improvement and additional staff.

In many organizations, it’s difficult for a reviewer to discuss people issues with management, even when these issues can be seen to directly and clearly contribute to fraud vulnerably. Assurance professionals may find it tricky, for political reasons to recommend the hiring of additional staff or to explain that the existing staff members do not have the experience or training necessary to perform their assigned tasks. Additionally, we are likely to run into political resistance when reporting management and leadership failure. But, that’s the job assurance professionals are expected to perform; to provide an honest, objective assessment of the condition of critical anti-fraud controls including those related to people.  If the scope of our work does not consider people risks, or if reviewers are unable to report people-related weaknesses, we are not adding the value we should. We’re also failing to report on matters critical to the maintenance and extension of the client’s anti-fraud program.