Category Archives: Conducting Internal Investigations

Structure & Scope

T.J. Jones presented himself as a turnaround specialist to the Chairman of the Board of Central State Corporation, a medium sized, public company, a mid-western manufacturer of computer equipment, who hired him to take over a large, but under-performing division of the company.  Jones immediately set out lofty goals for sales and profits and very quickly replaced all the existing senior staff of the division with new hires loyal to himself. To meet his inflated goals, two of Jones’s managers, in addition to legitimate equipment sales, shipped bricks to distributors and recorded some as sales of equipment to retail distributors and some as inventory out on consignment. No real products left the plant for these “special sales.” The theory was that actual sales would inevitably grow, and the bricks could be replaced later with real products. In the meantime, the unwitting distributors thought they were holding consignment inventory in the unopened cartons.

The result was that overstated sales and accounts receivable quickly caused overstated net income, retained earnings, current assets, working capital, and total assets. Prior to the manipulation, annual sales of the division were $135 million. During the two falsification years of the fraud, sales were $185 million and $362 million. Net income went up from a loss of $20 million to $23 million (income), then to $31 million (income); and the gross margin percent went from 6 percent to 28 percent. The revenue and profit figures outpaced the performance of Central State’s industry category. The accounts receivable collection period grew to 94 days, while it was 70 days elsewhere in the industry.

All the paperwork was in order because the two hand-picked managers had falsified the sales and consignment invoices, even though they did not have customer purchase orders for all the false sales. Shipping papers were in order, and several co-operating shipping employees knew that not every box shipped contained disk drives. Company accounting and control procedures required customer purchase orders or contracts evidencing real orders. A sales invoice was supposed to indicate the products and their prices, and shipping documents were supposed to indicate actual shipment. Sales were always charged to a customer’s account receivable.  During the actual operation of the fraud there were no glaring control omissions that would have pointed to financial fraud. Alert auditors might have noticed the high tension created by concentration on meeting profit goals. Normal selection of sales transactions with vouching to customer orders and shipping documents might have turned up a missing customer order. Otherwise, the paperwork would have seemed to be in order. The problem lay in Jones’ and his managers’ power to override controls and to instruct some shipping staff to send dummy boxes.  Confirmations of distributors’ accounts receivable may have elicited exception responses. The problem was to have a large enough confirmation sample to pick up some of these distributors or to be skeptical enough to send a special sample of confirmations to distributors who took the “sales” near the end of the accounting period. Observation of inventory could have included some routine inspection of goods not on the company’s premises.

The overstatements were not detected. The auditor’s annual confirmation sample was typically small and did not contain any of the false shipments. Tests of detail transactions did not turn up any missing customer orders. The inventory out on consignment was audited by obtaining a written confirmation from the holders, who apparently over the entire period of the fraud had not opened even one of the affected boxes. The remarkable financial performance was attributed to good management.

The fraud was revealed by one of Jones’ subordinate managers who was arrested on an unrelated drug charge and volunteered as a cooperating witness in exchange for the dropping of the drug charge.

This hypothetical case is a good example of the initial situation confronting management when a fraud affecting the financial statements comes to light, often with little or no warning. Everyone involved with company management will have a strong intuitive sense that an investigation is necessary; but the fact is that the company has now lost faith in the validity of its own public disclosures of financial performance.

That will need to be fixed. And it is not enough to simply alert markets that previously issued financial results are wrong; outsiders will want to know what the correct numbers should have been. The only way to find out is to dig into the numbers and distinguish the falsified results from the real ones. Beyond the need to set the numbers straight, the company will need to identify those complicit in the fraud and deal with them. This is not only a quest for justice but the need to restore credibility, and the company will be unable to do so until outsiders are satisfied that the wrongdoing executives and staff have been identified and removed.  Thus, the company needs an audit report on its financial statements. The need for a new audit report arises from the likelihood that, once a company’s financial statements have been found to be unreliable, the company’s external auditor will want to pull its existing, inaccurate,  report.

As a practical matter, pulling its report involves the external auditor’s recommendation that the company issue a press release that previously issued financial statements are not to be relied upon. Once the company issues such a press release, it will be out of compliance with any number of SEC regulations. It will no longer satisfy the threshold prerequisites for trading on the company’s securities exchange. It will be viewed by many, and certainly the plaintiff class action bar, as coming close to having admitted wrongdoing. And everyone on the outside, not to mention its own board of directors, will want answers fast. A critical step in the restoration of important business relationships and a return to compliance with regulatory requirements is the new auditor’s report. And, where fraudulent financial reporting has been discovered, an in-depth and comprehensive investigation is often the only way to get one.

A critical issue at the outset of a financial fraud investigation is its structure and scope. A key attribute for which the external auditor, as well as the SEC, will be on the lookout is that the investigation is overseen by the audit committee. In public companies, it is the audit committee that has explicit legal responsibility for oversight of financial reporting, and accounting fraud falls squarely within the orbit of financial reporting.  In addition, the audit committee, as a matter of statutory design, is structured to be independent and possessed of a level of financial sophistication that makes it the most viable subset of the board of directors to oversee the investigative efforts in this case. It’s also the audit committee that has the statutory power to engage and pay outside advisers even without the consent of management, a statutory power that can be vital if management, or part of management, as in our hypothetical case above, is a participant in the fraud.

The audit committee’s role is to oversee the investigation, not actually conduct it. For that it needs to look to outside professionals, and there are two types. The one is the outside counsel to the audit committee. If the audit committee has not already engaged outside counsel, it needs to do so. It’s audit committee counsel who will conduct the interviews, comb through the financial records, and present factual findings for audit committee consideration. Individual audit committee members may choose to sit in on interviews, and that is their choice. But it’s audit committee counsel who will conduct the investigation. The other group of professionals is the forensic accountants and/or CFEs.  Audit committee counsel, while knowledgeable of financial reporting obligations and investigative techniques, will probably not possess a sufficiently detailed knowledge of accounting systems, generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP), or computerized ledgers. For that, audit committee counsel is well advised look for help to the category of accountants and fraud examiners specifically trained in digging into financial records for evidence of fraud.

What exactly is the audit committee looking for in such an investigation? There are primarily two things. The first, obviously enough, is what the actual numbers should have been. Often fraudulent entries involve judgment calls where the operative question is not whether the number matches the underlying financial records but whether the judgment behind the number was exercised in good faith.  The operative question for the investigators is whether the executive exercised his judgment in good faith to make the best estimate allowed by reasonably available information. Sometimes it’s not so easy to tell.

Beyond the correct numbers, the second thing for which the investigators are looking is executive complicity. In other words: who did it? Again, the good faith of those potentially involved comes into play. The investigators are not seeking simply whether executives reported financial results that turned out to be wrong. The issue rather is whether the executives tried to get them right. If they did and made an honest mistake or estimated incorrectly, that does not sound like fraud and may not even be a violation of GAAP to begin with. The main point here is that, when it comes to executive complicity, the investigators are ordinarily looking for evidence of wrongful intent (scienter). In other words, they are looking for an intentional misapplication of GAAP or an approach to GAAP that is so reckless as to constitute the equivalent of an intentional misapplication.

The scope of the investigation, then, should not pose too difficult an issue at the outset.  Initially, the scope will be largely defined by the potential improprieties that have been uncovered. The tricky question becomes: how far should the investigators go beyond the suspicious entries? The judgment calls here are formidable. One of the key issues involves the expectations of the external auditor and, beyond that, the SEC. If the scope is not sufficiently broad, the investigation may not be satisfactory to either one. Indeed, an insufficient scope can place the external auditor in a particularly awkward spot insofar as the SEC may subsequently fault not only the audit committee for inadequate scope but the external auditor’s acceptance of the audit committee’s investigative report.

An additional complicating factor involves the way fraud starts and grows. A critical issue to consider is that, overtime, as the Central State example illustrates, the manipulations will often get increasingly aggressive as the perpetrators spread the fraud throughout many line items so that no single account stands out as unusual but a substantial number are affected. For example, to prevent the distortion of accounts receivable from getting too large, Jones and his accomplices spread the fraud into inventory, then asset capitalization, then net income. The spread of the fraud is analogous to pouring a glass of water on a tabletop. It can spread everywhere without getting too deep in any one place.

So, once fraudulent financial reporting has been identified, even in just a few entries, the investigators will want to consider the possibility that it’s a symptom of a broader problem. If the investigators have been lucky enough to nip it in the bud, that may be the end of it.  Unfortunately, if the fraud has gotten big enough to be detected in the first place, such a limited size cannot be assumed. Even where the fraud ostensibly starts out small the need for a broader scope has got to be considered.

The scope of the investigation, therefore, can start out with its parameters guided by the suspicious entries revealed at the outset. In most cases, though, it will need to broaden to ensure that additional areas are not affected as well. Throughout the investigation, moreover, the scope will have to remain flexible. The investigators will have to stay on the lookout for additional clues, and will have to follow where they lead. Faced with an ostensibly ever-widening scope, initial audit committee frustration is both to be expected and understandable. But there is just no practical alternative.

The Initially Immaterial Financial Fraud

At one point during our recent two-day seminar ‘Conducting Internal Investigations’ an attendee asked Gerry Zack, our speaker, why some types of frauds, but specifically financial frauds can go on so long without detection. A very good question and one that Gerry eloquently answered.

First, consider the audit committee. Under modern systems of internal control and corporate governance, it’s the audit committee that’s supposed to be at the vanguard in the prevention and detection of financial fraud. What kinds of failures do we typically see at the audit committee level when financial fraud is given an opportunity to develop and grow undetected? According to Gerry, there is no single answer, but several audit committee inadequacies are candidates. One inadequacy potentially stems from the fact that the members of the audit committee are not always genuinely independent. To be sure, they’re required by the rules to attain some level of technical independence, but the subtleties of human interaction cannot always be effectively governed by rules. Even where technical independence exists, it may be that one or more members in substance, if not in form, have ties to the CEO or others that make any meaningful degree of independence awkward if not impossible.

Another inadequacy is that audit committee members are not always terribly knowledgeable, particularly in the ways that modern (often on-line, cloud based) financial reporting systems can be corrupted. Sometimes, companies that are most susceptible to the demands of analyst earnings expectations are new, entrepreneurial companies that have recently gone public and that have engaged in an epic struggle to get outside analysts just to notice them in the first place. Such a newly hatched public company may not have exceedingly sophisticated or experienced fiscal management, let alone the luxury of sophisticated and mature outside directors on its audit committee. Rather, the audit committee members may have been added to the board in the first place because of industry expertise, because they were friends or even relatives of management, or simply because they were available.

A third inadequacy is that audit committee members are not always clear on exactly what they’re supposed to do. Although modern audit committees seem to have a general understanding that their focus should be oversight of the financial reporting system, for many committee members that “oversight” can translate into listening to the outside auditor several times a year. A complicating problem is a trend in corporate governance involving the placement of additional responsibilities (enterprise risk management is a timely example) upon the shoulders of the audit committee even though those responsibilities may be only tangentially related, or not at all related, to the process of financial reporting.

Again, according to Gerry, some or all the previously mentioned audit committee inadequacies may be found in companies that have experienced financial fraud. Almost always there will be an additional one. That is that the audit committee, no matter how independent, sophisticated, or active, will have functioned largely in ignorance. It will not have had a clue as to what was happening within the organization. The reason is that a typical audit committee (and the problem here is much broader than newly public startups) will get most of its information from management and from the outside auditor. Rarely is management going to voluntarily reveal financial manipulations. And, relying primarily on the outside auditor for the discovery of fraud is chancy at best. Even the most sophisticated and attentive of audit committee members have had the misfortune of accounting irregularities that have unexpectedly surfaced on their watch. This unfortunate lack of access to candid information on the part of the audit committee directs attention to the second in the triumvirate of fraud preventers, the internal audit department.

It may be that the internal audit department has historically been one of the least understood, and most ineffectively used, of all vehicles to combat financial fraud. Theoretically, internal audit is perfectly positioned to nip in the bud an accounting irregularity problem. The internal auditors are trained in financial reporting and accounting. The internal auditors should have a vivid understanding as to how financial fraud begins and grows. Unlike the outside auditor, internal auditors work at the company full time. And, theoretically, the internal auditors should be able to plug themselves into the financial reporting environment and report directly to the audit committee the problems they have seen and heard. The reason these theoretical vehicles for the detection and prevention of financial fraud have not been effective is that, where massive financial frauds have surfaced, the internal audit department has often been somewhere between nonfunctional and nonexistent.. Whatever the explanation, (lack of independence, unfortunate reporting arrangements, under-staffing or under-funding) in many cases where massive financial fraud has surfaced, a viable internal audit function is often nowhere to be found.

That, of course, leaves the outside auditor, which, for most public companies, means some of the largest accounting firms in the world. Indeed, it is frequently the inclination of those learning of an accounting irregularity problem to point to a failure by the outside auditor as the principal explanation. Criticisms made against the accounting profession have included compromised independence, a transformation in the audit function away from data assurance, the use of immature and inexperienced audit staff for important audit functions, and the perceived use by the large accounting firms of audit as a loss leader rather than a viable professional engagement in itself. Each of these reasons is certainly worthy of consideration and inquiry, but the fundamental explanation for the failure of the outside auditor to detect financial fraud lies in the way that fraudulent financial reporting typically begins and grows. Most important is the fact that the fraud almost inevitably starts out very small, well beneath the radar screen of the materiality thresholds of a normal audit, and almost inevitably begins with issues of quarterly reporting. Quarterly reporting has historically been a subject of less intense audit scrutiny, for the auditor has been mainly concerned with financial performance for the entire year. The combined effect of the small size of an accounting irregularity at its origin and the fact that it begins with an allocation of financial results over quarters almost guarantees that, at least at the outset, the fraud will have a good chance of escaping outside auditor detection.

These two attributes of financial fraud at the outset are compounded by another problem that enables it to escape auditor detection. That problem is that, at root, massive financial fraud stems from a certain type of corporate environment. Thus, detection poses a challenge to the auditor. The typical audit may involve fieldwork at the company once a year. That once-a-year period may last for only a month or two. During the fieldwork, the individual accountants are typically sequestered in a conference room. In dealing with these accountants, moreover, employees are frequently on their guard. There exists, accordingly, limited opportunity for the outside auditor to get plugged into the all-important corporate environment and culture, which is where financial fraud has its origins.

As the fraud inevitably grows, of course, its materiality increases as does the number of individuals involved. Correspondingly, also increasing is the susceptibility of the fraud to outside auditor detection. However, at the point where the fraud approaches the thresholds at which outside auditor detection becomes a realistic possibility, deception of the auditor becomes one of the preoccupations of the perpetrators. False schedules, forged documents, manipulated accounting entries, fabrications and lies at all levels, each of these becomes a vehicle for perpetrating the fraud during the annual interlude of audit testing. Ultimately, the fraud almost inevitably becomes too large to continue to escape discovery, and auditor detection at some point is by no means unusual. The problem is that, by the time the fraud is sufficiently large, it has probably gone on for years. That is not to exonerate the audit profession, and commendable reforms have been put in place over the last decade. These include a greater emphasis on fraud, involvement of the outside auditor in quarterly data, the reduction of materiality thresholds, and a greater effort on the part of the profession to assess the corporate culture and environment. Nonetheless, compared to, say, the potential for early fraud detection possessed by the internal audit department, the outside auditor is at a noticeable disadvantage.

Having been missed for so long by so many, how does the fraud typically surface? There are several ways. Sometimes there’s a change in personnel, from either a corporate acquisition or a change in management, and the new hires stumble onto the problem. Sometimes the fraud, which quarter to quarter is mathematically incapable of staying the same, grows to the point where it can no longer be hidden from the outside auditor. Sometimes detection results when the conscience of one of the accounting department people gets the better of him or her. All along s/he wanted to tell somebody, and it gets to the point where s/he can’t stand it anymore and s/he does. Then you have a whistleblower. There are exceptions to all of this. But in almost any large financial fraud, as Gerry told us, one will see some or all these elements. We need only change the names of the companies and of the industry.

RVACFES May 2017 Event Sold-Out!

On May 17th and 18th the Central Virginia ACFE Chapter and our partners, the Virginia State Police and the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) were joined by an over-flow crowd of audit and assurance professionals for the ACFE’s training course ‘Conducting Internal Investigations’. The sold-out May 2017 seminar was the ninth that our Chapter has hosted over the years with the Virginia State Police utilizing a distinguished list of certified ACFE instructor-practitioners.

Our internationally acclaimed instructor for the May seminar was Gerard Zack, CFE, CPA, CIA, CCEP. Gerry has provided fraud prevention and investigation, forensic accounting, and internal and external audit services for more than 30 years. He has worked with commercial businesses, not-for-profit organizations, and government agencies throughout North America and Europe. Prior to starting his own practice in 1990, Gerry was an audit manager with a large international public accounting firm. As founder and president of Zack, P.C., he has led numerous fraud investigations and designed customized fraud risk management programs for a diverse client base. Through Zack, P.C., he also provides outsourced internal audit services, compliance and ethics programs, enterprise risk management, fraud risk assessments, and internal control consulting services.

Gerry is a Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE) and Certified Public Accountant (CPA) and has focused most of his career on audit and fraud-related services. Gerry serves on the faculty of the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) and is the 2009 recipient of the ACFE’s James Baker Speaker of the Year Award. He is also a Certified Internal Auditor (CIA) and a Certified Compliance and Ethics Professional (CCEP).

Gerry is the author of Financial Statement Fraud: Strategies for Detection and Investigation (published 2013 by John Wiley & Sons), Fair Value Accounting Fraud: New Global Risks and Detection Techniques (2009 by John Wiley & Sons), and Fraud and Abuse in Nonprofit Organizations: A Guide to Prevention and Detection (2003 by John Wiley & Sons). He is also the author of numerous articles on fraud and teaches seminars on fraud prevention and detection for businesses, government agencies, and nonprofit organizations. He has provided customized internal staff training on specialized auditing issues, including fraud detection in audits, for more than 50 CPA firms.

Gerry is also the founder of the Nonprofit Resource Center, through which he provides antifraud training and consulting and online financial management tools specifically geared toward the unique internal control and financial management needs of nonprofit organizations. Gerry earned his M.B.A at Loyola University in Maryland and his B.S.B.A at Shippensburg University of Pennsylvania.

To some degree, organizations of every size, in every industry, and in every city, experience internal fraud. No entity is immune. Furthermore, any member of an organization can carry out fraud, whether it is committed by the newest customer service employee or by an experienced and highly respected member of upper management. The fundamental reason for this is that fraud is a human problem, not an accounting problem. As long as organizations are employing individuals to perform business functions, the risk of fraud exists.

While some organizations aggressively adopt strong zero tolerance anti-fraud policies, others simply view fraud as a cost of doing business. Despite varying views on the prevalence of, or susceptibility to, fraud within a given organization, all must be prepared to conduct a thorough internal investigation once fraud is suspected. Our ‘Conducting Internal Investigations’ event was structured around the process of investigating any suspected fraud from inception to final disposition and beyond.

What constitutes an act that warrants an examination can vary from one organization to another and from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. It is often resolved based on a definition of fraud adopted by an employer or by a government agency. There are numerous definitions of fraud, but a popular example comes from the joint ACFE-COSO publication, Fraud Risk Management Guide:

Fraud is any intentional act or omission designed to deceive others, resulting in the victim suffering a loss and/or the perpetrator achieving a gain.

However, many law enforcement agencies have developed their own definitions, which might be more appropriate for organizations operating in their jurisdictions. Consequently, fraud examiners should determine the appropriate legal definition in the jurisdiction in which the suspected offense was committed.

Fraud examination is a methodology for resolving fraud allegations from inception to disposition. More specifically, fraud examination involves:

–Assisting in the detection and prevention of fraud;
–Initiating the internal investigation;
–Obtaining evidence and taking statements;
–Writing reports;
–Testifying to findings.

A well run internal investigation can enhance a company’s overall well-being and can help detect the source of lost funds, identify responsible parties and recover losses. It can also provide a defense to legal charges by terminated or disgruntled employees. But perhaps, most importantly, an internal investigation can signal to every company employee that the company will not tolerate fraud.

Our two-day seminar agenda included Gerry’s in depth look at the following topics:

–Assessment of the risk of fraud within an organization and responding when it is identified;
–Detection and investigation of internal frauds with the use of data analytics;
–The collection of documents and electronic evidence needed during an investigation;
–The performance of effective information gathering and admission seeking interviews;
–The wide variety of legal and regulatory concerns related to internal investigations.

Gerry did his usual tremendous job in preparing the professionals in attendance to deal with every step in an internal fraud investigation, from receiving the initial allegation to testifying as a witness. The participants learned to lead an internal investigation with accuracy and confidence by gaining knowledge about topics such as the relevant legal aspects impacting internal investigations, the use of computers and analytics during the investigation, collecting and analyzing internal and external information, and interviewing witnesses and the writing of effective reports.

Zack is Back on Internal Investigations!

Our Chapter is looking forward with anticipation to our next two-day training event (May 17th and 18th) when we will again have Gerry Zack, one of the ACFE’s best speakers, presenting on the topic ‘Conducting Internal Investigations’.  Gerry was last with us several years ago, when he taught ‘Introduction to Fraud Examination’ to an overflow crowd; judging from the number of early registrations, it looks like this year’s event will be an attendance repeat!

One of the training event segments Gerry presented in detail last time dealt with related party transactions internal to the organization and some of the unique challenges they can pose for fraud examiners.  Such ethical lapses take the form of schemes where individuals who approve one or more transactions for their organizations also benefit personally from them.  Per the ACFE, the business processes most affected by such scenarios are the loan function, the sales function and corporate purchases.

Regarding loan schemes, the key risks fraud examiners should look for are:

— The provision of loans to senior management, other employees, or board members at below-market interest rates or under terms not available in the marketplace;
— Failure to disclose the related party nature of the loan;
— The client organization providing guarantees for private loans made by employees or board members.

In these scenarios, the favorable terms benefit the employee at the expense of the employing organization.  To identify undisclosed loans to senior management, board members, and employees, the CFE could search for related-party loans using data analysis to compare the names on all notes receivables and accounts receivables with employee names from payroll records and board member names from board minutes. If a match occurs, the CFE should assess whether the related-party transaction was appropriately authorized and disclosed in the accounting records and financial statements.  Examiners can also search for undisclosed related-party loans by examining the interest rate, due dates, and collateral terms for notes receivables.  Notes receivable containing zero or unusually low interest rates, or requiring no due dates or insufficient collateral, may indicate related-party transactions.  The CFE can also examine advances made to customers or others who owe money to her client organization. Organizations generally do not advance money to others who owe them money unless a related-party relationship exists.

Gerry’s presentation for related party sales pin-pointed red flags like employees:

— Selling products or services significantly below market price or providing beneficial sales terms that ordinarily would not be granted to arms-length customers.
— Inflating sales for bonuses or stock options using related parties to perpetrate the scheme. Either a sale really has not taken place because the goods were not shipped or there was an obligation to repurchase the goods sold so the sale was incomplete.
— Approving excessive sales allowances or returns as well as accounts receivable adjustments or write-offs for related parties.

To cover up the related-party transaction, employees may deny reviewers access to customers to impede them from acquiring evidence concerning the related-party relationship.  Where the CFE suspects related party sales, s/he should perform analytical procedures to compare price variations among customers to identify those who pay significantly below the average sales price. Examiners can also attempt to identify any customer who pays prices that differ from the approved price sheet. Customer contracts can be directly analyzed for unusual rights of return, obligations to repurchase goods sold, and unusual extended repayment terms. Analytical procedures to identify customers with excessive returns, sales allowances, account receivable adjustments, or write-off’s may also be performed. Any variances in these areas might indicate undisclosed related-party transactions. Gerry also point out that data analysis can be used to efficiently compare employee addresses, telephone numbers, tax identification numbers, and birthdays with customer addresses, telephone numbers, tax identification numbers, and company organization dates. When creating a shell company, many individuals use their own contact information for convenience and their own birth date as the organization date because it is easy to remember. Any matches could indicate a related-party association and should be investigated minutely.

For third party purchases schemes, some of the key red flags are:

— the company paying prices significantly above market for goods or services;
— the company receiving significantly below average quality goods or services that are purchased at market prices for high quality goods or services;
— the company never actually receiving the purchased goods or services.

CFE’s should consider comparing cost variations among vendors to identify those whose costs significantly exceed the average cost. For identified variances, examiners should discover why the cost variations occurred to assess whether a related-party relationship exists. Like the examination steps for customers, it’s important to compare the employee’s address, telephone number, tax identification number, and birth date to vendors’ information to see if a relationship exists. CFE’s can also assess the use of sales intermediaries for products they can purchase directly from the manufacturer at lower costs.

For the comprehensive review of all this information, Gerry stressed that the level and quality of client company documentation is critical.  In reviewing their client organization’s documentation, the CFE may find that the organization does not have in place any policies or procedures prohibiting related-party relationships or transactions without prior approval. The organization also may not provide training to employees around related-party relationships and transactions, or require employees even to certify whether they are involved in any conflicts of interest with the organization. CFE’s should recommend, as a component of the fraud prevention program, that their client organization maintain written policies and procedures defining the process for obtaining approval for related-party relationships and transactions.

Key risks exist if:

— Written related-party policy and procedures are nonexistent or insufficient;
— Employees are not required to certify regularly whether they have a conflict of interest;
— Related-party transactions are not approved in accordance with established organizational policies and procedures;
— Related-party transactions are approved with exceptions to organizational policies and procedures.

The CFE should review approved related-party policies and procedures documentation. If related-party policies or procedures don’t exist or if they don’t sufficiently mitigate the risk of unauthorized or inappropriate related-party relationships or transactions, the examiner should consult with senior management and the board, if necessary, to offer guidance on a pro-active basis toward the development of such policies and procedures as a key fraud prevention measure.  The CFE should also review conflict of interest statements. If an employee documents a conflict of interest in his or her statement, the examiner should assess whether the conflict of interest was appropriately authorized and whether the process recognizes and discloses conflicts of interest.

Third party transactions are but a single topic of many to be covered by Gerry in our May event.  If you are called upon by your employer to investigate instances of fraud, waste and abuse both within your parent company and within related business affiliates, this is a seminar for you.  A well run internal investigation can enhance an enterprise’s well-being and can help detect the source of lost funds, identify responsible parties and recover losses. It can also provide a defense to legal charges by terminated or disgruntled employees. But perhaps most importantly, an internal investigation will signal to other employees that the company will not tolerate fraud. This seminar will prepare you for every step of an internal investigation into potential fraud, from receiving the initial allegation to testifying as a witness. Learn to lead an internal investigation with accuracy and confidence by gaining knowledge about key topics, such as relevant legal aspects of internal investigations, using computers in an investigation, collecting and analyzing internal information, interviewing witnesses and writing reports.

There are only 70 training slots available and our seminars fill up fast!  If you are interested in this vital investigative topic, you can find the seminar agenda, venue information, speaker bio and registration information at http://rvacfes.com/events/conducting-internal-investigations/.